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The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to improve knowledge of practices for countries to employ in 
support of food security under the conditions of climate change. Food security, as defined by the World 
Food Summit of 1996, is "when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to 
maintain a healthy and active life.” It is usually broken down into four pillars: availability, accessibility, 
usage, and stability, which considered together are the foundation for people to be properly nourished. 
This four-pillar approach is central to the framework of this thesis, as it allows us to understand the 
different factors contributing to food security, and thus to analyze current policy for how well these 
policies may address the states’ problem areas under the conditions of climate change.  
In order to accomplish this overarching goal, this thesis seeks to answer the following three 
questions: 1) How do current agricultural and climate change policies contribute to food security? 2) In 
what ways does a rights-based approach to food security help prepare countries for the fight against 
hunger under the conditions of climate change? and 3) What should these countries do to improve food 
security domestically both now and in the future? Answering these questions will be accomplished by 
analyzing four case studies: Bolivia, Kenya, Nepal, and Ukraine.  
Agriculture lies at the heart of food security, contributing to each of the pillars for overall 
improved food security. Although agriculture is most commonly linked with availability, or the supply of 
food, it also contributes to access, or the economic and physical ability of people to procure food. The 
linkages between agricultural development and poverty alleviation are complex, but it is generally 
accepted that agricultural development significantly contributes to lifting people from poverty. To answer 
the second question, I depend heavily on historical, political, and geographical analysis to understand the 
country context. I investigate the 2008 food crisis, an international shock to food systems, to identify 
vulnerable populations and the strength of the case study countries’ food security response. I also apply 
the temperature and precipitation output data from a climate change model to key crops to determine 
potential effects of climate change on food security. I find that while every country studied is taking some 
action to mitigate or adapt to climate change and support food security through agricultural policy, there 
is no one- size-fits-all model. Results of the agricultural and climate change policies analysis supports the 
context-specific approach to formulating and evaluating policy.  
In 1967, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
established an international legal framework to assure that everyone gets fed using the individual rights 
approach. Enshrining the right to food in international law is not enough to ensure the end of world 
hunger, however. States that are party to ICESCR have to take action to respect, protect, and fulfil the 
	 3 
right. In order to make the right justiciable in domestic courts so that individuals can bring suit when they 
feel their right to adequate food has been violated, states often integrate the right to food into their 
domestic legal systems. Each of the case study countries’ constitutions include a provision on the right to 
food. I find that the context in which the constitution was negotiated has a large impact on the strength of 
this constitutional provision, but that this does not translate into different approaches to food security at 
the level of agricultural or climate change policy. Based on jurisprudence from Kenya and Nepal, I posit 
that the right to food is more tractable in the courts when the case involves acute hunger and when there is 
clear evidence that the government has not done anything to prevent it. Furthermore, in preliminary 
results, I show that there are significant barriers to pursuing justice for the right to food, including through 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which has 
the potential to allow individuals who feel their rights have been violated to seek help on the international 
level.  
Finally, I offer some guidelines for ways to think about creating and assessing agricultural policy. 
If land rights are a flash point, there needs to be policy put into place that reflects understanding of 
historical inequalities. Policymakers, whether they be locally based or foreign consultants should be 
sensitive to the issue characteristics of any given problem, and try to understand its origin before putting 
policy into place. Taking into account who farms what, where, and how will help policies be responsive 
to farmers’ needs as well as to climate change. Determining who is vulnerable to food insecurity, and 
whether they face seasonal, chronic, or acute hunger will allow for better targeting of these groups. Social 
safety nets and food and nutrition policies that improve access should be included alongside efforts to 
increase productivity. To minimize the effects of climate change on food security, early warning systems 
on natural disasters, agricultural research and extension services, as well as agricultural insurance can 






















































































































 	 8 
ABBREVIATIONS	
	
AA Association Agreement 
ADS Agriculture Development Strategy (Nepal)  
AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area 
AgGDP Agricultural gross domestic product 
AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
ASAL Arid- and semi-arid lands 
ASDS Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (Kenya)  
C (°)  degrees Celsius 
CA Constituent Assembly (Nepal) 
CAP Common Agriculture Policy (of the European Union) 
CCT conditional cash transfer 
CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (United States) 
CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
CMIP5  Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 
CONAN Consejo Nacional de Alimentación y Nutrición (Bolivia) 
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (between Ukraine and the EU) 
DSR dry-seeded rice 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EMAPA Empresa de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos (Bolivia) 
ESC Economic, social and cultural 
EU European Union 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FDI foreign direct investment 
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FNSP Food and Nutrition Security Plan (Nepal) 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GC General Comment 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GESI Gender equality and social and geographical inclusion (Nepal) 
GIS geographical information system 
GMO genetically modified organism 
ha hectare 
ICCPR  ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
kg kilogram 
LDC Least Developed Countries 
LEDS Low Emission Development Strategy (Ukraine) 
MAPF Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food (Ukraine) 
masl meters above sea level 
MDRyT Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural y Tierras (Bolivia) 
m meter 
mm millimeter  
NAPA National Adaptation Programme of Action 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCCAP National Climate Change Action Plan (Kenya) 
NCPB National Cereals and Produce Board (Kenya) 
NeKSAP Nepal Food Security Monitoring System  
NFC Nepal Food Corporation 
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NFNSP National Food and Nutrition Security Policy (Kenya)  
NGO non-governmental organization 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OP-ICESCR Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
PAN Política de Alimentación y Nutricíon (Bolivia) 
PMSC Programa multisectorial desnutrición cero (Bolivia) 
PPP PPP 
PPP public-private partnership 
PSDA Plan del Sector Desarrollo Agropecuario 2014-2018 “Hacia el 2025” (Bolivia)  
ReSAKSS Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System  
SCS 
Single and Comprehensive Strategy and Action Plan for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (Ukraine) 
SDG Sustainable Development Goals 
SOE State-owned enterprise 
SPS sanitary and phytosanitary  
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) 
VAT value-added tax 
WB World Bank 
WFP  World Food Programme  
WHO World Health Organization 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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Alongside climate change, food insecurity is one of the top problems we are currently facing: after 
declining from 2005 to 2014, the number of undernourished people in the world increased to 821 million 
in 2017 (FAO et al. 2018). Each effects the other: agriculture significantly contributes to greenhouse gas 
emissions, while climate change jeopardizes agricultural production through changing climatic 
conditions. There are a number of tools that policymakers can use to lower these numbers, but they must 
be tailored to the country context and implemented properly. According to the World Food Summit in 
1996: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” 
(World Food Summitt and Food and Agriculture Organization 1996). Food security can be described 
according to four pillars: availability, access, utilization, and stability. A.K. Sen began challenging the 
focus on food availability as the cause of famines, pointing to the “failure of exchange entitlements” as 
another concern in hunger prevention (Sen 1982, 1976). Accessibility is central to Sen’s ideas, such that it 
is not enough to have food present, but people must also have the physical, economical and socio-cultural 
means to access it (Simon 2012, 5–6). The utilization pillar dictates that food should be safe and 
nutritious; this is the pillar with which this thesis deals the least. Last, stability refers to the need for the 
other three conditions to be met year-round. Governments take different approaches to ensuring food 
security for the people. Wealthier countries have the resources to set up expansive safety nets, but do not 
always manifest the political will to make them a reality. In the United States, for example, approximately 
one in five children faces food insecurity (Harris 2013). In poorer countries, rural peoples rely on 
subsistence agriculture with few governmental supports and when a harvest fails, their lives are also on 
the line. Already-marginalized groups are particularly vulnerable to hunger around the world (Elsheikh 
and Barhoum 2013, 3–4). Food aid is often the first thing we think of when we think about fighting food 
insecurity, but it is often not the best choice to solve this complex problem. Instead, approaches that focus 
on key sectors-agriculture, health care, education, for example-and granting the right to food can be more 
effective at producing the desired results.  
In the United States, we often boast of the rights we have and what we can do with them. In other 
parts of the world, however, people have not only the first generation negative rights enshrined in the 
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American Bill of Rights, but also constitutionally-enshrined economic, social and cultural rights (second 
generation), and even rights to things like development and peace (third generation rights) (Vasak 1977). 
Together, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) form the legal bulwark against 
infringements of a variety of human rights. Indeed, the International Bill of Human Rights (1948) 
includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the ICCPR (1976) and the ICESCR (1976). 
An artificial separation between these two groups of rights led to ESC rights being “rights of conduct,” 
whereas civil and political rights were “rights of outcome,” which has allowed states more leeway in 
addressing economic and social rights issues; however, over time these barriers have blurred (Ishay 2008, 
223–24; Rosga and Satterthwaie 2009, 64–65). Some states have ratified all of these treaties, while other 
have ratified none. Though less discussed than other human rights, the right to adequate food stands out 
as particularly important because of its connection to other rights, particularly health (Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999, 12). Children are not able to concentrate in school if they are 
hungry, and adults lead less healthy and productive lives when they are not fed (Wehler and And Others 
1995; Olson 1999; Brown and Pollitt 1996). Even in ancient agrarian states, rulers recognized the 
importance of food security to political stability and economic prosperity (Spitz 1985, 308). Because right 
to adequate food is a human right codified in international law, states that have ratified human rights 
treaties have obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to adequate food.  
RESEARCH	AIMS	AND	QUESTIONS	
This thesis hopes to fill gaps in the literature about the right to food and agricultural policies’ roles in 
supporting food security under the conditions of climate change; its analytical basis will be composed of 
case studies of four different countries. While both policymakers and scholars have contributed to 
understanding what the right to food looks like and ways to implement it, there is little comparative or 
case study-based research to determine the ways that the right to food plays out on the ground. Delving 
into sectoral policy illuminates a way that less sexy instruments contribute significantly to food security 
around the world. The research methods used here, which rely much more on historical texts and 
subjective analysis than econometric models or other quantitative methods, seek to show that only with an 
understanding of the local context can we hope to create policy to solve people’s pressing problems. 
The overarching question that this thesis seeks to answer is: what lessons can we learn from these 
case studies about effective ways to fight hunger under the conditions of climate change? This question 
can be further broken down into three questions: 1. How do current agricultural and climate change 
policies contribute to food security? 2. In what ways does a rights-based approach to food security help 
prepare countries for the fight against hunger under the conditions of climate change? What should these 
 	 16 
countries do to improve food security domestically both now and in the future? To find answers, I will 
look at four case studies, Bolivia, Kenya, Nepal, and Ukraine, in their historical, political, and economic 
context, read policy documents and legal statutes on the right to food, study critical crops, and view 
climate change data. In this chapter, I set the stage for my thesis research by presenting current literature 
and important concepts that will come up as I answer these questions.     
QUESTION	1:	HOW	DO	CURRENT	AGRICULTURAL	AND	CLIMATE	CHANGE	POLICIES	CONTRIBUTE	TO	
FOOD	SECURITY?	
There are three ways that international right to food law can—and should—be integrated into national 
policy: through constitutional articles, framework laws, and sectoral policy (Bultrini et al. 2009, 3–4). 
Sectoral policy refers to the bundle of laws and regulations of a specific economic area; it is the least 
studied way that right to food law becomes integrated into national policy (Knuth and Vidar 2011, 1). As 
a result, studying sectoral policy will fill important gaps in the literature. Specifically, I will investigate 
the implementation mechanisms of agricultural policy via sectoral plans for the agricultural sector. The 
advantage to analyzing sectoral plans is that rather than looking at laws on a specific topic (e.g. water 
use), they allow us to see how the government envisions all of the agricultural production factors working 
together and thus will give us a better picture of the reality on the ground. I focus on the agricultural 
sector rather than on education (or any other related sector) is because of the strong linkages between 
agricultural production and food access via poverty alleviation as well as food availability (Irz et al. 2001, 
462). While the education sector can contribute to the usage pillar of food security, it does not have the 
same cross-cutting influence that agricultural policy does. Similarly, evaluating climate change policy is 
an essential step because of the potential impacts of climate change both on agriculture in specific and 
food security in general (Howden et al. 2007, 19691; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007).   
In order to answer the question of how the case study countries’ current policies effect 
agricultural production and food security, I must decide what elements agricultural and climate change 
policies need to address to support food security. In each of the first four sections that make up Part I of 
this thesis on national context, agricultural context, the 2008 crisis, and climate change context, I will gain 
the information and criteria with which I will analyze the agricultural and climate change policies. I base 
this approach on the assumption that context matters when writing policy, that there is no one-size-fits-all 
template that can be used to assure food security. The importance of taking into account context in 
evaluating environmental policy (Mickwitz 2003) and improving peacemaking (Autesserre 2014) shows 
that there is support in the literature for this method, and it may be applied to agricultural policy and food 
security, despite a tendency to promote the use of indicators and more quantitative approaches to these 
areas (Josling and Valdés 2004). This thesis will ultimately uphold the value of understanding context in 
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agricultural and climate change policy to support food security. In the following, I describe the 
components of and reasoning behind each of these four elements that will be included in Part I, as well as 
my research methods. 
NATIONAL	CONTEXT		
To begin each of my case studies, I will explore the recent history of the country, as well as the 
geopolitical and socioeconomic situation. This background information is vital for a complete picture of 
the country context; to illustrate this point, I will draw the reader’s attention to several of these elements 
and explain their importance. First, policy that does not take into account past or current minority-
majority group tensions could exacerbate the problem and create violence, similar to that which occurred 
in Kenya in 2007-2008 (Kanyinga 2009). Second, agricultural policy must be attentive to the structure of 
land holdings in order to provide support to those who need it most: support for smallholder rice farmers 
in the United States is an extreme example but nevertheless illuminates the necessity for such 
information. Third, agricultural policies should be responsive to geographic conditions, especially in 
countries with big variation. Agronomy research has not always been attentive to geographic factors, yet 
these can largely determine where and what time of crops can be grown (White, Corbett, and Dobermann 
2002). Fourth, trends in economic and population change can raise alarm bells about potential future 
problems or help assuage fears. Information that will be included in this section includes the formation of 
the state, the political situation through today, the economy and historical changes, and a general outlook 
based on current statistics on hunger and the economy. Because of the large number of issues facing 
societies, I will identify three that I consider the largest and most relevant to food security to use to 
analyze the policies. The first element of my case study will therefore rely on secondary sources, mainly 
historical accounts and geography primers. I will also reference databases from the World Bank and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization to understand trends in hunger and poverty. 	
AGRICULTURAL	CONTEXT	
In addition to the general background explored in the previous section, there are elements specific to the 
agricultural sector that should be accounted for when evaluating agricultural policy and climate change 
policy. To understand the conditions in which the agricultural policy went into effect and the specific 
problems facing agricultural producers, I will profile the agricultural sector in each country. The essential 
points covered in this section pertain to Who? What? Where? And How? That is, who grows what types 
of crops, where, and how do they grow them. Looking ahead at some of the differences on these four 
counts between the case study countries will help explain the importance of these factors.  
Starting with the who, we turn to Bolivia and Ukraine. In Bolivia, around 200,000 smallholder 
farmers produce most of their top consumer crop, potatoes; in Ukraine, large agriholdings, many of them 
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still partially state-owned, dominate agricultural production across the board. Moving to the what, we 
look at Ukraine and Kenya. Ukraine tends to dominate in cereal production and oilseed worldwide. Kenya 
grows some cereals, but is a net importer of them; its main export crop is tea. The where also matters: in 
Kenya, tea is grown in the wetter areas around Lake Victoria, while in Nepal, cardamom is grown in the 
hills. Finally, the how: those doing terrace farming in the hills of Nepal lack even basic mechanization, 
while soybean production in Bolivia is better mechanized. What the answers to these questions allow 
policymakers to do is to target their interventions at the groups that need the support the most.  
In order to answer these questions, this section of each case study will entail an investigation of 
production efficiency, the structure of holdings, export items, and other characteristics of the agricultural 
system. Using both secondary profiles of the agricultural system as well as data from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization and World Bank, I will identify the key challenges facing the agricultural 
system at large to analyze the agricultural and climate change policies.  
THE	2008	FOOD	CRISIS:	CAUSES,	CONSEQUENCES,	AND	POLICY	RESPONSES	 	
In order to focus on the country-specific context in the case studies, in this section I will explain the 
global context and causes of the 2008 crisis. Here, this crisis will be explained in order help readers 
understand why the 2008 crisis is a useful reference point and an event from which it is crucial to draw 
lessons. The 2008 food crisis served as a wake-up call to flaws in both the global food landscape as well 
as individual countries’ capacities to prepare for and respond to shocks, as well as weaknesses in fulfilling 
the international right to adequate food. Although climate change presents a new type and scale of 
challenge for countries to feed their populations, this is not the first time that they have dealt with 
potential disruptions and changes in their food systems. Indeed, when approaching the 2008 food crisis, 
scholars looked to the 1972-1974 crisis to understand trends and prepare for the future (Headey and Fan 
2010, vol. 165, chap. 4).1 Through drawing on the past, I hope to make connections and learn lessons to 
prescribe solutions for the future. To understand how well countries are prepared to meet the challenges 
of climate change, I will investigate the effects of the 2008 crisis on the country, and the country’s 
immediate response. Specifically, I will determine the principle factors causing the domestic crisis, the 
relation between the international and domestic crises, areas impacted, and the groups that were most 
affected. These last two pieces of information will allow me to analyze the policies in place to determine 
whether they are targeting the appropriate populations. In addition, information from this section will 
																																								 																				
1 While some researchers have warned about the potential for the occurrence of more frequent extreme weather 
events with climate change, and this trend’s negative impact on food security, the science has not reached a definite 
conclusion on the effects of climate change on extreme weather events (Rosenzweig et al. 2001, 91–93; Stott et al. 
2016, 37). 
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facilitate policy recommendations on what the country should do should similar situations happen in the 
future. 
 In 2007 and 2008, food prices around the globe shot up in a matter of months: from 2005 to 2008, 
there was an 83% increase in global average food prices (Christiaensen 2009, 1). In 2009, the FAO 
estimated that there were 1.02 billion people undernourished; before the crisis, from 2004 to 2006, these 
numbers were closer to 850 million people (FAO 2009). The 2008 food crisis had profound immediate 
and long-effects on the global food landscape, but particularly hurt the world’s urban poor (Bezemer and 
Headey 2008). While the numbers vary between studies, there is a general agreement among scholars that 
the food crisis created more poverty, particularly in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (Headey and Fan 
2010, 165:74–75).  
Food price hikes do not cause harm equally between or within societies. In poorer countries, 
households can spend up to 80 percent of their budget on food (UNCTAD 2008, 82). When food prices 
increase dramatically in a short period of time, households do not have room in their budgets to react 
quickly. Urban households without their own production of foodstuffs (about 60 percent of urban 
dwellers in developing countries) and that rely completely on the market are at risk when real wages do 
not rise in tandem with food costs (Cohen and Garrett 2009, 6, 8–9). Although some farmers might 
benefit from high prices, most smallholders are net food buyers so they are also hit by high food prices. 
Because they lack bargaining power, they often cannot reap the full benefits of higher prices either 
(Rapsomanikis 2015, 26; Spitz 1985, 312). 
Because of its global scope of the crisis, the triple economic, fuel, and food threats, and increased 
integration of developing countries into the global economy, this crisis was particularly devastating, 
distinguishing it from other periods of food insecurity (FAO 2009, 9–10). Determining the exact causes of 
a global crisis and is tied with many other changing variables is difficult. Using different economic 
models, teams of researchers came to different conclusions on how much of the price increase could be 
explained by a given factor, or even if a factor contributed to the crisis at all. Attribution is further 
complicated by how different researchers define food. For example, Ng and Aksoy use two separate 
definitions: one that includes meats, dairy, grains, fruits, and vegetables, and the other that includes 
coffee, nuts, and agricultural raw materials (Ng and Aksoy 2008b, 3). Konandreas, on the other hand, 
focuses on his own selection of 17 agricultural products to create his analysis (Konandreas 2012, 10). In 
the systems-level analysis that is necessary to undertake for problems like the 2008 food crisis, however, 
results from different methods are important to understand the multitude of explanations and interwoven 
threads of causality. The most-frequently cited causes of the crisis are summarized in the table below.  
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Table 1.1. Evidence for the primary drivers of the 2008 global food crisis.  
Cause Supporting evidence 
Biofuels • Correlations between biofuels and related commodities before and 
during the food crisis: A taxonomy perspective (2012). Kristoufek, 
Janda, and Zilberman.  
• Global Scenarios for Biofuels: Impacts and Implications (2008). 
Rosegrant, Zhu, Msangi, and Sulser.  
Low interest 
rates in the US 
• Commodity prices, interest rates and the dollar (2009). Akram.  
• A Note on Rising Food Prices (2008). Mitchell. 
Low grain stocks • Soaring Food Prices: Facts, Perspectives, Impacts, and Actions Required 
(2008). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.  
• Price Volatility in food markets- can stock building mitigate price 
fluctuations? (2012). Serra and Gil.   
Depreciation of 
the dollar 
• What Explains the Rise in Food Price Volatility? (2010). Roache.  
• Exploding commodity prices, lax monetary policy, and sovereign wealth 
funds (2008). Calvo. 
Speculation  • Commodities Market Speculation: The Risk to Food Security and 
Agriculture (2008). IATP’s Trade and Global Governance program with 
Steve Suppan. 
• Drivers and Triggers of International Food Price Spikes and Volatility 
(2016). Tadasse, Algieri, Kalkuhl, and von Braun.  
Oil and chemical 
input price 
increases 
• Long-Term Drivers of Food Prices (2013). Baffes and Dennis.  
• Impact of biofuel production and other supply and demand factors on 
food price increases in 2008 (2011). Mueller, Anderson, and Wallington.  
 
In addition to these factors, several studies have indicated that other influences contributed to the 
food crisis. Some scholars have posited that changing demand for animal products from industrializing 
countries contributed to the price spikes (Popkin and Du 2003; FAO 2008; Trostle 2010, 12). Weather, 
too, may have impacted production as droughts occurred in the major exporting countries of Russia, 
Ukraine, Australia, and South Africa, yet decreases in production from these countries was largely 
compensated for by surpluses in others (Mitchell 2008, 13). Food export restrictions have been deemed 
both a primary cause and an exacerbating action (Shama 2011, 10–13; Paarlberg 2010, 23–24). 
States took different actions on agricultural trade during and immediately after the price spikes. 
The two dominate trade-based policy responses were to reduce taxes on cereals and create subsidies for 
consumers. About a quarter of states surveyed by the FAO also implemented export restrictions. Most 
states did take some action to help mitigate the impacts of the high food prices on their populations, to 
varying degrees of success. The two regions where governments were the least active were also home to 
some of the most vulnerable groups: in Africa and Latin America (FAO 2008, 41–42). McMichael 
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chronicles food riots and other responses to high prices throughout history, as food prices have frequently 
been the source of much political unrest, giving states another incentive to stabilize food prices (2009). In 
the long run, however, these trade-based actions actually exacerbated the problem at hand and slowed 
recovery (Mitra and Josling 2009, 11). 
 Since 2008, the international community has taken few additional steps to prevent food crises. 
One way to create market stability is through negotiations on which trade measures states can implement 
in order to restrict the use of tools that might exacerbate price spikes. As many states imposed export 
restrictions when food prices began to rise which further increased prices, experts have pointed to the 
global trade arena as the level at which the most effective preventative measures may be taken (Shama 
2011, 6). Conventionally, the World Trade Organization is where such negotiations would occur. 
Commonly referred to as the WTO, this multilateral trade group serves as the platform wherein member 
states decide on the conditions of multilateral trade.  Starting in 2001, WTO members began negotiations 
on a sensitive topic: trade in agricultural products. This ministerial-level series of trade negotiations 
aimed to lower trade barriers, which in the context of agriculture specifically dealt with eliminating 
subsidies (World Trade Organization n.d.). Recalling the contribution of subsidies to biofuel prices in the 
2008 food crisis, it becomes evident that this is an area in which addressing market distortions might help 
stabilize world prices. Rather than accelerating the negotiations following the food crisis, wider dissent 
grew between member countries, stalling the discussion. There has been no movement on Doha 
negotiations since 2016 (Elliott 2018).  
 Responses immediately following the crisis and in the ten years since have done little to change 
global food architecture. While the 2008 crisis was an exceptional event because of its scale and scope, 
with changes in climatic conditions, more shocks to the system may be expected. Understanding the tools 
that these countries used during the food crisis and their current legislative state will illuminate the ways 
in that agricultural and climate change policy can prevent crises like that in 2008. Research methods for 
this section will include reviewing secondary sources, reports from both the respective governments, 
international organizations, and NGOs, news reports, and statistics. 
CLIMATE	CHANGE	CONTEXT	
Many countries or municipalities have begun preparing for impacts of the conditions of climate change on 
agriculture. The case study countries have begun implementing their own laws on climate change: for 
example, Kenya signed a framework law to address climate change in 2016 (Parliament of Kenya 2016). 
As climate change may have differential effects on different crops, I will choose two key crops rather than 
attempting to generalize to the whole sector. The main export crop will be analyzed because of its large 
impact on AgGDP and the agricultural economy. I am also using this crop to measure how access (based 
primarily on economic ability to get food) might change. The second crop, the major food crop consumed 
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domestically, will relate more closely to availability of food under the food security framework. Together, 
these two crops will provide for a glimpse into the effects of changes in production on food security. I 
will follow a similar pattern to the who grows what, where and how four-part question used above in 
order to determine challenges to production and specific growing requirements. 
In order to investigate the projected impact of climate change upon food security in each case 
study, data outputs from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) will be used. 
CMIP5 is a global collaborative model of the effects of climate change around the world. CMIP5 assumes 
business as usual CO2 emissions, population growth, and low adaptation causing radiative forcing, or 
increased energy absorbed by the earth, of 8.5 Watts per m2 by 2100 (Riahi et al. 2011). Using CMIP5’s 
viewer, I will obtain the model ensemble mean projection for precipitation and temperature for each case 
study country. I will use information from crop guides to determine the boundaries for production, as well 
as water and temperature requirements throughout the growing season. Comparing the crops’ needs with 
the climate projections, I will determine the potential impact on the production of each crop. Because I 
will not be downscaling the data to fit with the specific areas that the main two study crops are grown due 
to time constraints, I will instead perform back of the envelope calculations to adjust temperature outputs 
for crops grown significantly higher or lower than the county’s average elevation, specifically in Bolivia 
and Nepal. Thus, in the section on climate change I will use both data from CMIP5 as well as qualitative 
data about the crops themselves. 
 Armed with an understanding of the projected temperature and precipitation changes and the 
needs of crops, I will be able to determine the impacts on food security in the aggregate and also speak to 
potential changes in access and availability. For each case study country, I will determine which, if any, 
policy measures countries have taken vis-à-vis climate change in support of food security. I will look at 
constitutional provisions, adaptation plans, climate change law, as well agricultural sector policy itself. I 
will determine the strengths and weaknesses of the climate change policy in relation to specific challenges 
to the two main crops as well as to the sector at large from the previous section.  
AGRICULTURAL	AND	CLIMATE	CHANGE	POLICY	ANALYSES	
Finally, in Part II in the sections on agricultural and climate change policies, I will use the information 
and factors that I have determined to be most important to food security from Part I in order to analyze the 
case study countries’ current agricultural and climate change policies. I will do a close reading of the 
relevant documents, and offer commentary on their strengths and weaknesses. In order to analyze the 
policy, I will use the information on challenges to the sector, vulnerable areas and groups, and climate 
change impacts to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the policy. In this section, I will answer part of 
the second question on agricultural and climate change policy. The thrust of the analytical work in this 
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thesis will take place in two sections of Part II, in the section on the right to food framework, as well as in 
the conclusion.  
QUESTION	2:	IN	WHAT	WAYS	DOES	A	RIGHTS-BASED	APPROACH	TO	FOOD	SECURITY	HELP	PREPARE	
COUNTRIES	FOR	THE	FIGHT	AGAINST	HUNGER	UNDER	THE	CONDITIONS	OF	CLIMATE	CHANGE?	
I start this section by outlining the importance of the right to food, before explaining its origin. The right 
to food is significant: a rights-based approach allows people to think of the problem they are experiencing 
(lack of food for whatever reason) as a violation of their rights, allowing them to challenge the “policies 
and structures behind violations” (Jochnick 1999, 60). By acknowledging that hunger is not a personal 
failure or problem but instead a violation, people can use legal systems to seek recourse or support when 
they are harmed (McClain-Nhlapo 2004). Using a rights-based approach allows us to take into account 
the numerous factors and complexities behind hunger, instead of focusing on the individual responsibility 
of those experiencing it.  
 Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
codifies the right to adequate food in the most all-encompassing way under international law. Champions 
of a universal human to food rely on this Article to urge states to include right to food law in their 
national legislations. The Article reads: 
“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and 
to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps 
to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of 
international co-operation based on free consent. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be 
free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, 
including specific programmes, which are needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use 
of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition 
and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient 
development and utilization of natural resources; 
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to 
ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.” 
Simply having the right to food codified in international law unfortunately is not enough to cause states to 
take action on this issue. The superior coercive powers, other states or the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights provide weak enforcement for economic, social and cultural rights like the 
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right to adequate food on the international level. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) can also 
contribute to enforcing the right to food by use the “name and shame” method to try to get states to 
change their behavior by exposing what actors are doing to an angry public (Roth 2004b, 67). This 
method relies on information gathering, framing of the issue, and leveraging connections to get states to 
stop or start doing something (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Roth 2004a).   
The primary way that the right to food can become justiciable is thus the integration of 
international law into domestic legal systems; individuals and companies can then file complaints in 
domestic courts. Some states integrate ICESCR into their national legislation directly, taking a monist 
approach, and others integrate it into their domestic legal systems before it can apply under the dualist 
system; many fall somewhere in between (Kadelbach 1999, 66). While Bolivia, Kenya, and Ukraine are 
closer to the monist end of the spectrum, Nepal has not stipulated international law’s status in relation to 
domestic law.  
Those who believe their right to food has been violated and who are not able to get justice 
domestically can look internationally for help. ICESCR does not have a complaint mechanism, but its 
Optional Protocol, formally adopted by the UN General Assembly during the food crisis in December 
2008, establishes an individual complaint mechanism, a state-initiated complaint mechanism, and an 
inquiry mechanism. States must become party to the OP-ICESCR in order for its people to use it; as only 
45 states have signed the agreement, which entered into force in 2013, its broad usefulness is 
compromised. Although the Optional Protocol represents an important step toward supporting human 
rights, it falls short in its goals due to geopolitical constraints as many states are wary of giving direct 
power over their domestic legislation to international bodies; the United States in particular has slowed 
much of the international progress towards fulfilling the right to food (Shaw 2007). Despite some 
practical challenges to enforcing international human rights law, painting human rights as something that 
states2 have the “moral duty” to protect supports the realization of these rights (Cronin-Furman 2010, 
188).  
One of the ways that governments have skirted taking action on the right to food is through the 
vagueness of obligations under ICESCR. A push to clarify states precise obligations under the ICESCR 
Article 11 began after the 1996 World Food Summit. At this event, states asked the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the body of independent experts that monitors the implementation 
of the ICESCR, for guidance on what exactly they had to do to “take appropriate steps” to “progressively 
realize” the right to food under ICESCR (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999, 1). 
																																								 																				
2 There have also been several moves to expand the number of actors with responsibilities from states to include 
individuals and corporations, see Cronin-Furman, 2010 and Jochnick, 1999 for a longer discussion of this issue.  
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While the Summit itself was tense, the Rome Declaration Rome Declaration on World Food Security and 
the World Food Summit Plan of Action were negotiated beforehand and approved upon arrival (FAO 
1996; Shaw 2007, 347–55). In the documents, the leaders acknowledge food security as a multifaceted 
issue requiring work at all levels, and reaffirm the right to food (Food and Agriculture Organization 
1996). The food security paradigm as we know it today is largely a product of this Summit, wherein a 
host of different actors work on all four pillars of food security.   
Not only was this summit monumental for food security in general, but it also helped propel 
economic, social and cultural rights onto par with civil and political rights. In 1999, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights published General Comment 12 that offered clarification on this 
subject. The General Comment (GC) defines the right to adequate food as “The availability of food in a 
quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, 
and acceptable within a given culture; The accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that 
do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights,” harkening back both to the World Food 
Summit definition of food security with an added emphasis on sustainability and interconnectivity with 
other human rights (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999, 3).  
The specific obligations under the covenant, as clarified by GC 12, are to take steps to progressively 
achieve the full realization of the right to adequate food (United Nations 1976). Progressive realization, 
while giving states flexibility because of the realities of the difficulties of granting ESC rights, compels 
states to “move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” (Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1990, pt. 9). They must take “deliberate, concrete, and targeted” steps to meet their 
obligations, which is not limited to only implementing legislation but rather includes other activities to 
advance the right (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1990, 1–2).3 Like other human 
rights treaties, ICESCR has three levels of obligations: the obligation to respect, to protect, and to fulfill. 
In this context, the obligation to respect means that states should not take any action that would prevent 
individuals from accessing adequate food; the obligation to protect means that states should take action to 
prevent other actors from interfering with the fulfillment of this right; the right to fulfill means that states 
should both facilitate the right to food by taking action and implementing policies to help people have 
access to food and by providing food when people cannot get it on their own (Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 1999, 4). Violations occur when a state’s actions or non-actions prevent people 
from having “minimum essential levels” of food (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1999, 4). These violations may be the result of the direct action of states or of actors that the state upon 
																																								 																				
3 This standard was first applied to ICESCR in General Comment 3, and further affirmed to apply to the right to 
food in GC 12.  
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which the state does not enforce proper rules that would allow for the right to food to be achieved 
(Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999, 5, 1990, 3–4). States submit periodic reports 
on the measures that they have taken to achieve the right to adequate food, and indicators can be used to 
determine whether states have upheld their obligations.  
Because much of the enforcement of international law depends upon states self-reporting what they 
have done and plan to do, states must create verifiable benchmarks such as framework laws so that third 
parties can check if they are following their obligations (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 1999, 13–14). Framework laws refer to a broad set of rules, in this case relating to meeting the 
right to food. Aspects that General Comment 12 says should be in the law include intended collaboration 
with civil society and the private sector, recourse procedures, and national monitoring mechanisms 
(Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1990, pts. 4–7). The General Comment is clear: 
while only states are party to the Covenant and have formal obligations, all members of society have 
responsibilities in the realization of the right to adequate food (Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1999, 4).  
This Article and GC 12 clearly articulate that everyone has the right to adequate food, and that states 
need to take measures both domestically and collaboratively to ensure that this right is met (Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999). Some legal scholars have suggested that the language in 
Article 2 of ICESCR as well as General Comment 12 create transboundary obligations, so that states must 
work together to ensure that their actions do not hurt the food security in other countries (Skogly and 
Gibney 2002, 790). International trade of foodstuffs, as the proceeding section on the 2008 crisis shows, 
can have extremely detrimental impacts on global food security because of unpredictability in prices and 
demand (Sarris, Conforti, and Prakash 2009, 2). Trade agreements can prevent states from taking 
restrictive measures that might negatively impact other countries’ peoples, and should be encouraged 
according to the ICESCR (United Nations 1976, pt. 11(2)b).  
 In this thesis, then, I will investigate if and how the right to food is justiciable in the case study 
countries, and also investigate the impact that the language in the constitution on the right to food has on 
sectoral policy. In answering my first question on right to food law’s influence on countries’ preparations 
for food security under climate change, then, I will look primarily at the legal situation, as well as any 
other legislation with the explicit goal of advancing the right to food. This step of the case studies will 
entail a deeper investigation of the right to food laws on the books in each country. I will explore the 
country’s constitutional provisions related to the right to food; through investigating the context in which 
the constitution was negotiated and the actors involved as well as the language itself, I will determine the 
reasons behind the specific formulation. I hope to determine if and how the ICESCR influenced the 
articles by comparing the language in the international treaty and the domestic constitutions. In looking at 
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the constitution, I will also see if any of the problems I identified in the background section have any legal 
solutions. Next, I will look at court cases and jurisprudence in each country to see if, and how, the right to 
food is justiciable in practice within domestic legal systems. If the country has a food and nutrition 
security strategy I will review it here, as well as analyzing briefly any relevant components of the 
country’s development strategy. This right to food section will include the first important analytical 




I will answer this question in the conclusion of my thesis by drawing upon my investigation of the right to 
food framework and agricultural and climate change policies in each country. I will compare the four 
different case studies to each other, while also offering country-specific policy recommendations. Based 
on my analysis, I will also create some general guidelines to help policymakers and right to food 
advocates think about their work and do it more effectively.  
CASE	STUDY	SELECTION	METHODOLOGY	
In order to answer questions about the right to food and sectoral policy and give policy recommendations 
to improve food security under changing climatic conditions, four case studies have been selected. As no 
country can represent the world or even the majority of situations, case study countries will act as the 
units of analysis. In the following paragraphs, I lay out the selection criteria that led to the selection of 
Bolivia, Kenya, Nepal, and Ukraine as the case study countries to be pursued, as well as the research 
supporting these choices.  
 First, presence of constitutional right to food law, whereby provisions on human rights become 
part of the “supreme law of the land,” was the first characteristic taken into account for this project 
(Vidar, Kim, and Cruz 2014, 2). This selection criterion was chosen to ensure that countries would have 
documentation for the completion of this project. Because of limitations on how many countries could be 
studied, it is impossible at this time to complete a comparative study between countries with and without 
constitutional provisions, making this an observational study. How countries integrate these rights into 
their constitution varies considerably by country, which means that even four countries with constitutional 
provisions can have diverse implementation.4 Bolivia, Kenya, and Nepal have direct and general 
																																								 																				
4	Knuth and Vidar divide constitutional integration into four main categories: 1) “explicit and direct recognition of 
the right to food;” 2) “the right to food as implicit in a broader human right;” 3) “direct principles of state policy;” 4) 
“indirect recognition through interpretation of other human rights” (Knuth and Vidar 2011, 14–18). 	
 	 28 
constitutional provisions, yet in Bolivia and Nepal the right focuses on food sovereignty rather than 
security; Ukraine has a more general provision closer to ICESCR’s standard of living provision (Knuth 
and Vidar 2011, 35–36).  
 Second, the case study countries in this thesis have been chosen to represent a variety of distinct 
possibilities for adaptation. If a given country already faces land or water constraints on what they can 
grow, they will be less able to respond to climate change’s impact on their food system through 
expanding land under agricultural development. Fader et al. use climate data, soil texture, land use 
patterns, seasonal phenology, agricultural management and yields as well as hydrological variables to 
ascertain how a country might reach food independence (Fader et al. 2013, 2). The key limiting factors 
they identify are access to land and water, which for some countries can be counteracted with increased 
productivity or expansion of crop lands (Fader et al. 2013). According to Fader et al., Nepal requires a 
productivity increase to meet demands, it is not possible for Bolivia to meet demands with its land 
constraints, Kenya will require a productivity increase or expansion of crop area, and Ukraine has the 
possibility of meeting demand under current productivity and crop areas of 2000 (Fader et al. 2013). The 
usefulness of this study ends in selecting case study countries, however, because the authors’ scenarios do 
not include potential changes in production due to climate change, only due to demand and production 
changes.  
Third, I have chosen to work with countries classified as having low or medium levels of 
development because of the importance of agriculture to developing countries’ economies. Subsistence 
farming typically accounts for a higher percentage of livelihoods in these countries than in industrialized 
countries, yet at the same time, there are fewer government supports for farmers (de Janvry and Sadoulet 
2010). Thus, changes in agricultural production will directly affect the ability of families to stay on their 
land. Developing countries’ exports are dominated by raw materials, including agricultural goods, which 
put them at risk of market fluctuations (Jaffee 1992). While wealthier countries can adapt to climate 
change by importing food, poorer countries are less able to do this. If their trade balance further shifts into 
the red with fewer agricultural exports, importing foodstuffs in adequate amounts will prove an enormous 
hurdle. Finally, some developing countries are paradoxically most at risk due to the effects of climate 
change but are also less able to adapt to climate change. This is not to say that every developing country’s 
agriculture production will be adversely affected by climate change; indeed, Ukraine has already seen an 
upshot in production as temperatures moderate (Bindi and Olesen 2011). The Human Development Index 
rates Nepal as having low development, while the other three case studies have medium levels of 
development. 
Fourth, the case study countries were also chosen because of two practicalities: their locations 
and the ability to access documentation. As where a country is located has a direct impact on its climate 
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and ability to import goods, as well as the geopolitical context, it is important that countries in this study 
come from different parts of the world. As such, Nepal is in Asia, Bolivia is in Latin America, Kenya is 
an African state, and Ukraine is in Eastern Europe. In addition, access to necessary sectoral plans and 
legislative documents can be difficult, particularly since the author does not speak the main languages in 
each of the case study countries. Each of the case study countries had the necessary documents available 
in accessible languages. To ensure that information on sensitive topics would be available, countries 
classified as “not free” in 2018 by Freedom House were excluded; all four case studies were in the 
category partly free (Freedom House 2018). 
 A number of countries were excluded from being case studies because they are oil exporters or 
they are small island states. Research by Ng and Aksoy has shown that each of these conditions has a 
large impact on a country’s ability to obtain and distribute food, particularly in a crisis (2008). Small 
island states have limited land on which to grow crops, and little money to import goods. As they have 
trade deficits in agricultural foods, they are less able to respond to food crises by importing goods, 
making them even more vulnerable (Ng and Aksoy 2008a, 448). Conflict itself can disrupt both 
agricultural production and trade of agricultural goods (for fascinating coverage of how this played out in 
the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, see White 2005). In times of conflict, policy human rights can go to 
the wayside and holding perpetrators accountable becomes more difficult. Ukraine is a bit of an exception 
in this category: since 2014, it has been fighting a war against Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk 
and Luhansk oblasts. The conflict has been going on in a simmering state for five years with no end in 
sight; as Ukraine is the only top grain exporter that is not a highly developed country or an unfree 
country, Ukraine was ultimately selected. While being a small island state or a state involved in a conflict 
negatively impacts countries’ ability to get food to its people, oil exports give countries a source of wealth 
from which to purchase food. 
THESIS	ORGANIZATION		
This study will consist of four countries serving as case studies. Each case study—and thus each 
chapter—will be divided into two parts. The first part is devoted to an introduction to the background of 
the specific country, detailing in particular its specific geopolitical and socioeconomic context. This is 
followed by discussions of its agricultural context, its experience of the 2008 food crisis relating to 
causes, consequences, and responses, and climate change projections for key crops. The second part 
explores the right to food framework, the agricultural framework, and the climate change framework in 
the context of the background from Part I. The conclusion will tie these threads together and elucidate 
larger trends and guidelines. The challenges to our food system are great, but this thesis is based on the 
premise that there is concrete action that states and individuals can take to help alleviate suffering. I hope 
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that this thesis can serve as a first step in my life’s work of contributing to decrease food insecurity 
around the world. 
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Bolivia presents a fascinating case study on the right to food because of its strong rights-based legal 
framework and policies. A new constitution in 2009 ushered in an era of rights related to the environment, 
land, food, and other second and third generation rights. Since Bolivia is a signatory to the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, investigating how 
Bolivia applies the right to food, and how it differs from non-signatory countries suggests policy 
recommendations around legislating for the right to food. Despite these legal frameworks Bolivia has the 
second-highest rate of undernourishment of the four case studies, and is tied with Kenya for the highest 
poverty levels. Bolivia is a landlocked and mountainous country, which creates challenges to agricultural 
production, distribution, and importation. As a lower-middle income country, Bolivia faces problems not 
only with producing enough food, but also with ensuring that citizens have economic access to food. The 
main food crop in Bolivia is the potato, and soybeans account for the largest share of agricultural exports. 
By investigating the national context, the agricultural context, the 2008 crisis, and climate change context 
in Part I, I will be able to analyze how Bolivia’s right to food framework, and agricultural and climate 




In order to understand how Bolivia is working towards food security-and what it should do to improve in 
the future-this first section introduces important foundation-laying information on the political, economic, 
geographical, and historical context of the country. Bolivia is a landlocked country on the western side of 
Latin America, sharing borders with Peru, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. Bolivia’s Human 
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Development Index5 has risen little since 2000, yet its poverty headcount ratio has been decreasing while 
its gross domestic product (GDP) has increased (United Nations Development Programme 2018; World 
Bank 2019). Its population of around 11 million in 2017 has been growing, following population trends in 
many lower- and middle-income countries, including Nepal and Kenya (Central Intelligence Agency 
2018). Most population growth since the 1950s has occurred in urban areas, and Bolivia has also 
experienced geographical shifts in its population, as transportation allows more people to move into the 
lowlands (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.; Hudson et al. 1991, 58, 86).  
Geographically, the country is composed of three major zones: tropical lowlands in the east, 
valleys and yungas in the center, and altiplanos (high plateaus) and mountains, which includes the Andes 
occidental range, in the west (Klein 2011, 3). Despite the existence of better cropland in the eastern 
lowlands, Bolivia’s population was historically restricted from these areas because of how difficult they 
were to reach without modern roads (Klein 2011, 1–2). This trend has rapidly changed course in recent 
years, as soybean production in the Santa Cruz district has become the regional driver of growth in the 
country, with growth rates higher than that at a national level (Urioste 2012, 439). The yungas and valleys 
provide the most fertile agricultural land as well as good rainfall, yet a lack of infrastructure particularly 
in the northeast tempered the expansion of agriculture in the area (Hudson et al. 1991, 55). In the 
mountainous region, what little rainfall is received is concentrated in the north near Lake Titicaca 
(Hudson et al. 1991, 52). Lake Titicaca, the largest lake in South America, feeds the Desaguadero River 
which runs south; glacial melting in the warmer season also supplies water in this area (Hudson et al. 
1991, 53–54). Water availability changes dramatically throughout the country: Lake Titicaca and 
northeast of La Paz, the capital city, have high amounts of rainfall and rivers, as does the upper lowlands. 
The south of the country is notably drier, especially in the mountainous and yungas areas (Hudson et al. 
1991, 52, 55–56). Extreme weather events like El Niño also plague the country, and may become more 
frequent under the conditions of climate change (Trenberth and Hoar 1997). 
Bolivia shares in the familiar South American story of colonial rule by the Spanish who treated 
those previously living in the Inca empire as slaves and destroyed existing social and governmental 
structures (Hudson et al. 1991, 60). Simón Bolívar Palacios led the fight for independence for what was 
then called Upper Peru and ousted Spanish forces in 1825; in 1826, the Peruvian assembly approved 
Upper Peru’s independence, creating the Republic of Bolivia (Hudson et al. 1991, 16–17). Over the 
course of the next century, Bolivia was forced to cede much of its original land to its neighbors, including 
its access to the sea, shrinking the country to its present size (Hudson et al. 1991, 24). After political 
																																								 																				
5 The Human Development Index accounts for education, health, and living standards to create a composite and 
human-focused measure of development.   
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turmoil and economic distress in the 1940s and 1950s, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) 
seized La Paz in early 1952 and instituted a new government in what is now called the Bolivian National 
Revolution (Hudson et al. 1991, 35). Starting in 1964, Bolivia experienced just under two decades of 
instability caused by coups and countercoups, with civilian rule only firmly reappearing in 1982 (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2018).  
Bolivia’s economy has gone through a series of changes, alternating between socialist policies 
and more liberal ones. After the Bolivian National Revolution, policies swung left, putting into place the 
Agrarian Reform Law and nationalizing tin mines (Hudson et al. 1991, 36). State income could not keep 
up with spending, particularly on the salaries of a growing public sector, causing the economy to plummet 
(Hudson et al. 1991, 101). Siles Zuazo, the president at the time, responded to the crisis by decreasing 
government spending and freezing wages to balance the budget in 1956 with help from the IMF (Hudson 
et al. 1991, 38, 104). The economy picked up steam in the early 1970s, experiencing fast growth thanks to 
high commodity prices and the discovery of oil (Hudson et al. 1991, 44, 104). In 1978, however, things 
changed course again when political instability and sharply declining public and private international 
funding prevented the government from being able to pay its debts (Hudson et al. 1991, 101).  
By 1983, Bolivia’s foreign debt had reached $3 billion, which made up 80 percent of the total 
GDP (Klein 2011, 241). The government printed more money as a solution to the spiraling debt, leading 
to exorbitant levels of inflation: by 1985, inflation reached over 24,000 percent (Klein 2011, 241; Hudson 
et al. 1991, 105). The president at the time, Paz Estenssoro, undertook an “orthodox shock” program 
through the New Economic Plan of 1985 (Klein 2011, 244). Orthodox shock programs consist of 
applying Washington Consensus measures to countries facing severe economic problems.6 In one 
ambitious decree (Decree 21060, 29 August 1985), Paz Estenssoro began this liberalizing program by 
devaluing the currency, establishing uniform interest rates, eliminating price and wage controls, and 
decreasing government expenditures. He further disassembled the state bureaucracy and reduced the 
power of organized labor in subsequent decrees (Klein 2011, 245).  
While the achievements of this program “in terms of macroeconomic stability and structural 
reforms are beyond doubt,” the social impact of the program is less clearly positive (Thiele 2003, 199). 
Reviewing changes following the adjustment program in the Gini index, which measures inequality from 
0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality) reveals that inequality likely remained between 0.55 and 0.6 
through 1997, indicating persistent high inequality (Thiele 2003, 303–4). 21.5 percent of the population 
																																								 																				
6 The Washington Consensus is a set of ten policy measures that induce economic liberalization; the name comes 
from the location of the headquarters of the major financial institutions backing the reforms (the World Bank Group, 
the International Monetary Fund, etc.). 
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was unemployed in 1985 following extreme layoffs in the public sector and privatization (Hudson et al. 
1991, 106). Using a non-monetary indicator of poverty called the unfulfilled basic needs index (NBI) 
showed that while urban poverty almost halved following structural adjustment, rural poverty remained 
stagnant (Thiele 2003, 306–7). As government spending on public goods like infrastructure decreased, 
support for development dwindled (Hudson et al. 1991, 107). Even health markers placed Bolivia 
significantly lower than other countries with similar GDP per capita levels (Thiele 2003, 308). Structural 
adjustment, then, may have had positive macroeconomic effects, but its successes were not evenly 
distributed throughout society: as of 2015, 71.5 percent of rural people continue to live in poverty 
(Colque, Urioste, and Jose Luis 2015, 16).  
The 1989 and 1991 elections brought the mestizo, or those with both white and indigenous 
ancestors, into full power, showing a distinct social shift that placed mestizos at the top of the power 
structure, but that also included indigenous groups in the coalition. The president, Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada, continued many of the liberalizing policies started in the 1980s, including privatizing state-
owned enterprises (SOE) (Pearce 2011, 56). At the same time, de Lozada also took measures to include 
peasants and indigenous groups, protecting communal property rights for indigenous communities and 
decentralizing power to municipal governments largely made up of indigenous representatives (Pearce 
2011, 57–58). This new political power invigorated indigenous voters, who turned out in great numbers to 
vote for the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party in 2002 (Klein 2011, 261, 279). In 2005, after de 
Lozada’s resignation due to a number of protests and strikes over the construction of a natural gas 
pipeline, the country elected Bolivia’s first fully indigenous president, Evo Morales (Pearce 2011, 60). In 
2009, a new constitution was approved, making Bolivia into a plurinational democratic state, with four 
independent branches of government and nine highly independent regional departments. 
Under the Morales administration, the state made a re-entrance into economic and political 
affairs, reversing the post-1980s trend of state withdrawal, and perhaps suggesting that the country may 
be moving towards a “socialist-communitarian” economy (Pearce 2011, 115). Education became a top 
priority, with education spending making up eight percent of GDP (Klein 2011, 277). The leftist 
government, backed by a new progressive constitution, has made considerable strides in supporting the 
indigenous population, although indigenous people remain more impoverished as compared to their non-
indigenous counterparts (Gigler 2009, 9). Morales, who in 2019 continues to act as president, has had his 
share of scandals, including mass protests over a proposed road in 2011 and a run for president in 2018 
that, although approved by the Supreme Electoral Court, protesters say violates the constitution (Quiroga 
2011; Casey 2018).  
In this next section, I will explore the macro-level issues at play, as problems in society at large 
have bearing upon food security and food policy. In Bolivia, there is a distinct divide between indigenous 
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and non-indigenous groups, with the former being generally better off in measures of health and wealth. 
Land rights and reform, although a topic of policymaker concern since independence, have not 
materialized in ways that ensure either private property or communal use. Because of difficult 
geographical conditions and lack of access to waterways or the sea, infrastructure is needed to ensure that 
people and goods can travel around the country, yet transportation networks are severely lacking. 
The population can be roughly divided into whites, mestizo people, and indigenous groups, which 
can themselves be further divided into minority communities (Hudson et al. 1991, 61). Mestizo people 
form the largest portion of society, at about 68 percent (Central Intelligence Agency 2018). Wealth and 
language also divide the groups, as indigenous communities tend to speak their own languages, although 
many people are bilingual speakers of Spanish (Hudson et al. 1991, 63, 65). While indigenous poverty 
has decreased, a wage gap in rural areas between indigenous and non-indigenous people remains (World 
Bank 2015, 8). Indigenous households are also 11 percent more likely to be poor than other groups, and 
rural-dwelling indigenous communities experience even higher rates of poverty (World Bank 2015, 9). 
While there has not been the same type of violence between majority-minority groups in Bolivia as there 
has in Kenya, indigenous peoples have still faced discrimination and marginalization. Indigenous people 
gained the vote in 1952 after the Bolivian National Revolution when literacy requirements were repealed, 
over a century after Bolivia’s independence (Pearce 2011, 27). Although explicit legal discrimination was 
eliminated in the 1960s, Bolivia continues to struggle with other mechanisms of exclusion that 
disenfranchised the poor and indigenous groups (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011, 5–6). Indigenous people are 
more likely to be undernourished than their non-indigenous counterparts, pointing toward a group that 
should receive special attention under any food and nutrition security-related intervention (Larrea and 
Freire 2002, 359).  
Issues related to who owns land and in what quantities continue to plague Bolivia. Despite post-
independence legislation to remedy land inequalities, large haciendas remained in the hands of the few: in 
1950, estates with 1,000 or more hectares of land held 92 percent of arable land (Hudson et al. 1991, 35). 
Reforms undertaken in the 1950s after the 1952 revolution, including the Agrarian Reform Law of 1953, 
also took up the issue of land rights to varying degrees of success: in the western part of the country, 
peasant groups were stronger and so reforms were implemented more effectively, but in the lowlands to 
the east, the status quo remained (Hudson et al. 1991, 70–71). While they did not increase production by 
large margins, they did help the rural poor by giving them security and the means to produce their own 
food (Hudson et al. 1991, 118). The land reforms also ended indentured servitude, which allowed the poor 
to move throughout the country (Pearce 2011, 31). Despite land redistribution through acreage restrictions 
initiated in 2006 with Law 3501, land grabbing poses a significant threat to smallholders (Ormachea 
Saavedra 2009, 35). Brazilian and Argentinian investors make up the biggest portion of foreign land 
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holders, although they often lack official titles (Urioste 2012, 442–52). Despite this, those living in Santa 
Cruz commonly identify migrants from the Andes as the opposition group, which prevents residents from 
organizing against foreign land grabs (Urioste 2012, 450).  
Lack of adequate infrastructure prevents people and goods from traveling around and outside of 
Bolivia. Ranked number 131 on the World Bank’s Logistic Performance Index, Bolivia is the case study 
country with the poorest infrastructure (World Bank 2018a). The National Road Service began increasing 
road construction in 1964, although many of these roads are deteriorating and dangerous (Hudson et al. 
1991, 145). In recent years, Bolivia has invested about 4 percent of its GDP in infrastructure, while 
receiving little in terms of private investment (Serebrisky et al. 2015, 9, 11). Despite these investments, 
which are high for the Latin America and the Caribbean region, infrastructure development in Bolivia 
continues to lag. Like Nepal, Bolivia lacks access to ports, making international trade more difficult. 
Unlike Nepal, however, Bolivia does not have a single country exerting control over its access to the sea, 
allowing it more opportunities to trade with all of its neighbors. Because of constraints on production 
from lack of land and water resources, Bolivia must import foodstuffs to meet its population’s needs. 
Bolivia is currently working towards adhesion to the regional trade integration and trade bloc called 
Mercosur; even without being included in the trade bloc, most of Bolivia’s trade is with Mercosur 
members (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). This group includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela, (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
are full members with voting rights) which are all significant trading partners with Bolivia (Mercosur 
Secretariat n.d.). The association applies a common tariff to all goods entering the bloc, and allows 
citizens to freely travel within it. It also has a political dimension, suspending Paraguay in 2012 and 
Venezuela indefinitely in 2016 over authoritarian leanings (Felter and Renwick 2018). If Bolivia becomes 
a full member, as it has been in the process of doing since 2012, it will likely cause a change in supply 
and demand as Bolivia’s market access expands. Nevertheless, these hopes are tempered by a lack of 
transportation infrastructure that continue to make regional trade inefficient (Gligo 1996, 21–22). Thus, 
lack of infrastructure poses a challenge to trade and transportation, and isolates Bolivia from its 
neighbors.      
I finish this background section by noting macro trends in poverty and food security. It is clear 
that the past 30 years have showed a marked improvement in living conditions for some of Bolivia’s 
population, yet there is more work left to do to meet SDG 2 on zero hunger. Undernourishment has fallen 
since 1999, although in the last five years both the prevalence and number of people undernourished has 
increased. Measures of food availability, including supply of animal protein and average value of food 
production have also leveled off in the last five years, indicating that Bolivia is facing a problem with 
food availability (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). GDP per capita has risen from $4,412 in 2000 
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to $6,885 in 2017. One might be surprised to learn that Bolivia’s GDP per capita is the highest of the four 
case studies, surpassing the runner up Ukraine by about the same amount as Nepal’s GDP per capita 
($849). Yet, the income inequality in Bolivia is high on international charts, and the highest in Latin 
America (Central Intelligence Agency 2018).7 The proportion of people living below the national poverty 
line has fallen from 63.1 percent in 2004 to 36.4 percent in 2017 (World Bank 2017). Taken together, 
these trends show that while poverty is declining and the economy is doing well, hunger has, and 
continues, to increase due to decreases in food availability. Because of this situation, it becomes clear that 
there must be issues with availability, stability, and usage beyond just accessibility.  
AGRICULTURAL	CONTEXT	
Moving from macro-level societal issues to focus on agriculture, in this section I explain agriculture’s 
history and setting to understand constraints and challenges in the sector and to better assess current 
policies and make recommendations for improvement. Agriculture in Bolivia has been deeply entwined 
with political movements and economic issues. After the Bolivian National Revolution, for example, a 
decline in agricultural production by peasant farms contributed to an economic crash (Hudson et al. 1991, 
37). Even after the end of colonialism, white colonialists remained in control of the haciendas, their 
wealth allowing them to retain control over both the labor force and politics (Hudson et al. 1991, 61). 
Bolivia’s agricultural sector can be characterized by two different systems of agriculture: larger scale 
operations growing cash crops, and smallholders producing subsistence items. These two groups are also 
roughly split geographically: large farmers generally control the lowlands, while smaller subsistence 
farmers live in the yungas and highland areas (Hudson et al. 1991, 115). In Bolivia, the average size of 
land that smallholders cultivate was 0.89 ha in 2005 (Rapsomanikis 2015, 5). About 26 percent of people 
are employed in the agricultural sector, putting Bolivia just behind Ukraine (14 percent) for the lowest 
amount of sector livelihood participation among case study countries (World Bank and ILO 2018). 
Because the Andes mountain range cuts across the country lengthwise, most agriculture is undertaken in 
the department of Santa Cruz in the east (Zapata-Caldas et al. 2009, 16). However, in most of the 
agriculture production from this region is for export: according to the vice minister of Santa Cruz, in 
2013, 80 percent of production was for foreign consumption (Agencia Boliviana de Información 2013).  
Agricultural policies starting in the 1950s incentivized diversification and industrialization in the 
sector, with strong support for smallholders in the agrarian reform package (Hudson et al. 1991, 101). 
Bolivia took an import-substitution approach to development, placing tariffs on imports and providing 
																																								 																				
7 Because the informal economy is an important contributor (only about a third of the population receives regular 
salaries) to incomes but is not usually accounted for in dominant measures of inequality, it is likely that these claims 
may be slightly exaggerated (Pearce 2011, 41, 54).  
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support to domestic producers until the 1980s. Under the IMF’s austerity program, however, trade was 
liberalized, and Bolivia worked to promote diversification in its agricultural exports (Hudson et al. 1991, 
150). From 1990-1998 and following structural adjustment, public investment in agriculture fell from 
0.48 percent of GDP to 0.27 percent of GDP (Thiele 2003, 315). Smallholders have been systematically 
excluded from many agricultural development initiatives, as investments in agriculture have been 
concentrated in the more profitable lowlands (McKay and Colque 2016; Hudson et al. 1991, 119; Ladman 
and Tinnermeier 1981, 69). After the economic crisis and adjustment program, the government stopped 
being involved in setting prices and producing and marketing key products, letting the market step in 
where it had previously asserted control (Hudson et al. 1991, 116). In the 2000s, the government again 
started participating more actively in the agriculture sector under Morales’ administration. 
While Bolivia’s exports center around mining and the extraction of other natural resources, the 
country does produce foodstuffs both for export and for local consumption (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). 
The connection between agriculture and mining had been even closer in areas like Potosí, where miners 
took up agricultural production on the side (Klein 2011, 52). Unlike the other case study countries with 
clearer food trade balances, Bolivia is a net food exporter if one only counts raw foods, but adding 
processed foods to the balance flips Bolivia into a net food importer (Ng and Aksoy 2008, 130, 136). Tin 
mining drove the economy and political system for much of the early 20th century, and accounted for as 
much as 40 percent of exports through 1980 (Hudson et al. 1991, 104). When the international tin market 
collapsed in 1985, agriculture made up a greater share of the GDP. In the 1990s, natural gas exports 
expanded with construction of new pipelines, making the two main export products natural gas and 
soybeans (Pearce 2011, 53). Agricultural exports, hindered by a lack of infrastructure, were (and remain) 
difficult, so most of the food produced was for the domestic market (Hudson et al. 1991, 113). In 2002, 
over 90 percent of agricultural production was consumed domestically (Berdegué et al. 2006, 6). In 2017, 
14 percent of GDP came from the agricultural sector (Central Intelligence Agency 2018). 
It is important to note that Bolivia is a producer of coca, the plant used to make cocaine. This 
illicit market flourished in the 1970s through the 1990s, particularly on small farms, but has since been in 
decline. During the country’s economic problems in the 80s, farmers turned to coca production for access 
to the US dollar, that did not have the same degree of hyperinflation problems as the peso (Hudson et al. 
1991, 124–25). Under pressure from donors, the government began aggressively cracking down on 
production in 1983, although the crop remained legal in designated areas and for traditional use (Hudson 
et al. 1991, 125).8 Klein credits funds from this clandestine market with financially supporting the 
																																								 																				
8 Indeed, component nine of the most recent agricultural development plan calls for supporting the production of 
coca.  
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agricultural production of other crops as well as supporting the economy throughout the structural 
adjustment period. However, it also negatively impacted the production of other crops, as farmers often 
switched to coca for higher profits (Klein 2011, 251; Hudson et al. 1991, 126; Pearce 2011, 51).  
Despite recent high levels of funding for agriculture (13 percent of GDP in 2008), there remain 
many challenges to agriculture in Bolivia. Farmers face high barriers to enter national and international 
markets, particularly due to poor rural infrastructure and lack of direct access to the sea. There is still a 
technological divide between the most rural population in the highlands, who are likely also to be potato 
subsistence farmers, and larger farms in the lowlands. Farmers also lack access to credit and banking 
options, so the ability to invest in mechanization and other inputs is low (Klein 2011, 284–85). Research 
and extension services to help farmers improve their methods and yields have been insufficient, limiting 
growth (Hudson et al. 1991, 113). Because of the soil composition in the highlands, land is subject to 
erosion (Klein 2011, 4). Irrigation is low, with only seven percent of land under cultivation equipped with 
irrigation systems, which makes agriculture especially difficult in arid lands in the southwest (FAO 2015, 
9).   
THE	2008	FOOD	CRISIS	IN	BOLIVIA:	CAUSES,	CONSEQUENCES,	AND	POLICY	RESPONSES	
While thus far I have explored factors related to food availability and access, another pillar of food 
security is stability, or whether people have the food they need year-round. In order to investigate the 
food security pillar of stability, I will analyze the 2008 food crisis that destabilized the food security status 
quo in Bolivia. This crisis reveals several points: first, those who are most vulnerable to shocks; second, 
the government’s responses; and third, the key areas in which policy faltered.  
Prior to the 2008 crisis, GDP and GDP per capita had been rising, likely increasing access to 
food. The biggest challenge to food security in Bolivia is lack of access, as incomes remain low, 
particularly for rural people (World Food Programme 2019). During the international food crisis of 2008, 
prices in Bolivia rose 49.3 percent from January 2006 to December 2008 (José Cuesta et al. 2010, 850). 
Households in Bolivia spend on average 61.4 percent of their daily income on food and cooking fuel 
(Melgar-Quinonez et al. 2006, 1434S). There have been big disparities in income between rural and urban 
areas, with those living in rural areas in the southern highlands receiving the lowest wages, and thus 
experiencing the lowest access to food (Hudson et al. 1991, 110; Gigler 2009, 6). The distribution of 
poverty mirrors the distribution of indigenous groups: “the poorest regions are the ones where most of the 
indigenous peoples live” (Gigler 2009, 9). Compared to the general population, in which the split is 70 
percent to 30 percent urban to rural, just over 50 percent of indigenous people lived in rural areas in 2012 
(World Bank 2015, 31). In rural areas, the gap between indigenous and non-indigenous wages is higher 
by four percent than that in urban areas (World Bank 2015, 11). In addition, regional disparities in access 
to social services has been occurring since at least the 1950s, with better services for those living in the 
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lowlands and worse for indigenous highland dwellers (Hudson et al. 1991, 96; World Bank 2015, 32–35). 
It is clear, then, that rural indigenous communities are those who are vulnerable to price increases because 
of their low wages and poverty. When international prices rose, those who purchase food from the 
market, both urban and rural dwellers, experienced the effect of lowered purchasing power (José Cuesta 
et al. 2010, 849). As about 30 percent of smallholders are net food buyers who would have had to 
purchase more food when potato production fell, high international prices were not limited to urban areas 
(Organization 2008, 76). Ivanic and Martin show that price increases of a large array of goods would 
increase the poverty rates for urban people slightly more than rural people (2008, 409). Other simulations 
also projected urban groups to be the most influenced by the crisis as they are overwhelmingly net food 
buyers (José Cuesta et al. 2010, 857). Therefore, we know that the urban poor are vulnerable to price 
spikes in addition to the rural poor, especially indigenous groups.  
In addition to the international price increases explained in chapter one, there were also domestic 
factors contributing to the crisis. In July 2008, Bolivia as a country did not require urgent food assistance, 
but a regional flood did occur, causing localized hunger (FAO 2008). A La Niña event occurred from 
November 2007 to March 2008, bringing with it the increased rainfall that caused the devastating flood. 
Beni and Santa Cruz were the two areas hit hardest by the flooding, which resulted in over 70 deaths and 
the declaration of a natural disaster (EFE Newswire 2008c, 2008b). Because of the flooding, over $300 
million worth of crops were lost, and soybean production declined by 170,000 tons in 2008 (EFE 
Newswire 2008a; Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). Following the winter and fall floods, Bolivia 
experienced drought in Oruro, La Paz, and Potosí, regions along the western side of the country 
(Government of Bolivia 2008). This drought had a smaller impact than the flood on agricultural 
production of potatoes, which grow in La Paz. While potato production decreased from 754,807 tons in 
2006 to about 735,254 tons in 2007, the 2008 harvest regained 10,000 tons before an explosion in 
production in 2009 (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.).9 Potato imports increased from around 
2,200 tons in 2006 to 25,000 tons in 2008, before decreasing again in 2009 (UN Comtrade 2019). There 
are signs that this decline in production had an impact on food availability in Bolivia, as the average 
dietary energy supply adequacy stagnated during this period (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). 
Like in Kenya and Nepal, violence also occurred in Bolivia at the same time as the 2008 crisis. 
The departments of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, and Chuquisaca which hold most of Bolivia’s natural gas, 
wanted more autonomy from Morales’ government control. There were violent protests in the Santa Cruz 
and Pando departments, particularly by those angered over Morales taking some natural gas profits to use 
																																								 																				
9 It is unclear whether this increase in production in 2009 is due to changes in data collection methods, or some other 
factor contributing to increased production.  
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for the national pension fund (Facts on File News Digest 2008; Burbach 2008). The conflict escalated, 
and Bolivia expelled the US ambassador over claims that he was helping protestors overthrow the 
government (Associated Press 2008). While these protests were eventually quelled and the constitution 
ratified, these fractures likely contributed to the uptick in hunger in 2008. Increased biofuel demand also 
contributed to the crisis in Bolivia, according to a representative of Bolivia to the Economic and Social 
Council; however, as soybeans are not a food crop and maize is, the effects of increases in demand for 
biofuels did not impact food security as directly in Bolivia as it did in Kenya (United Nations 2008). 
While Bolivia experienced domestic declines in food availability and access, there was also high 
international price transmission (Schüttel et al. 2011, 127). Bolivians tend to eat products such as 
potatoes, cereals, and fruits and vegetables rather than meats and dairy, which means that their 
breadbasket is based on foods traded on the commodities market (Pérez-Cueto et al. 2006, 566). Poverty 
simulations showed an expected increase of just over 6 percent in Bolivia, the highest in the region (José 
Cuesta et al. 2010, 855). Despite these signs of a possible crisis, the period from 2007 to 2009 failed to 
produce any noticeable macro trends in poverty or hunger. Indeed, the Global Hunger Index which takes 
into account child stunting, child wasting, child mortality, and undernourishment, gave Bolivia a score of 
27.1 in 2005 and 21.8 in 2010 (Global Hunger Index 2018). Data on undernourishment from the FAO 
shows that while the prevalence of undernourishment remained stagnant in 2007-2009 rather than 
following the trend of decreasing, it did not increase during the years of the crisis; the number of 
undernourished people, however, increased by about 100,000 in the three-year period from 2008-2010 
(Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). Poverty actually fell from 2007 to 2009 for both urban and 
rural dwellers (World Bank 2019). These trends in hunger and poverty are quite curious given that 
Bolivia experienced higher prices and lowered production in 2008. 
One way to explain the difference between the expected impact on hunger and poverty and the 
actual outcome are the actions that the government of Bolivia took during the crisis. I begin by looking at 
the trade measures applied. Bolivia’s top food product import sources are Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Peru, 
and the United States (World Integrated Trade Solution 2015). As its trade partners began implementing 
export restrictions on key commodities, prices rose in Bolivia. Over the course of the food crisis, Bolivia 
implemented export bans on wheat (July 2007) soy and sunflower oils (May 2008), maize, sugar and 
sorghum (February 2010), as well as poultry (Shama 2011, 32; Schüttel et al. 2011, 128). Wheat 
consumption in Bolivia is second only to potatoes; however, Bolivia covers 70 percent of the domestic 
demand of wheat through imports. When wheat prices rose on the international market, Bolivia lowered 
the rate of the import tax (Schüttel et al. 2011, 128). An export ban was placed on all vegetable oils from 
March 19 to April 18, 2008 and afterward quotas were placed on oil production (Schüttel et al. 2011, 
129). Bolivia is a net exporter of vegetable oils, something that these export restrictions did not seem to 
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take into account (José Cuesta et al. 2010, 850). Only about one third of vegetable oils produced in 
Bolivia are consumed there, so these export bans set shockwaves throughout the system, as exporters 
were no longer able to sell most of the production (Schüttel et al. 2011, 129). These measures came as 
producers were recovering from floods, which caused huge losses, decreasing economic profits. The trade 
restrictions have had negative effects overall, while the elimination of import tariffs may have increased 
availability (José Cuesta 2011, 89).  
Under the Morales government, which came into power in 2006, Bolivia began pursuing social 
programs more aggressively, including special feeding programs for children and the elderly that were put 
into place prior to the crisis (Food and nutrition security platform 2019). Food products including oil, rice, 
wheat flour, and sugar began to be sold at reduced prices at special government stores, (WFP 2009, 5). 
Special government-owned EMAPA stores also distributed subsidized wheat flour directly to consumers. 
Starting in July 2007, 95 percent of imported flour was distributed with subsidies to the national bakery 
sector (Schüttel et al. 2011, 128). On the production side, wheat farmers were given subsidized fertilizer 
and access to government milling. Bolivia’s social safety nets are quite good overall; Bolivia did not, 
however, take any specific actions that “intensified or expanded” its social safety nets during the crisis, 
pointing to the need for a better emergency response network (José Cuesta 2011, 89).  
Increased food aid and foreign assistance does not explain why Bolivia did not experience the 
increase in poverty and hunger that was expected. Food aid flows actually declined from 2006 to 2009, 
illustrating that an increase in aid did not prevent the poverty increase that was projected to occur (Food 
and Agriculture Organization 2017). Overall food security-related official development assistance fell in 
2008, before increasing again in 2009 (FAO 2019). As all of the factors for a crisis were present in 
Bolivia, it is unclear at first glance why the dramatic increases in poverty and hunger that were projected 
did not come to pass. There are several explanations for this incongruence in the data. First, the data on 
poverty and hunger simply might not be as accurate as we would need it to be in order to see increases at 
such a level. However, there was stagnation in the decline of hunger during this time, and there was a 
general decrease in availability as measured in calories available. This suggests that the crisis did have a 
negative effect, just not as extreme as that predicted. EMAPA and the government’s other responses to 
the crisis probably did have a positive impact on hunger, although this is not quantifiable in this thesis.  
International prices rose, and the high prices were transmitted onto Bolivia’s domestic markets at 
the same time as a La Niña year decreased potato production. Rural people, especially indigenous 
communities and smallholders who are net food buyers, experienced a reduced crop just as global prices 
were rising. In addition, the EMAPA shops are mainly in more urban areas, so rural people would not 
have had access to as much state support. The urban poor were also impacted, as they produce little of 
their own food and thus experienced the brunt of the international price increases. Similar to Nepal and 
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Kenya, there was political violence and extreme weather events that contributed to the crisis on the 
domestic level. Removing tariffs allowed for more food to enter the country (for example, potatoes), and 
which was likely the most useful action the government took. Some of its export restrictions on primarily 
export crops had a more negative impact: as in Ukraine, Bolivia consumes little of its vegetable oils, and 
so preventing them from leaving just created a situation in which farmers and processors lost out on 
income. There was not a significant international response to the crisis as there was in Nepal and Kenya, 
perhaps due to some social safety nets already in place when it occurred. While EMAPA allowed for 
reduced-priced items to reach consumers and subsidies for agriculture prevented the climatic conditions 
from negatively affecting the next harvest, Bolivia could do more to implement specific emergency food 
response programs. While Bolivia did feel the effects of the 2008 crisis due to both international and 
domestic factors, these were somewhat abated by government action.  
CLIMATE	CHANGE	CONTEXT	
In this next section, I profile the two main crops that will be studied in this thesis, and then using climate 
projection data, I discuss potential challenges to production in the future. First, I investigate potatoes. 
Potatoes are the top subsistence crop, with a key role in food availability, particularly for the rural poor 
(Colque, Urioste, and Jose Luis 2015, 35). The dependence upon potatoes as a food crop means that if 
there were to be changes in production in the future related to climate change, Bolivia’s food availability 
could take a hit. Next, I look into soybean production. Soy production, unlike potatoes, is almost entirely 
for export. Soybeans account for 3 percent of GDP, and are the largest export crop (Nolte 2015, 2). 
Because of their importance to the economy, soybean production can be related to food accessibility. In 
addition, soybeans and potatoes are grown in two distinct parts of the country, so together, the two crops 
provide insights into food security in most of Bolivia. By investigating potential changes due to climate 
change in the production of these two crops, we can gain a fuller picture of changes in availability and 
access to food.  
The potato was first domesticated in the Lake Titicaca region, and continues to be Bolivia’s most 
important food crop (FAO 2008; Hudson et al. 1991, 119). Classified as tubers, potatoes grow 
underground from starch produced in the potato plant’s leaves. Unlike other crops that require farmers to 
repurchase seeds each year, new potato plants grow from the eye of other potatoes, allowing farmers 
greater control over their cultivation (International Potato Center n.d.). The majority of the production 
still occurs at a high elevation along the Andes corridor, in relatively close proximity to Lake Titicaca. 
About 200,000 smallholder farmers produce most of the country’s potatoes, cultivating around 30 
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traditional varieties using methods suited to the tough climatic conditions of the Andes (FAO 2008).10 In 
2012, the government of Bolivia reported that Bolivians eat on average 92 kg of potatoes each year, well 
above the next most-consumed item, bread products, at 40 kg a year (PIEB 2012).11 Potato production has 
been steadily increasing in Bolivia since the turn of the century, and in 2017, over a million tons of 
potatoes were produced, covering domestic demand (Devaux et al. 2010, 10; Food and Agriculture 
Organization n.d.). Subsistence farmers in the highlands, where potatoes are grown, face some of the most 
challenging growing conditions in the country: they have the smallest plots, and both geographical 
conditions and historical use have damaged the soil (Hudson et al. 1991, 115). Production is already 
challenged by poor soils and climatic variability, which points towards vulnerability to climate change 
(Devaux et al. 2010, 9). Potato farming in Bolivia is very inefficient, with yields significantly lower than 
those in neighboring countries (Pearce 2011, 43). A lack of technology, poor research and extension 
services and little access to credit have prevented Bolivian potato farmers from thriving (Hudson et al. 
1991, 119; Godoy, de Franco, and Echeverria 1993).  
 
Figure 2.1. Map of potato production in Bolivia, courtesy of the Ministerio de desarrollo rural y tierras de 
Bolivia.  
																																								 																				
10 The International Potato Center (CIP) reports that there are approximately 4,000 potato varieties that are native to 
the Andes region, although only some of them are edible (International Potato Center n.d.). 
11 The FAO reports that these numbers were closer to 65 and 40 kg per capita per year, respectively; regardless of 
these discrepancies, potatoes are still the product most consumed in Bolivia.  
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Now, I profile Bolivia’s most-produced crop: soybeans. Soybeans are they are relatively new to 
Bolivia, with commercial production beginning around 1985 (McKay and Colque 2016, 4). The majority 
of this legume is grown in the Santa Cruz region, taking up 55 percent of agricultural land in the district. 
Yields are lower than in other neighboring countries, coming in between 1.8 and 2.3 metric tons per 
hectare (Nolte 2015, 2). Many smallholder farmers have been pushed out of soybean production, and the 
11,000 that remain struggle with a lack of access to good land, financial institutions, and labor markets 
(McKay and Colque 2016, 3–4, 22). Foreigners are also increasingly the owners of soybean farms, and 
95 percent of soybean production is controlled by only six companies (Urioste 2012; McKay and Colque 
2016, 16). In 2015, soybeans accounted for 10 percent of total exports, making up $1.1 billion in exports 
in 2014 (Nolte 2015, 2). Exports mainly go to the Andean countries surrounding Bolivia: Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Domestic demand for soybeans was approximately 800,000 
metric tons in 2015, much of which goes to animal feed (Nolte 2015, 2; Hudson et al. 1991, 122). Only 
one genetically modified type, or event, of soybean (GTS 40-3-2) has been allowed to be grown in 
Bolivia since 2008 (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications 2017, 1). In 
2017, however, 100 percent of farmers were using biotech soybeans (2017). The main challenges to 
soybean producers mirror overall agricultural issues: difficulty in transporting products, lack of 
technology to increase production, and accessing credit (Nolte 2015, 3). In addition, all of the land 
officially dedicated to intensive soybean production in Santa Cruz is already under soybean production, 
so the growth seen in the past 30 years may be coming to an end unless yields increase (Urioste 2012, 
440). 
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Figure 2.2. Map of soybean production in Bolivia, courtesy of the Ministerio de desarrollo rural y tierras 
de Bolivia.  
In Bolivia, climate variability already causes floods and droughts, as it did in 2008. In this part of 
the climate change section, I study the key crops, soybeans and potatoes, with an eye toward potential 
changes in production due to climate change. By comparing temperature and precipitation requirements to 
projections from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 5 (CMIP5), I will be able to consider food 
stability and availability in the future. The model ensemble mean for annual temperature projects an 
increase of 3.2°C for the period from 2050-2074 as compared to 1980-2004 (Adler and Hostetler 2013). 
The model ensemble mean for precipitation shows zero change at the country level, and disaggregating by 
month shows few variations as well. Smallholder farmers that grow potatoes are concentrated at altitudes 
between 3,000 and 3,500 meters above sea level (Theisen 2009). Soybeans are produced at the much 
lower altitude of 400masl (Nolte 2015). In order to account for these two disparate production zones, I 
will adjust the temperature data to better fit the two locations. To complete back-of-the-envelope 
calculations on the projected mean temperatures for the higher altitude regions of the country, three cities 
were selected for their location in relation to the concentration of potato and soybean production. The 
chosen cities, La Paz, Sucre, and Santa Cruz, sit at 3,639m, 2,810m, and 400m above sea level 
respectively. Although temperature increases are predicted to be higher at higher altitudes, at the altitudes 
of interest for soybean and potato growth, regional models have shown that temperature change remains 
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consistent at the relevant elevations (Urrutia and Vuille 2009, 8). The CMIP5 model ensemble mean 
increase in temperature by month was then applied to climate data from each of the cities for an estimate 
of what temperatures might look like in Bolivia’s key crop zones.   
 
 
Figure 2.3. Average monthly temperature observed and projected for La Paz, 3,639 masl (Adler and 
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Figure 2.5. Average monthly temperature observed and projected for Santa Cruz, 400masl (Adler and Hostetler 









































Figure 2.6. Average monthly precipitation observed and projected for Bolivia (Adler and Hostetler 2013; Merkel 
n.d.).12 
These projected temperature increases may pose considerable challenges to potato cultivation 
lower in the Andes. Potato plants themselves grow best between 16°C and 20°C, while the optimal soil 
temperature for tuber formation is between 15°C and 18°C (FAO Land and Water Division 2008, 2; 
Beukema and van der Zaag 1990, 38).13 As temperatures rise, tuberization, or the formation of new 
potatoes, decreases (Sonnewald et al. 2015). While farmers closer to 3,500m, as represented by La Paz, 
may not experience as many temperature-driven changes in production, those at lower elevations might 
experience reduced production because of higher temperatures. The CMIP5 model ensemble mean shows 
that precipitation may increase in the winter, which may be beneficial for potatoes because they need 
water during their early growth so that the plants can produce good quality tubers (FAO n.d.). Potatoes 
require 500 to 700mm of water over a season, so as long as precipitation does not decrease as projected, 
temperature will likely be the limiting factor for potato production. Those who live in mountainous areas 
																																								 																				
12 While there is a direct correlation between elevation and temperature, changes with precipitation are more varied, 
so it was impossible to adjust precipitation for altitude with the author’s limited data analysis skills. 
13 The Andes region has 4,000 varieties of potatoes with different temperature requirements, and so these 
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will have more flexibility under the conditions of climate change up to a certain point, at which point soil 
composition and precipitation would make for difficult growing conditions. Using this method of 
adaptation has its own potential flaws, as farmers may have to increasingly contend with land rights 
issues. As the Bolivian government seeks to ensure land rights and conservation areas, there may be 
increasing tensions between farmers and conservationists as smallholders climb higher into the páramos 
in order to plant their crops. Another possibility for potato production is a shift to planting earlier or later 
in the season, when the weather is still cooler. As these cooler times also correspond to the dry season, 
changing time of the year for potato growth will pose challenges in terms of water availability. If potato 
production declines because of higher temperatures, this will have direct negative effects on Bolivia’s 
food security as it may decrease food availability.  
Soybean production in Santa Cruz may increase under the conditions of climate change. 
Soybeans are produced in two crop cycles, one in the winter and one in the summer, and yields can vary 
considerably between the seasons as well as between individual growers (Nolte 2015). Soybeans require 
temperatures of at least 10°C to germinate, and growing time shortens with higher temperatures (Casteel 
2010, 6). Soybeans grow best in hot temperatures up to about 30°C (FAO n.d.). Because the temperature 
is projected to rise, the time from planting to harvest for soybeans may shorten, allowing for more crop 
rotations. While the CMIP5 model ensemble mean projects that only the winter months may have 
increased precipitation, a regional climate model for the Andes using A2 and B2 scenarios14 found that 
precipitation might increase up until 2,000masl which includes the soybean growing elevation (Urrutia 
and Vuille 2009, 10; Adler and Hostetler 2013). Soybeans generally need between 450 and 700mm of 
water per growing season (FAO, n.d.). The model shows the possibility for up to 400mm per year 
increases of precipitation below 500m, perhaps showing a positive change for soybean production. The 
biggest challenge, however, may come from pests and diseases, as warmer temperatures encourage their 
spread. Successful disease prevention therefore may become more important in the future. 
Climate data from the CMIP5 shows that food availability, illustrated through temperature-
induced potato production declines at lower elevations, might decrease under the conditions of climate 
change. As rainfall may increase in the lowlands, this may help soybeans and potatoes alike. Temperature 
is the limiting factor for potatoes, as they require lower temperatures for tuberization and better growth to 
occur. Soybean production may increase, increasing the income for growers in the Santa Cruz department 
and increasing food accessibility. In this analysis, however, it was not possible to investigate the effects of 
																																								 																				
14 A2 and B2 are two of four scenarios established under the Emissions Scenarios report from the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change in 2000. Generally, both scenarios envision regionally-based economic growth with slow 
technology adaptation, with population projections being lower in B2 (Nakicenovic et al. 2000, 4–5).   
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extreme weather events on production. Potato farmers have already noted that droughts have begun 
killing much of their crops (Rights & Democracy and Coordinadora de Integracion de Organizaciones 
Economicas Campesina de Bolivia 2011, 25). As production declined in 2008 because of flooding related 
to La Niña, it is important to stipulate that these projections must be considered in light of there also 




A rights-based approach to food insecurity, as detailed in chapter one of this thesis, is one way to help 
people get the food they need. In order to better understand how the right to food approach contributes to 
food security under changing climatic conditions, we must first understand the legal framework in 
Bolivia. Bolivia ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 
1982, following its return to civilian government, similar to the events that unfolded in Nepal. It signed 
the Optional Protocol in 2010, and ratified it in 2012; it entered into force in 2013 after 13 states ratified 
it. Bolivia is the only case study country that has ratified the Optional Protocol, which will allow us to 
determine whether the Option Protocol appears to have had a positive influence on food security in the 
country by an international avenue for justice and making remedy on the national level an obligation. Not 
only are inhabitants guaranteed these rights in the constitution, they are also protected by international 
human rights law which the Bolivian constitution deems part of the constitution itself (“Constitution of 
Bolivia” 2009, pts. 14 (3); 410).15 
Since independence, there have been no fewer than 22 significant changes to Bolivia’s 
constitution (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 41). Following protests calling for the nationalization of 
hydrocarbon resources and a new constitution, Morales created the Constituent Assembly to draft a new 
constitution; it was then proposed and approved by a referendum (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011, 8). During 
negotiations, issues that were particularly salient for the political parties included natural gas privatization 
and distribution of funds from the sector, the location of the capital, and worries about the secession of 
four lowlands departments (recall from the 2008 food crisis section that there had been violence there 
prior to the food crisis) (Pearce 2011, 108–11). Because of the tense negotiations, like that in Nepal and 
Kenya, the constitution is expansive but also includes some opaque meaning in order to placate different 
sides (Pearce 2011, 112).  
																																								 																				
15 When negotiating treaties, the government of Bolivia needs to consider food security and sovereignty 
under article 255 (8).  
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The language around the right to food in Bolivia’s constitution is very much a product of the 
context in which the constitution was negotiated. The push to include food sovereignty in the constitution 
was not the first major step into the food sovereignty paradigm; indeed, prior development plans and laws 
had included language on the issue (Jose Cuesta, Edmeades, and Madrigal 2013, 2; McKay, 
Nehring, and Walsh-Dilley 2014, 1190–91). The food crisis in 2008 also contributed to the language 
on food sovereignty in the constitution, as officials called for food sovereignty to prevent future crises 
(United Nations 2008). What emerged after years of negotiations between different factions was a 
constitution that “supports enhanced human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights and 
the rights of underprivileged groups” (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011, 10). At play in negotiations were 
questions of the state of Bolivia’s sovereignty in relation to international actors and interests (McKay, 
Nehring, and Walsh-Dilley 2014, 1177–78). Food sovereignty in Bolivia and Nepal both served as 
means to unifying disparate groups, with the concept used by “state actors in particular ways to support 
their own strategies and goals” (McKay, Nehring, and Walsh-Dilley 2014, 1178). 
Bolivia’s 2009 constitution sets the stage for its people to enjoy the right to food. Article 16 lays 
out the right in two clauses: “Every person has the right to water and food. The State has the obligation to 
guarantee food security, by means of healthy, adequate and sufficient food for the entire population.” 
While in Nepal citizens have the explicit right to food sovereignty, in Bolivia food sovereignty is not an 
individual right, but rather something the state is supposed to pursue. Food sovereignty, the term 
famously promoted by the international peasants movement Via Campesina at the World Food Summit in 
1996, relates to the choice that countries and communities have in what they eat and produce, and is also 
associated with local control and trade (Campesina 2003; Edelman 2014, 970).16 Food sovereignty may 
not be so different to food security now as in earlier years where food security was tied to availability 
with a focus at the international level; however, food sovereignty as a concept remains less well-defined 
and universally understood than food security (Edelman 2014, 967). In Bolivia, this poses challenges for 
legislating and adjudicating the right: “How can you have a powerful notion of food sovereignty at the 
level of the nation state, particularly in the context of plurinationality like in Bolivia and Ecuador, when 
different groups (peoples, nations or communities) have divergent ideas about what food sovereignty 
means and looks like in practice?” (McKay, Nehring, and Walsh-Dilley 2014, 1179). As scholars have 
noted there is a tension between sovereignty of the state and sovereignty of individuals and communities 
within food sovereignty, which the constitution resolves by making food sovereignty something the state 
																																								 																				
16 The origin story of food sovereignty is of course more nuanced than the popular version of Via Campesina’s sole 
creation of the concept; for a longer discussion of this issue, see Edelman 2014.  
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should take action upon instead of something to which individuals are entitled (McKay, Nehring, and 
Walsh-Dilley 2014, 1177, 1192–93; Edelman 2014, 967–68). 
This relegation of power to the state can be seen in the articles on the right to food. The state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) are given the dual mandate of economic development and promoting food 
security (“Constitution of Bolivia” 2009, pt. 309 (4)). The concept of food sovereignty applies beyond 
Bolivia’s domestic sphere: when negotiating treaties, the government must also think about the food 
security of the population. It cannot import, produce, or commercialize genetically modified organisms or 
toxic elements that “harm health and the environment” (“Constitution of Bolivia” 2009, pt. 225 (8)). 
In aligning with the control aspect of food sovereignty, the regional departments are given control over 
their resources in order to preserve food security (“Constitution of Bolivia” 2009, pt. 300 (16)). 
Municipalities have further control over energy projects in their jurisdiction to ensure food security. It is 
also notable that the municipalities can regulate transport and sale of food products, which opens up the 
opportunity for them to set price controls if necessary (“Constitution of Bolivia” 2009, pts. 302 (12-
13)). Another way that the constitution sets the stage for food security and sovereignty is through 
delineating the steps in Bolivia’s rural development strategy (“Constitution of Bolivia” 2009, pt. 405). 
Indeed, the goal of the rural development policy is to guarantee food security and sovereignty through 
prioritizing the consumption of agricultural goods produced in Bolivia (“Constitution of Bolivia” 2009, 
pt. 407 (1)).  
Searches into the existence of cases on article 16 in the constitutional court showed that there 
have not been to date any legal challenges to the right to food in Bolivia.17 In addition, Bolivia has not 
had any cases brought against it under OP-ICESCR. This lack of jurisprudence raises questions about the 
justiciability of the right to food in general for several reasons. As the constitution of Bolivia includes 
language that not only gives individuals the right to food but also gives the state the obligation to fulfill 
that right, the opportunity to file suit should theoretically be higher in Bolivia than in other countries. 
Several potential explanations for this difference between expected outcomes and actual outcomes include 
corruption, underfunding of the court system, poor access to courts, and an excruciatingly slow and 
backlogged system (The Economist 2012). The reason that I find most salient based on my research is 
that of those experiencing hunger lacking access to courts, based on the geographical location of the 
																																								 																				
17 I used both Bolivia’s database of rulings in the constitutional court, searching for key terms and articles. I verified 
these findings with cases in www.escr-net.org’s database of jurisprudence related to ESC rights. It is possible that 
there have been rulings in lower courts that do not use online archives, but I have been unable to find mention of 
jurisprudence on the right to food in Bolivia in secondary sources, pointing to a dearth of rulings.  
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poorest and most undernourished peoples. Those facing the most harm, and with the best ability to prove 
that the state is not fulfilling its obligation to the right to food live in rural, indigenous communities. This 
means that although there might be violations to the right to food, there are high barriers to addressing 
them through the legal system in Bolivia.   
Two of the macro issues identified in the background section, indigenous rights and land 
inequalities, are dealt with in the constitution. The constitution provides new and stronger rights for 
indigenous peoples; indeed, Articles 2, 3, and 5 establish indigenous people as having the right to 
autonomy, the same rights as other Bolivians, and indigenous languages as official languages. Under 
articles 9 and 26, indigenous people have the right to special representation and communal democracy. 
Furthermore, there is an entire chapter, chapter four, dedicated to the rights of indigenous people. This 
support for indigenous people succeeded years of reforms led by the indigenous-campesino sectors of 
society (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011, 7). The constitution gives the national and local governments control 
over the land and establishes principles about using it with thought to biodiversity and the social good. 
However, lobbying from commercial farmers and agroindustrialists nullified the constitution’s ability to 
bring about true land reform through Article 311 which guarantees the right to land property (McKay and 
Colque 2016, 15).  
Article 45 of the constitution grants the right to social security for reasons of sickness, work risks 
(including those involved in agricultural production), and disability, among others. Universal health care 
is guaranteed under article 36 which created the national health system, but less than a third of the 
population was registered under the schemes in 2004 (ILO and Samame 2017). Employees pay into their 
pensions so that they can have support when they are elderly, and there is a universal pension system for 
those who cannot (World Bank 2018b, 74). Finally, individuals can receive benefits if they are injured at 
work. Overall, Bolivia’s social safety nets coverage of the poor is one of the best of in the world, at 73 
percent (World Bank 2018b, 40). About 23.4 percent of the poorest of the poor receive unconditional cash 
transfers from the government, and 75 percent of this same group receive conditional cash transfers 
(World Bank 2018b, 36–37). 
 The government of Bolivia formulates its specific and ambitious goals for food sovereignty in its 
Agenda Patriótica 2025. First, the plan calls for the elimination of hunger and the reduction of 
malnutrition for all people by 2025. Towards this end, the agenda states that all levels of government 
should act together to provide food in schools, as well as promoting the production of the amount and 
type of products that people want to consume, diversifying production, and supporting smallholder 
agriculture (Peña Claros et al. 2013, 25). Both these goals and the aspirations expressed in the 
constitution should be taken as just that: aspirational goals. They also serve a political purpose for the 
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government, as it can point at these documents as evidence of its commitment not only to complying with 
international human rights law, but also to helping the people.  
 Bolivia has a National Council on Food and Nutrition, or a food sovereignty steering group, as 
well as a Food and Nutrition Policy. PMSC focuses on eliminating hunger in young children, although it 
does include language on access, availability and use of food for the whole population. As in Kenya’s 
National Food and Nutrition Security Policy, this PMSC acknowledges the right to food as one of its 
goals. The Food and Nutrition policy was put into place in 2014, and also includes language on the right 
to food and ensuring that this right is justiciable. Usage is the primary pillar of food security that the 
policy addresses, with the overall motto of knowing how to eat well to live well. It relies heavily on the 
food sovereignty framework, starting with objective one that calls for production of nutritious and 
abundant food by family farmers. The policy includes targeted action for indigenous groups and rural 
populations, two of the most vulnerable (and overlapping) groups. The policy includes a program to 
develop urban agriculture, but there is not the attention given to this vulnerable group that there should 
be. One of the most important things that this policy does is address the links between economic 
inequality and malnutrition, which is a crucial step as Bolivia struggles with the access pillar of food 
security. In addition, these policies fill gaps in food security related to nutrition and usage that are not 
addressed in the agricultural policies. The major problem with this policy, however, is that it does not 
outline implementation, nor is there a separate implementation document. This leaves another gap, and 
opens space for litigation to force the state to take stronger action on food security.  
Large social changes occurred prior to the referendum on the new constitution in 2009 that put 
into place a new regime based on sovereignty. The constitution takes a leap forward on ensuring 
indigenous rights and equality, and also moves towards land reform. Bolivia’s right to food legislation 
should be read in the context of a state trying to push back against what it saw as international meddling. 
Nevertheless, the constitution does acknowledge the right to food, despite tensions between human rights 
as internationally recognized and imbedded in the liberal order and the constitution’s rejection of that 
very framework (Gregor Barié 2014, 28). As such, food sovereignty in Bolivia seems more akin to anti-
colonialist and liberalization rhetoric than it does a guide for the state’s anti-hunger work (McKay, 
Nehring, and Walsh-Dilley 2014, 1193). The Food and Nutrition Policy creates the specific framework 
legislation on hunger including the right to food. The right to food should be most justiciable in Bolivia 
since it is party to the OP-ICESC, and the constitution and framework law explicitly give the state a role 
in guaranteeing the right to food. As we see, however, the presence of this legal framework has not led to 
cases being heard on the topic, which raises an important point: even when there is a strong legal 
framework, the right to food is still only marginally adjudicated. A similar phenomenon occurs in Kenya, 
in which other ESC rights are heard much more frequently than the right to food. What the study of 
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Bolivia adds is that unless people feel that they will benefit from using the courts, that they can actually 
access courts, and that there is a clear path to justice through them, whether or not the right to food is 
theoretically justiciable becomes irrelevant.  
AGRICULTURAL	FRAMEWORK	
In order to evaluate Bolivia’s current agricultural policies, this section will use the issues previously 
identified in this chapter. Starting at the macro level, Bolivia’s indigenous population continues to be 
marginalized, its infrastructure in general and for trade in specific is in poor shape, and land reform, 
particularly in the soybean-producing lowlands, has not settled the score on divisions relating to land 
rights. In the agricultural sector, farmers have little technology, the lowest yields in the region, little 
irrigation, and poor access to credit which challenge investment and production. Soil erosion has also 
plagued farmers, particularly in the highlands. The agricultural policy, then, should address many of these 
issues in order to support food availability. Programs that target rural indigenous communities as 
agricultural producers will help prevent crises like that in 2008 by both increasing availability of food and 
decreasing poverty in rural areas. In addition, measures that support natural disaster preparedness can help 
minimize the decreases in production that were seen in 2008. We see from data on precipitation and 
temperature that climate change-induced temperature rises will harm potato production. Soybeans on the 
other hand may benefit from increased precipitation and higher temperatures, if pests do not spread. 
Using this information, I will now assess the agricultural policy and make recommendation to improve 
sectoral policy and food security in Bolivia.  
Derived from the Agenda Patriótica and the constitution, as well as earlier agricultural plans, the 
government created the 2014-2018 plan for agricultural development, called Plan del Sector Desarrollo 
Agropecuario 2014-2018 “Hacia el 2025,” (PSDA) to support and develop the agriculture in the country, 
which is Bolivia’s most recent agricultural strategy. As in Kenya, climate change is a fundamental 
principle in the plan, as well as risk management; together, this sets the framework for agricultural policy 
that fully integrates climate change into its programs. However, food sovereignty or security are not 
principles for action except in so far as the plan derives from the Agenda Patriótica 2025, although 
sustainability and local production, which are part of the concept of food sovereignty, are included. The 
plan is organized around ten main components, each of which contains its own set of strategic objectives. 
The plan is somewhat standard in its objectives, but on the whole, it tends towards a more socialist 
ideology, which aligns with the country’s legislation. The PSDA focuses its attention throughout on 
smallholder farmers. This approach is valuable for two reasons: first, smallholders produce most of the 
food that is consumed domestically, and second, they tend to live in the highlands where there is the most 
poverty. Thus, attention to smallholders will support increased availability of food, as well as access for 
the poor. While it does give particular indicators for each strategic objective, it is extremely unlikely that 
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every goal will be met, or even for there to be data to show progress towards the goal. The stated 
objective may say something of political interest for the government, yet the indicators and funding 
amounts reveals the writers' true priorities.  
In relation to the three macro level issues—indigenous rights, land rights, and infrastructure—this 
plan makes a strong step toward ameliorating the conditions causing the problems. Attention to 
infrastructure is the macro issue that receives the least attention, likely because of Agenda Patriótica’s 
work on the issue. Infrastructure challenges are not even mentioned in component nine which focuses on 
increasing exports; this is a serious oversight, as the top barrier to trade is lack of infrastructure. Having 
agricultural fairs internationally, as the plan calls for, will prove ineffective at marketing if products 
cannot be shipped from the country in the first place. It calls for increased investment in infrastructure 
under component five, but there are no infrastructure indicators besides those for irrigation. The plan 
provides good support for indigenous peoples, dedicating all of component six to advancing their welfare 
through community development and ensuring that indigenous rights are respected. Indigenous groups are 
also targeted for special access to land under component 3, helping with both the macro issue while also 
decreasing vulnerability. The first component is to transform and consolidate tenancy, access and use of 
land under cultivation, which speaks to the macro problem of land accesses and land grabbing issues. 
Strategic objectives include finishing the process of land restructuring and ensuring that land under 
cultivation is properly titled in light of Law 429 (2013) and Law 3501 (2006). These laws that put into 
place the framework for land reform, requiring the redistribution of land that does not fulfill its economic 
and social function, determining whether current land usage follows the law, and regulating the market in 
order to avoid the creation of large estates. This part of the agricultural plan is important for Bolivia in 
terms of showing its dedication to its marginalized rural population and their ability to subsistence farm. 
The inclusion of land reform in this policy demonstrates several key remaining problems in the 
agricultural sector. First, land reform through the constitution and the flagship land rights laws has not 
been entirely effective in completing the redistribution efforts that Morales espouses. As in the 
constitution, there is tension between property rights and land distribution within the first component, as 
the PSDA outlines both. Smallholders, indigenous groups, and the poor are targeted as recipients of land 
under component one’s fourth objective, yet they do not appear as special beneficiaries as part of the 
goals section, meaning that in the implementation phase these groups are not given priority. In addition, it 
is easy for foreigners to get around land restrictions through marrying a Bolivian citizen or through 
shadowy, and mostly unregulated, land transactions (Urioste 2012) 
The policy takes some action to address the problems specifically facing the agricultural sector. I 
start with the areas in which the plan could improve. In the first component, the plan explains how 
converting plots into titled or collective lands will help smallholders access credit. This is the only 
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component in which credit is mentioned, despite ample evidence that lack of credit is a large-scale 
problem. There is no plan to improve extension services for potatoes besides a brief mention under 
component ten to ensure that agricultural information is available to all. Extension services will be 
particularly necessary so that potato farmers have the knowledge they need to select the types (as well as 
access to the types) of potato that is best suited for their specific changed environment. The plan is rather 
imprecise on steps related to irrigation, beyond component three which includes the improvement of 
water management as well as soil management, and component five which says that there should be 
investment in irrigation for smallholders. Irrigation is one of the key challenges facing the sector, and may 
also become increasingly important with more frequent droughts in the future.   
 Under component two, the issue of lack of technology in the sector in general and for potatoes 
and soybeans in particular will be addressed. This part of the plan is particularly weak, leaving a gap in 
Bolivia’s agricultural support. Yield increases are the only indicators of the plan, yet the action steps do 
not make clear exactly what actions will be taken to increase yields. Indeed, the action plan calls for using 
ancestral knowledge and genetic resources, but does not specify how the Ministry of Rural and Land 
Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural y Tierras, or MDRyT) will do this. Potato production is 
targeted for a 30 percent increase in all regions, without attention to the ways that altitude or climate 
might make yield increases more difficult in higher areas. While there are additional challenges to 
measuring the transmission of local knowledge, more ambitious goals may have tracked workshops to 
share practices or community knowledge banks. The lack of attention to traditional agricultural methods 
in its indicators is highly detrimental to Bolivia’s food security: as most potatoes grown in Bolivia are 
produced using traditional methods, and Bolivians consume far more potatoes than other crops, by 
excluding traditional knowledge from the indicators Bolivia leaves behind the largest portion of its 
farmers. 
Next I discuss some of the stronger aspects of the plan. Component number three focuses on 
management and use of water, soils, and vegetation. Of particular note to food security in Bolivia is soil 
stewardship, outlined under strategic objective number one, as erosion is already making production 
difficult in the highlands. Ways to improve the soil that the plan outlines include crop rotation and using 
better tillage systems. In addition to improving use, the plan sees Bolivia also restoring areas that have 
suffered erosion and salination by improving vegetation cover and other agroecological methods. Areas 
that are particularly damaged will be protected in order to return them to a better condition. This tripartite 
approach to soil rehabilitation is a good one, in which extremely damaged soil is protected, moderately 
eroded areas are rehabilitated, and farmers use methods to prevent erosion in the first place. These 
methods will be especially important if potato farmers begin moving higher into the mountains where soil 
is of poorer quality because of climate change.  
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This plan is quite strong in dealing with the effects of climate change, and directly connects its 
climate change mitigation work with food security. Potato production is vulnerable to droughts in La 
Niña years, and the lowlands are susceptible to flooding, so mitigating the effects climate change on 
producers through adaptation is a good step. Strategic objective three of component five deals mostly with 
institutional-level action, such as developing institutional capacities and creating early warning systems. 
One interesting part of this component is that it envisions climate change preparations happening not only 
at the level of the national government, but also municipalities. Decentralization is part of the concept of 
food sovereignty, and it also will help prepare communities for climate change because local actors best 
understand communities’ needs. Component eight on diversification of the rural economy will also 
contribute to climate change adaptation, as it will allow more people to move from the highly climate 
sensitive agricultural sector to more stable job opportunities. The employment target for those in the 
highlands who are the poorest and also more likely to be indigenous is lower than that in other areas, 
which is exactly where the government should be dedicating the most resources.  
Component five on production increases for “food security with sovereignty” details Bolivia’s 
primary pathway toward improved yields and overall production. As Bolivia struggles with the lowest 
yields in the region, implementing this part of the plan will assist in increasing food availability. It is 
strongly rooted in ecologically-friendly production methods to achieve these yield increases. The plan 
includes indicators on the yields it would like to achieve, as well as the tonnage of ecologically-friendly 
produced goods. The specific steps to increasing yields are not clear, however, meaning that the MDRyT 
has a lot of wiggle room to determine how to accomplish its own goals.  
Unlike the three other case study countries’ agricultural plans, Bolivia’s does not credit 
international actors as authors of the plan. In implementing the plan, however, the government notes that 
it will rely on international assistance. This is an important point in that even the most anti-internationalist 
country of the four cannot do what it feels it needs to without international support. In addition, while 
component nine articulates a path towards increased domestic consumption, it also wants to see increased 
Bolivian exports on the international market (Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural y Tierras 2014).  
 This plan is a mixed bag in terms of its potential to improve food security. While this plan uses 
powerful rhetoric and includes ambitious goals, it does not give much guidance as to the step-by-step 
actions the state will take in order to put words into action. Positive action on land rights, indigenous 
rights, erosion, climate preparation, and yields is balanced with lack of attention to infrastructure, 
extension services, and credit access. This plan is a demonstration of the government’s inability to 
implement action to put food security and food sovereignty into place. As McKay, Nehring, and Walsh-
Dilley write, “Despite a general commitment to food sovereignty, there has been an inability to enact 
meaningful structural changes that might contribute to the achievement of food sovereignty on the 
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ground” (2014, 1193). Income diversification and yield increases may help with food access and food 
availability, respectively, but overall there is much more that this plan could do with its one-billion-dollar 
budget.  
CLIMATE	CHANGE	FRAMEWORK	
In order to understand where Bolivia should go in terms of its climate change policy and food security, 
this section will focus on the parts of the country’s climate change policies related to agriculture and food 
security. Specifically, I will examine how Bolivia plans to adapt to rising temperatures in the highlands as 
well as droughts and floods. While Bolivia contributes little to the causes of climate change, it is already 
being affected by it. Glaciers have begun melting, jeopardizing electricity supplies from hydropower as 
well as water for direct human use (Bradley et al. 2006, 1755–56). Bolivia is regularly impacted by El 
Niño events that have been occurring more frequently likely because of climate change (Cai et al. 2014). 
The Bolivian Amazon, a biodiversity hotspot, faces the threat of intermittent floods and droughts as well 
as a reduction in vegetation (Cook and Vizy 2008). The most vulnerable are the rural poor who are less 
able to adapt to changing temperatures and rely directly upon the earth and climate for their livelihoods.  
Bolivia ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1994, the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1999, and the Paris Agreement in 2016. It developed broad strategic objectives to 
addressing climate change: to reduce vulnerability to climate change in different sectors; to promote 
planned adaptation under various sectoral programs; and to reduce the risks to climate change impacts in 
different sectors identified as vulnerable (Plurinational State of Bolivia 2009, 60). Bolivia’s constitution is 
weaker on climate change than one might expect given its negotiation context: climate change is not 
mentioned in the document. Standing in for climate change rights are environmental rights. Article nine 
establishes that the state has the responsibility to protect the environment “for the welfare of present and 
future generations,” alluding to the multigenerational problem of climate change. Indigenous people have 
a special right to the environment under article 30, and articles 32 and 33 establish that everyone has the 
right to a clean environment and that they can take legal action to protect this right.  
Within the Economic and Social Development Plan 2016-2020, Bolivia expresses the need for it 
to take action towards environmentally friendly practices and emissions reductions (Plurinational State of 
Bolivia 2016, 58). Several relevant goals to agriculture include implementing technology for risk 
management and production under the conditions of climate change; implementing sustainable agro-
industrial systems; supporting water systems to prepare for climate change; and promoting international 
cooperation on climate change (Plurinational State of Bolivia 2016, 93, 118, 149, 154). It is not just the 
public sector that has been asked to react to climate change; the private sector is also called upon to 
support mitigation and adaptation (Plurinational State of Bolivia 2016, 123). It has also taken action, with 
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the support of development banks and the private sector, on climate change issues: a review of its actions 
levels that it undertook no fewer than 20 distinct projects to improve climate change adaptation before 
2011 (Adaptation Partnership 2011, 67–70). 
The Food and Nutrition Policy (PAN) acknowledges that climate change will have large impacts 
on food security, and that Bolivia is already experiencing the effects of climate change. In the section on 
climate change, the policy lists smallholders and indigenous groups as those who will be most impacted 
by climate change. This step is an important one because it outlines the groups to target for intervention, 
although it leaves out the urban poor who may have to purchase more costly imported food if prices rise 
but purchasing power does not, and if poor infrastructure and other barriers to trade are not resolved. The 
policy rests more on mitigating the effects of climate change through sustainable resource use at the local 
level, and displays little support for putting into place larger adaptation programs. This focus on 
mitigation instead of adaptation seems contradictory, as the beginning of the section raises the point that 
Bolivia already experiences the effects of climate change.  
Although several government documents mention a national plan on climate adaptation, this plan 
does not appear to be completed or available to the public. As the last policy available on climate change, 
the Mecanismo Nacional de Adaptación al Cambio Climático, or the National Climate Change Adaptation 
Mechanism, is from 2007, and there has been no updated version and Bolivia has not submitted a 
National Adaptation Programme of Action, I will thus analyze the Ley Marco de La Madre Tierra or the 
Law on Mother Nature as the primary document through which Bolivia will adapt to climate change. This 
law takes a rights-based approach to climate change, saying that Bolivians have the right to live well, and 
that state action on climate change must be done in an equitable manner. This justice and rights-based 
approach is similar to that throughout the constitution, which grants a whole host of rights. Speaking to 
the larger land rights issue, the law reaffirms the need to plan and regulate land use in accordance with 
climate change impacts.  
To eliminate risks and reduce climate vulnerability, the law outlines six measures under Article 
17. The plan includes incorporating climate change into all policies and programs which, from the 
policies and plans surveyed in this thesis, seems to have been well-implemented. The second component 
deals directly with the issue at hand: food security under the conditions of climate change. It hopes to 
maintain production levels to ensure food security through attention to the availability pillar. What is of 
particular note about this article is that it targets vulnerable regions and peoples. Although it does not 
specify the groups or areas to which it refers, the law has the potential to significantly help rural and 
indigenous people who are the poorest and most marginalized. Another element of the law that may 
benefit food security is the creation of early warning systems and information networks to support both 
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the agricultural sector and climate change awareness. Here the law specifies the communities to target: 
indigenous peoples, intercultural communities, and Afrobolivians.  
The law gives more attention to research and extension services than the agriculture sectoral 
policy provides under Article 17. There is no mention of crops or areas to be targeted for extension 
services, so this law only partially fills the gap left in the agricultural sectoral plan. It also includes strong 
language under Article 27 on water management and protection, key to mitigating both droughts and 
floods.  
The most noteworthy parts of this plan relate to finance and investment. As access to credit is a 
weakness in Bolivia’s agricultural sector, harnessing state power to support more borrowing opportunities 
will help smallholder farmers. This plan includes this finance portion in several places, including under 
Article 20 to support the agricultural sector with the goal of improving food security, and Article 18 
which outlines that smallholders should receive special financial support (Plurinational Legislative 
Assembly 2012).  
Bolivia’s climate change policy, like its agricultural policy, leaves some room for improvement. 
While there are measures that help farmers gain access to investment opportunities and smallholders and 
indigenous groups are targeted throughout the documents for special attention, there is an overall focus on 
mitigation instead of adaptation. There is also no attention given specifically to potatoes in any of the 
planning documents, which is a key crop for food security and also vulnerable to changes in temperature 
due to climate change. Bolivia will likely be impacted by climate change no matter what mitigation 
behavior it takes, so investing more heavily in helping farmers adapt to changing climates through 
extension services is likely a better use of its financial resources. Bolivia should create a program with 
clear implementation actions and goals to assure that action on climate change actually takes place.  
 
CONCLUSION	
In this case study on Bolivia, I investigated the right to food, agriculture, and climate change policies and 
programs in order to better understand gaps in Bolivia’s current policies and to make policy 
recommendations. Unlike in Ukraine, where food access is the main challenge to food security, Bolivia 
struggles to meet any one of the pillars, although availability and access were particularly of note here. In 
the national context section, I identified majority-minority groups, poor infrastructure that limits trade, 
and land inequality as macro issues that policies need to address in order to ensure that food security has 
the institutional and macro-level support to be successfully implemented. The constitution and the 
agricultural sectoral plan directly address land issues and indigenous rights, and there are other instances 
in the development strategy and climate change policy where these overarching problems are addressed. 
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Land rights issues, despite law after law since the 1950s on reform, have proven to be particularly 
intractable, probably because of the economic and political strength of the owners of large estates in the 
lowlands. I am unconvinced that the redistributive policies in place will be fully implemented because the 
power structure in the lowlands remains the same as under past redistribution attempts. Infrastructure in 
relation to agriculture is not a priority under current agricultural policy, but the Agenda Patriótica and 
other overall development legislation do prioritize it; the question here is whether infrastructure will be 
built to take into account climate change and future agricultural import needs. Indeed, the call for 
increased yield and production will be of little use if Bolivia still cannot effectively move food around the 
country. Investment in transportation infrastructure is therefore an important step toward food security.   
The two main groups vulnerable to food insecurity are at-risk for different reasons. Rural 
smallholders, particularly indigenous communities, are facing increasingly difficult agricultural 
conditions in the highlands, which may decrease food availability while also eliminating their source of 
income. Livelihood diversification under the agricultural sectoral plan is a good step towards supporting 
rural people, yet the policy’s attention to extension services to help them maintain yields is poorly 
developed. Urban people, who are also at risk for food security, receive no attention in the agricultural 
policy, and are only targeted for support through urban farming projects in the PAN.  
Extreme weather events, like that in 2008, are one of the biggest concerns for agricultural 
production going forward. However, there is not as much support in the policies as there should be for 
action to mitigate flooding and drought, as well as conducting research and providing extension services 
to farmers, both of which may become more significant problems moving forward. There are several 
gestures to improve irrigation, which may mitigate droughts; the flip side of the issue, flooding, is left 
unexplored. As the lowlands is where flooding usually occurs, and it is the primary export production area 
where more established farmers live, there is the possibility that some farms have the funds to invest 
themselves on flood prevention. If only to prevent another political crisis similar to 2008, the government 
should invest in flood prevention programs and infrastructure in the region. In addition, CMIP5 shows 
that the temperature overall will increase, and precipitation will stay largely the same; these projections 
may have negative consequences on potato production, as potatoes need cooler temperatures to grow, but 
soybeans may benefit.  
As Bolivia is a net food importing country with limits on production primarily due to 
geographical land features, the agricultural plan’s focus on erosion mitigation and rehabilitation will 
support food security by ensuring that there remain areas where food can be grown in the future. Yields 
are supposed to increase, but it is not clear exactly how the government will support this effort. There are 
also some glaring gaps in the agricultural policy: it does not do enough to improve technology and credit 
access, nor does it provide extension services for farmers. 
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The most important program that Bolivia has to support food security is its social safety 
programs. These provide cash transfers, health care, and insurance to almost three-fourths of the 
population, and helped keep the 2008 crisis from creating the havoc that experts predicted. Accessibility 
is still a problem, and as there is not an overall program focused solely on nutrition (except for specific 
groups, e.g. children and the elderly), the cash transfer programs in place should continue to be heavily 
supported. While opposed by the natural gas-producing districts, diverting some profits into these social 
programs seems to have had positive effects in decreasing poverty.  
Legal support for the right to food in Bolivia includes language on food sovereignty, reflecting 
the current socialist tendencies of the government. There is a strong backing for this right with the state 
having the obligation to guarantee food security. As in the other case study countries, it appears that this 
language has had little influence on food security. While there is strong normative and legislative support 
for food security, using the courts to force the government to implement programs that specifically target 
rural indigenous people as well as the urban poor might be more effect than in Kenya for several reasons. 
First, there is a glaring policy gap that plaintiffs can point to as the state failing to fulfill its obligations. 
Second, the very process of bringing the government to court on the right to food and food sovereignty 
would highlight differences between the state’s rhetoric and action, and might shame the government into 
taking action simply from public opinion. Although Bolivia is party to OP-ICESCR, there have been no 
complaints brought against it to the Economic, Social and Cultural Committee. I posit that the same 
reasons that Bolivians do not use the domestic courts are further magnified for this international process. 
However, this is an avenue which should be tested, if only to attempt to set some precedent at the 
international level on the right to food to determine whether the OP-ICESCR is useful for this issue.  
Overall, Bolivia has some significant challenges to overcome in order to assure food security. 
Through maintaining and continuing to expand the social safety nets currently in place, Bolivia can work 
to make sure that people have access to food economically; infrastructure investment can facilitate 
physical access. Under the conditions of climate change, it appears that food availability may decrease, 
which again points to the importance of facilitating trade in foodstuffs, which includes infrastructure 
investments. In order for Bolivia to fulfil the right to food and work towards zero hunger, it must first turn 
its discourse into action. The government has already faced rising criticism and protests because of 
Morales’ fourth presidential bid and corruption scandals (Casey 2018). In order to continue the progress 
that Bolivia has thus far made, political and economic stability are necessarily; any successor to Morales 
might continue and strengthen the reforms and policies he put in place, while working to maintain 
democracy and eliminate corruption. In order to improve its food security under the conditions of climate 
change, Bolivia should formulate an updated Multisectoral Zero Hunger Program and climate change plan 
of action, continue to limit soybean cultivation area, and enforce these limits, and invest in extension 
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services and infrastructure. On the right to food front, activists should try to bring cases on the right to 
food before the constitutional court and OP-ICESCR complaint mechanism. 
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Nepal, home to many of the world’s highest peaks, is also a fascinating case study of a country hoping to 
industrialize quickly and move large numbers of its population out of the agricultural sector. I have 
chosen to study Nepal for several reasons. First, of the four case studies, Nepal has the highest percentage 
of its population employed in agriculture; as a result, changes in the agricultural sector have the potential 
to directly and significantly improve the lives of its inhabitants. Like Bolivia, Nepal includes the right to 
food sovereignty in its constitution, but does so in slightly different ways: it gives the right to food 
sovereignty to citizens, without presenting the state as the guarantor of this right. While constitution of 
each case study was negotiated under relatively tense conditions, Nepal’s emerged at the end of a civil 
war, which will give us insights as to the effects of war on the right to food. Nepal is a net food importer, 
and is overwhelmingly dependent on India for all of its trade. Although Nepal has close and complicated 
relations with India, it was never colonized by a foreign power. It faces challenges to all four pillars of 
food security, although stability and access are those with the biggest gaps. Nepal does not produce major 
quantities of commodity goods, so income and access rely on quality production of cardamom. As the 
only lower-income country of the four, Nepal may be able to learn some lessons from the other case study 
countries about how to increase its wealth and decrease poverty. Through the lens of Nepal’s national 
context, agricultural context, the 2008 crisis, and climate change impacts on major crops investigated in 
Part I, I will analyze Nepal’s right to food framework as well as the agricultural and climate change 
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In this section, I begin exploring Nepal’s history, politics, and economy in order to better understand the 
context of agricultural and climate change policies. Nepal, a landlocked country between China and India, 
has seen its ranking on the Human Development Index increase by over 50 percent since 1990 (United 
Nations Development Programme 2018). Despite this leap forward, Nepal continues to face problems 
from its rising population and its lack of sustained growth (World Bank 2018b). Its population of just 
under 30 million people, most of whom live in rural areas, experience high levels of poverty (N. P. 
Shrestha 2008, 99). Nepal’s population has risen steadily since the 1990s, with urban populations almost 
quadrupling in the same period. Emigration for better employment prospects has been on the rise, and 
remittances continue to be economically important, making up approximately 30 percent of GDP (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2019). At 1.13 percent, however, Nepal’s population growth is undercut only by 
Ukraine’s negative rates as the lowest of the four countries (World Bank 2017b). As a post-conflict state, 
Nepal is still getting its house in order in terms of policies and implementation processes to improve the 
lives of its citizens. Despite the many challenges that it continues to face, there are also many agricultural 
development opportunities that the government of Nepal hopes to exploit in order to become a middle-
income country in the next fifty years.  
 The country is divided into three geographical zones: the Tarai (Terai)18 plain in the south, at 
about 300 meters above sea level and making up 20 percent of total land; the mountainous region in the 
north that makes up 24 percent of the total land area; and the lower hills and slopes that make up 56 
percent of the country (Food and Agriculture Organization 2011a). The majority of the population lived in 
the hills zone until the 20th century, when overpopulation pushed people to move to the plains 
(Hrabovszky and Miyan 1987, 265). The three regions can be distinguished along the lines of poverty and 
food security, with the most food and least poverty in the Tarai (Pyakuryal, Roy, and Thapa 2010, 22).  
 Nepal is the second-most water-rich country in the world, with abundant surface and ground 
water resources (V. P. Shrestha 2007, 55). Its numerous rivers makes Nepal a prime candidate for 
hydropower, but this source of electricity is underdeveloped (V. P. Shrestha 2007, 57). Transboundary 
water usage rights pose a challenge to agricultural development in Nepal, as it has been unable to fully 
benefit from abundant hydro resources. Nepal and India have also sparred over water rights, since both 
countries rely on water from the Ganges river and its tributaries (Mirumachi 2015, 71–73). India has 
placed claims on large amounts of the water that flows from the Himalayas into its territory, which Nepal 
has been unable to contest because of India’s geopolitical advantages (Mirumachi 2015, 73–74; Whelpton 
2005, 132). In its position as the “hydro-hegemon” in the Ganges Basin, India has sought control over the 
region’s water supply through bilateral treaties that disadvantage Nepal and its other smaller neighbors 
																																								 																				
18 Both spellings are used in the literature, as using the Roman alphabet requires works to be transliterated.  
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(Mirumachi 2015, 74, 76, 78–80). The landmark Nepal-India Joint Committee on Water Resources, 
established in 2000, has been criticized for failing to include discourse on issues important to Nepal 
(Mirumachi 2015, 75–75). Thus, while Nepal has ample opportunity to expand hydropower energy, it 
faces political restrictions from unequal usage rights under plurilateral treaties.  
Home to eight out of ten of the world’s highest peaks, Nepal’s average elevation is 2565m 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2019). Both Nepal and Bolivia have agricultural production that occurs at 
extremely high elevations. Nepal is at risk of natural disasters, including earthquakes, floods, and 
landslides (Central Intelligence Agency 2019). In 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake devastated the 
country, leaving almost 9,000 people dead and millions more in need of humanitarian assistance. The 
disaster highlighted the vulnerability of the country, particularly among those living in remote areas 
(United States Agency for International Development 2015). Recovery from the disaster was slow, and 
aid groups reported that agricultural systems were highly damaged by the tremors (Mercy Corps 2016).  
Nepal’s political past is unique in many respects, notable for its absence of colonization by a 
Western power and for being the oldest independent state of the four. Arising from a series of city-states 
and feudal rulers, unified Nepal came into being in the mid-1700s (Whelpton 2005, 35–36). In 1846, the 
Rana regime, which placed the king and the hereditary prime minister securely under the control of the 
Rana family, was established (Whelpton 2005, 46–47). In 1951, the king and political parties worked 
together to oust the Rana rulers, and democracy was instituted for nine years before it was surpressed by 
the monarchy (Whelpton 2005, 71, 98–99). Starting in 1979, student protests created unrest that then 
spread, and that finally gave way to multiparty elections in 1991 (Jha 2015, 17; Whelpton 2005, 107–17). 
Even under the nascent democracy, the rural poor’s vote was frequently co-opted by more influential 
people in the area, and Communist parties protested the new government (Whelpton 2005, 176–77, 189).  
The newly elected government failed to institute a new constitution, leaving many disillusioned 
with the system. Following the rise and collapse of several political parties’ hold on the government, and 
the ensuing violence, power struggles, and alleged fraud, the leftist Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
began the ‘People’s War’ in 1996 (Whelpton 2005, 204). This civil war, which left tens of thousands dead 
in massacres on both sides, continued for longer than expected given that the Maoists had no international 
backers (Jha 2015, 30). In 2002, the new king Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev used a constitutional 
provision to take control of the government, returning the country to monarchical rule (Whelpton 2005, 
221). The Maoist uprising also began seeing more successes because of failures by the state, and by the 
time of the king’s ascent controlled several districts (Jha 2015, 42). The use of violence escalated on both 
sides, and rounds of peace talks between the rebels and the king failed repeatedly (Jha 2015, 48, 55). As 
people fled the violence, agricultural production decreased and food insecurity increased (Baral and 
Heinen 2005, 3). Leaders of the Nepali Congress, a social-democratic party, realized that a way out of the 
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turmoil would be to work with the Maoists to abolish the monarchy (Jha 2015, 62). Finally in 2006, an 
agreement between the Maoists, the Nepali Congress party, and the king resulted in a Constituent 
Assembly by direct vote, and the official abolition of the monarchy in 2008 (Jha 2015, 3, 65–66). 
Although peace did not occur overnight, following 2006 Nepal was much more politically stable 
due to the end of the civil war. Despite some challenges within parties, strikes, and the failure to pass a 
constitution on the first go, the government nevertheless finally agreed on a new constitution, which was 
implemented in 2015. The current Nepali system is a democratic republic, with a president, a prime 
minister, and a parliament called the Constituent Assembly (CA) (Central Intelligence Agency 2019).  
The recent political history of Nepal shows that political stability has not been one of the 
country’s strong points, which has presented a challenge to agricultural development. The Nepali state 
began planning its development strategy in 1955, modeled after the Indian system involving somewhat 
state-supervised development (Whelpton 2005, 125–26). The Rana rulers remained ambivalent about 
supporting development projects, however, which caused Nepal’s growth to fail to meet these plans, and 
faced with a devalued currency, a balance of payment problems, and lack of reserves, the government 
turned to the World Bank for a loan in the mid-1980s (Jha 2015, 9; P. K. Shrestha 2010, 4; Whelpton 
2005, 125–27). In 1985-1986, policies around state-owned enterprises and licensing for private business 
were liberalized as a direct result of the loans in a structural adjustment program similar to those received 
by Kenya and Bolivia at around the same time (Whelpton 2005, 147). Following two structural 
adjustment programs, Nepal entered into an “Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility” with the IMF in 
1992 (P. K. Shrestha 2010, 4). Already low after structural adjustment, Nepal’s tariffs decreased further 
upon becoming a member of the WTO in 2004 (P. K. Shrestha 2010, 6). The success of these programs, 
like those in the other case study countries, can be called into question: “These programs have actually 
weakened the government capacity and neither was it able to create institutional mechanism necessary for 
strong economy,” writes Shrestha, pointing towards poverty and poor living standards as outcomes of the 
programs (2010, 2, 21).   
During the People’s War, security and development were combined into one integrated project to 
lessen the Communists’ hold on underdeveloped areas (Whelpton 2005, 210). Ruling parties have been 
largely unable to implement long-term plans because of quick turnover. Corruption has plagued the 
country, “inhibited development activities, circumscribed enforcement of human rights, hampered the 
enforcement of directive principles and policies of the State, and constrained in basic infrastructure 
development,” (Government of Nepal 2011a, 75). Pervasive corruption combined with the lack of state 
presence in rural areas and with mistrust of the government has meant that efforts to implement much-
needed development strategies and projects have struggled to succeed. The poor are largely concentrated 
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in rural areas: 90 percent of poor Nepali people are rurally-based (Central Intelligence Agency 2019; 
Government of Nepal 2011a).  
Problems that affect society at large present challenges to agriculture and climate change policy 
in specific. To that end, I will now discuss three main macro-level issues that Nepal must address in order 
to assure food security. In Nepal, lack of infrastructure to reach remote mountainous villages, relations 
with India, and land problems are the biggest governance challenges facing the country.  
 Because of Nepal’s geography, successive regimes have found building transportation 
infrastructure to be quite challenging: as Shrestha points out, the rivers are too fast and turbulent to 
navigate, and building roads in the mountains is incredibly costly (2007, 91). In 2018, Nepal was ranked 
number 123 in regards to its infrastructure, illustrating the need to improve these facilities (World Bank 
2018a). Although roads and airports have increased accessibility throughout the country, some remote 
areas remain outside of the scope of infrastructure projects. Over 40 percent of roads are fair weather 
roads, or roads that can only be used under good conditions because of lack of paving or other surfacing 
treatments (V. P. Shrestha 2007, 91). Networks of land transportation, the most important mode of 
transportation, are more robust in the south and generally the southeast of the country, leaving many 
districts in the north poorly serviced (V. P. Shrestha 2007, 97). Lack of infrastructure continues to be a 
problem for expanding agricultural markets, particularly because many smallholders live in remote areas, 
and thus only sell a small portion of their production on the market, making markets thin and prices high 
(Rapsomanikis 2015, 7, 27). This is also a problem for redistributing food from food surplus to food 
deficit regions, so that a surplus does not equal availability everywhere. Access to sanitation services 
remains low, with only 46 percent of the population having access to sanitation facilities (Food and 
Agriculture Organization n.d.). Without transportation to move supplies or personnel, education, health 
and other services are also less available in mountainous and rural areas. 
As a landlocked country, Nepal faces problems trading on an international scale, and depends on 
India as its top trade partner. Although it has special agreements in place with India to allow movement of 
goods through India to Nepal, these arrangements continue to cause problems for Nepal. There are high 
costs imposed on transporting goods from India to Nepal, from slow transportation systems to paperwork 
requirements. Indeed, trade by road and by rail both take over twice as long as they should under optimal 
efficiency (Taneja, Bimal, and Dayal 2016, 17–18). When India implemented a trade blockage in 2015, 
for example, medicine prices skyrocketed and access decreased in Nepal (A. Sharma, Mishra, and Kaplan 
2017). Both countries are parties to the Trade Facilitation Agreement of the WTO, but have failed to 
implement measures that might speed up and reduce the cost of trade (WTO 2019). Despite its reliance on 
India, Nepal has a long and fraught relationship with its southern neighbor. Throughout time, the 
connection between the two countries has waxed and waned based on Nepal’s political status, its 
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relationship to China, and trade rules. In trade relations, Nepal tends to export raw materials to India, 
which India in turn exports to Nepal in the form of manufactured goods (Jha 2015, 21). The agricultural 
trade balance between the two countries has become increasingly negative for Nepal (R. Sharma, Kumar, 
and Joshi 2017, 250). Among Nepali people, India is frequently seen as a colonist state, and leftist 
factions have frequently labeled it the ‘enemy’ (Jha 2015, 39; Whelpton 2005, 174).  
Nepal’s growing population has put pressure on land access, despite low density, because of 
historical ties to feudalism that have not been fully severed through robust reform policies (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2019). In 1910, a new land tax system was implemented based on the payment of 
cash salaries, and in 1964, caps were placed on amount of land that could be owned by a given individual 
(Whelpton 2005, 75, 141). Land registration schemes began under the Land Revenue Act of 1978, which 
required that land transfer happen formally within the legal system (Acharya 2008, 7). Iterations of multi-
year development plans each highlighted different aspects of agricultural development through land 
policy without making any progress in putting the plans into place (Acharya 2011). The current laws that 
cap land ownership and regulate registration are not enforced, leading to insecurity for those working the 
land, and therefore low investment in plots (Wily, Sharma, and Chapagain 2009). Landholdings are 
unevenly distributed between groups, and feudalism remains, meaning that many who do agricultural 
labor do not own the land upon which they work (S. R. Sharma, Upreti, and Pyakuryal 2012, 127–28). 
Farmers have little incentive to invest in their land because of problems with the legal framework around 
property rights, and lack access to credit even if they wanted to invest. Land reform, although attempted 
by multiple governments, failed to materialize into redistribution for the landless (Wily, Sharma, and 
Chapagain 2009). The poor and very poor are usually landless or do not own enough land upon which to 
subsist, and recent trends show that the average size of land plots is decreasing (Akhter et al. 2018, 621; 
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agricultural Development 2015a, 30). The government of Nepal is still 
working on creating an umbrella land policy to better deal with the landless and increase land 
productivity, while the current Land Use 2015 policy seeks to zone land so that it can be used for food 
security purposes (Ministry of Land Reform and Management 2015). Despite being outlawed, bonded 
labor persists, particularly among landless agricultural workers (International Labour Organization 2013). 
Many bonded laborers have remained in the service of a landowner because they cannot obtain land that 
would allow them to make independent livelihoods (Wily, Sharma, and Chapagain 2009). In addition, 
traditionally marginalized groups including Muslims and Dalit communities experience landlessness 
more frequently than other groups (Government of Nepal 2011a, 61).  
To conclude this background section, I present some macro-level trends in indicators on food 
security and poverty in Nepal. Nepal’s GDP has risen exponentially since the early 2000s, yet GDP per 
capita is still the lowest of the three case study countries at $849 in 2017, showing that food accessibility 
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is a challenge to food security in Nepal (World Bank 2017a). The Gini index, which measures inequality, 
shows an increase in inequality in the early 2000s, and then a return to just under pre-spike levels. A 
dearth of data, however, means that long-term trends in inequality are impossible to assess (World Bank 
2010a). The latest data on poverty is from 2010, but from 1995 to 2010 poverty was quartered.19 In terms 
of food security, Nepal has grown increasingly dependent on imports to feed its population (Vijayan et al. 
2014). The prevalence of undernourishment in the population remains stagnant at 10 percent since 2009, 
while population growth has translated into rising numbers of undernourished people (Food and 
Agriculture Organization n.d.). By some measures, the availability of food has decreased in the last seven 
years: the value of food production and the average dietary energy supply adequacy have decreased (Food 
and Agriculture Organization n.d.). These trends show that while poverty is decreasing and the economy 
is growing, food availability and accessibility pose challenges to Nepal’s food security in the future.  
AGRICULTURAL	CONTEXT	
In this section on the agricultural sector, I explore the context and conditions for agriculture in Nepal in 
order to understand opportunities and constraints to offer better policy prescriptions. Agriculture likely 
began in Nepal around 2000 BCE, with farmers practicing burn and slash agriculture (Whelpton 2005, 
16). Low populations allowed farmers to plant one crop per land plot without the need for intercropping 
through the 20th century (Whelpton 2005, 18). The Rana rulers became involved in agriculture only in 
response to growing dissatisfaction of the population in the 1930s (Dhital 1970, 22). Until the end of the 
Rana regime in 1951, plans for development and support for agriculture were mostly for show (Dhital 
1970, 23). Development began in earnest with the first of a series of multi-year plans in 1956 mainly 
aimed at increasing agricultural production (Dhital 1970, 25, 27). Spending on agriculture and irrigation 
only totaled 15.7 percent of the total budget of the first plan, with the vast majority of resources going 
toward transport and communication improvements (Dhital 1970, 31). The first plan did not produce 
many of the desired results, and so after learning how to plan and mobilize funds, Nepal created its next 
plan (Dhital 1970, 41).  However, funding for agriculture fell by three percent under this new plan, and 
the agricultural goals were largely unmet (Dhital 1970, 49–54). The third plan from 1965 to 1970 again 
failed to reach its goals, although it came close to reaching the desired rice production; nevertheless, 
spending on agriculture did increase (Dhital 1970, 66, 73). The government of Nepal became increasingly 
involved in the agricultural sector during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1975-1980), spending on irrigation, 
chemical inputs, and programs to improve access to credit (Savada, Harris, and Library of Congress, 
Federal Research Division 1993, 122). Agricultural policy in the 70s through the 90s relied upon 
																																								 																				
19 Poverty here is defined as the ratio of people living on $1.90 a day in 2011 dollars (World Bank 2010b). 
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development aid donors and infrastructure projects, several of which have been widely criticized 
(Whelpton 2005, 143). 
Starting in the 1980s, government support for agriculture declined as the government liberalized 
trade and cut support for its state-owned enterprises. Structural adjustment phased out the use of subsidies 
for agricultural inputs, decreasing farmers’ access to inputs that might increase yields (N. P. Shrestha 
2008, 116). During structural adjustment, “agricultural output remained almost stagnant,” demonstrating 
the adverse effects of these programs on the sector (P. K. Shrestha 2010, 10–11). Unlike in Ukraine 
where the government continued to apply high tariffs at will, Nepal’s agricultural taxes declined to “the 
lowest in the region” in 2002 (Pyakuryal, Roy, and Thapa 2010, 25). Analyses have showed mixed results 
of liberalization: there is some indication that food security improved, but these gains were not spread 
evenly throughout the country, leaving higher levels of poverty for those living in the hills and mountains 
(Pyakuryal, Roy, and Thapa 2010, 27).  
In 1995, the government began implementing the Agricultural Perspective Plan, which put 
increased production of fruit and vegetables in the spotlight as well as a transition to green revolution-
type production (N. P. Shrestha 2008, 101; Whelpton 2005, 230). This plan, however, failed to be 
implemented as prescribed due to a lack of investment, few step-by-step plans, and little cooperation 
between government agencies (N. P. Shrestha 2008, 102). Some positive outcomes from the Agricultural 
Perspective Plan included improvements in rural road infrastructure, horticulture, and the management of 
community forests (Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agricultural Development 2015a, 44). 
Agriculture continues to be the main driving force of the economy, as 69 percent of Nepali people 
work in agriculture (down from 91 percent in 1981) and one third of GDP comes from the sector (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2019; Food and Agriculture Organization and United Nations Development 
Programme 2003, 32). Recent estimates of total land under production shows that around 20 percent of 
total land is cultivated, most of it in in the Tarai (Food and Agriculture Organization 2011a; V. P. 
Shrestha 2007, 64). In the hills, agriculture is carried out in terrace systems, in which retaining walls are 
built to prevent erosion and flatten out the terrain; crops are then planted in these man-made beds 
(Chapagain and Raizada 2017, 2). Nepali farmers frequently use intercropping and integrated crop 
systems that include livestock, which tend to be more resilient to pests and natural disasters (Panth and 
Gautam 1990, 53). Despite the use of these agroforestry methods, Nepal has not produced enough food to 
meet domestic demand since 2005 (Ministry of Agricultural Development 2013, 11).  
As in Kenya, agriculture in Nepal is characterized by smallholder subsistence farming, and also 
faces geographical constraints limiting where food can be grown (V. P. Shrestha 2007, 66). There is a 
smallholder farmer paradox in Nepal, as smallholders tend to have access to only small plots of land 
averaging 0.55 ha (down from 1.23 ha prior to 2007), yet they make up the vast majority of farms and 
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produce 70 percent of food (Rapsomanikis 2015, 6, 8; V. P. Shrestha 2007, 66). They also continue to 
produce yields that are twice as high as the yields from larger farms, likely because of the increased labor 
from family members (Rapsomanikis 2015, 11). Most of these smallholders grow crops only for their 
own consumption, leaving insufficient and non-producing families to purchase imported food 
(Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agricultural Development 2015a, 31). At the same time that Nepal 
requires more imported food to meet its needs, agricultural production has experienced falling terms of 
trade, or higher import prices compared to export prices (Food and Agriculture Organization and United 
Nations Development Programme 2003, 79). The sector is not well connected to other industries, and 
agroindustry and the processing of primary crops to export items of higher value remains limited 
(Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agricultural Development 2015a, 29).  
Farmers’ use of fertilizer, particularly nitrogen, has exploded in the last ten years due to government 
subsidies, but still falls behind that of neighboring countries (Bista, Amgain, and Shrestha 2013, 44; Food 
and Agriculture Organization n.d.). 
 I finish this section by outlining the main challenges to agriculture in Nepal.  
Agricultural production has not been able to keep pace with population growth, and yields have fallen 
behind other countries in the region (Bista, Amgain, and Shrestha 2013, 44–45). Although agricultural 
production has increased, this is due to the expansion of the area under cultivation (Food and Agriculture 
Organization n.d.; Whelpton 2005, 55,122). Farmers’ use of fertilizer, particularly nitrogen, has exploded 
in the last ten years due to government subsidies, but still falls behind that of neighboring countries 
(Bista, Amgain, and Shrestha 2013, 44; Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). Because of the width of 
terraces in the hills, mechanization is difficult to use and farmers often utilize home-made tools, which 
require more labor; overall, Nepali farmers lack access to technology (Chapagain and Raizada 2017, 
4–5; Savada, Harris, and Library of Congress, Federal Research Division 1993, 122). Specific 
challenges in the hills include declining water resources and soil fertility, as well as landsides and a 
declining labor pool. In the Tarai, shifting land with urbanization, erosion, and flooding challenge 
farmers’ ability to feed the country (Ministry of Agricultural Development 2013, 20). There has also been 
out-migration of men, changing the agricultural workforce and decreasing the number of skilled workers 
in the sector (Tamang, Paudel, and Shrestha 2014, 25). 
THE	2008	FOOD	CRISIS	IN	NEPAL:	CAUSES,	CONSEQUENCES,	AND	POLICY	RESPONSES		
In this section, I will investigate the causes, consequences, and policy responses to the 2008 food crisis in 
order to identify vulnerable populations and suggest policy changes that may ameliorate the government’s 
responses to hunger, paying particular attention to the stability pillar of food security. In 2008, those 
living in remote northern districts and rural agricultural wage laborers were the most hurt by higher food 
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prices, showing the need for government intervention to decrease vulnerability and increase food security. 
As in Kenya and Bolivia, domestic factors contributed to food insecurity, while also being harmed by 
global panic over rice availability. As the government relied heavily on international support to prevent 
famine, it is clear that there is much room for improvement in Nepal’s response to food instability.  
 Of the four case study countries, Nepal was hit hardest by the 2008 food crisis. Even prior to it, 
poor families were not able to afford sufficient food for an adequate diet (Akhter et al. 2018, 625). These 
poor conditions prior to 2008 meant that the effects of the food crisis devastated Nepal: 3.4 million more 
people became food insecure, and 5 million people fell into poverty (WFP 2009, 2). Because of the food 
crisis, the cost of the typical food basket increased by about 20 percent (Akhter et al. 2018, 621). The 
poorest of the population spend 70 to 75 percent of their income on food, so as prices spiked, they were 
unable to adjust their budgets to their rapidly decreasing purchasing power (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, WFP, and FAO 2009, 20). Rural agricultural wage workers, the poorest group, bore the 
brunt of the effects of the food crisis. Their purchasing power decreased, while drought decreased 
harvests. At the same time, imports of food were stalled because of exporting countries’ trade bans. 
Protests and strikes prevented the government from distributing aid and slowed trade networks. As 
transportation of products is essential because of regional food production disparities, which means that 
as petroleum costs have increased, so too has the cost of food in remote districts (Government of Nepal 
2011a, 61). To add to the suffering of poor families, the global financial crisis also likely decreased the 
amount of money sent home from abroad (FAO 2009, 16–17).  
 The effects of the food crisis were not spread evenly across the country: the northwest, and 
generally more northern districts faced greater food insecurity than the east and Tarai zone, and the 
country was declared to have regional, not country-wide, food shortages (FAO 2008, 18; Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives, WFP, and FAO 2009, 15). These differences in the location of the effects 
largely correlate with annual differences in production between districts, leaving some with food 
surpluses and some with food deficits. As around 18 districts experience food deficits on a yearly basis 
between June and September, the government regularly supplies foodstuffs to last them until the harvest 
(Kshetry 2008). As production fell with droughts, many more regions experienced food deficits than 
usual, and the government expanded its provision of basic food baskets (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, WFP, and FAO 2009, 14).  
A drought amplified the international crisis, taking place during the winter between 2008 and 
2009, during the period in which the country receives the least precipitation. During these winter months, 
however, weather stations reported rainfall far below that normally received (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, WFP, and FAO 2009, 6). Crops that are not irrigated, about half of the land under 
cultivation and in particular wheat, saw large declines in production. Production in relation to the 
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population growth had been declining for some time, and the drought in 2008-2009 led to even greater 
shortages as some areas experienced up to 70 percent crop loss (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, WFP, and FAO 2009, 20). This drought meant that Nepal’s normal production levels were 
not obtained, and families had to rely upon aid or imported foodstuffs.  
As a major importer of rice, one of the commodities for which supply on the international market 
decreased because of panicked export bans, Nepal is the case study country that was most impacted by 
other countries’ export restrictions (Paarlberg 2010, 23–24). Since 2002, Nepal has become 
increasingly dependent on agricultural imports, particularly from India, and in return, most of Nepal’s 
agriculture exports go to India (Gauchan et al. 2015, 250; R. Sharma, Kumar, and Joshi 2017, 249). 
Nepal’s agricultural imports ballooned from US$157 million in 1995/1996 to US$621 million in 
2010/2011, illuminating the extent of Nepal’s dependency on outside sources of food (Government of 
Nepal, Ministry of Agricultural Development 2015a, 27). During the 2008 crisis, India restricted their 
exports of rice from 2007 to 2010. This ban had a negative impact on Nepal, as rice is the number one 
agricultural good it imports from Indian and approximately 96 percent of its rice imports come from India 
(R. Sharma, Kumar, and Joshi 2017, 255). The price of rice went up 19 percent in 18 months, making 
imported rice difficult to access for Nepali families with dwindling purchasing power (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives, WFP, and FAO 2009, 18). India’s exports of non-Basmati rice to Nepal 
declined in February 2008, and stopped outright when India’s export ban went into full force in April 
2008 (Slayton 2009, 25). India’s rice export ban continued through 2010, and its high minimum export 
prices for Basmati rice continued through 2010 as well (Shama 2011, 29–30). Indeed, the rice price 
spikes were caused by slightly different factors than the food crisis as a whole, as export restrictions by 
major exporters like India thinned and destabilized the market while production remained largely 
sufficient to meet demand (Slayton 2009, 3–4). At the same time, regional food stocks declined, so 
there was no buffer to high import prices (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, WFP, and FAO 
2009, 23).  
  The government’s short-term responses to the crisis proved unsuccessful. The governmental 
Nepal Food Corporation (NFC) began increasing distributions of food to the poor in 30 mostly remote 
districts, yet these efforts yielded little respite because the government lacked the food stocks to distribute 
food in the quantities needed (Government of Nepal 2011a, 61; Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
WFP, and FAO 2009, 23, 28).20 The government also implemented food for food programs that require 
food aid-receiving families to produce food for the market, a challenge in times of drought (Government 
																																								 																				
20 The NFC has been criticized for being inefficient and failing to improve regional connectivity despite several 
rounds of reforms, so its lack of success in 2008 is not unexpected (Pyakuryal, Roy, and Thapa 2010, 21). 
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of Nepal 2011a, 62). Realizing their vulnerability to international market price spikes, in 2008, Nepal 
introduced policy to increase food storage, but this measure provided little help for those already suffering 
(Government of Nepal 2011a, 21). The World Food Programme (WFP) and other international 
organizations stepped in to help fill gaps in the government’s response. The WFP alone provided 
assistance to one quarter of the population; in addition to its school feeding programs and its food for 
work programs, the WFP also provided direct food rations during the crisis (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, WFP, and FAO 2009, 27; WFP 2009, 17).  
Besides consumer assistance, the government of Nepal also used several trade restrictive 
measures to keep food in the country. In April 2008, a ban on rice, maize and wheat went into effect, 
followed by a 35 percent export tax placed on wheat products in May 2008. The government proceeded to 
apply an export ban on pulses in July 2009 (Shama 2011, 32). Nepal’s agricultural exports sharply 
declined in 2008-2009 because of the drought and political unrest that decreased what was available for 
export (R. Sharma, Kumar, and Joshi 2017, 247). These late export bans likely did little to stop the spread 
of the crisis, as much of the cause of the crisis in Nepal was from internal, rather than external, sources, 
and Nepal relies on food imports. High prices lingered in Nepal after the decline in other parts of the 
world, which has largely been attributed to strikes and protests (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
WFP, and FAO 2009, 18). Trading in remote areas of Nepal is difficult, and so simply keeping food in the 
country was not enough; targeted action to help struggling populations, like the programs implemented by 
the WFP, might have been more successful (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, WFP, and FAO 
2009, 19).  
While a number of factors coalesced in Nepal making the 2008 food crisis the disaster it was, 
what is clear is that the government was ill-prepared to help vulnerable segments of the population. The 
2008 crisis demonstrates how Nepal’s food security is extremely vulnerable to any outside or inside 
disturbances. Going forward, there are several actions the government can take to decrease the country’s 
vulnerability to shocks. First, Nepal’s production must increase along with the population, otherwise 
Nepal will continue to be very vulnerable to the whims of international markets, particularly related to 
India’s rice exports. Second, food needs to be able to move around the country; increased production on 
its own will likely not help the northern districts that regularly face food deficit regions. Structural issues 
with infrastructure and political stability meant that the government was simply unable to provide timely 
assistance to those who needed it during the crisis. This means that investments in roads to remote 
communities, although expensive upfront, will allow food to move around the country not only during 
crises but also on an everyday basis. Third, while the NFC may be able to distribute food packages under 
normal circumstances, it lacks the funding and storage capacities to provide all of the assistance that the 
Nepalese need. In the short term, it appears that assistance from organizations like the WFP will need to 
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continue in Nepal to support food security. In the long-term, however, the government should increase 
spending on social safety nets and improve the NFC’s capacity to respond to crises. The type of aid given 
to inhabitants should be carefully targeted. When production fails in remote regions, direct government 
food provisions will be necessary to prevent starvation. In other areas where economic access is the larger 
issue, social safety nets, school feeding, and food for work programs will be more effective and prevent 
production disincentives. Fourth, steps to decrease vulnerability now will help Nepal in the future, as 
climate change may cause flooding and drought. A drought in 2008 and then a flood in 2009 limited food 
availability and caused additional humanitarian crises. Irrigation and water managements are thus a 
worthy investment. Last, Nepal must be politically stable in order for the above-mentioned actions to 
have the desired effects. In the last fifteen years, Nepal has become progressively more stable; continuing 
this trend is essential.  
CLIMATE	CHANGE	CONTEXT	
In order to understand the prospects for food security in the future, we must have a general grasp of 
climate change’s impact on agriculture. To narrow the scope of this inquiry, I will investigate two key 
crops, rice and cardamom. As Nepal’s number one food crop, rice is incredibly important to ensuring that 
Nepali people get the calories they need (N. P. Shrestha 2008, 109). Thus, production will serve as an 
indicator for food availability. Cardamom, the second crop in this study, is Nepal’s most important 
agricultural export. Thus, cardamom production will stand in for food access, as exports generate revenue 
and jobs. Like tea in Kenya, cardamom production is also dominated by smallholders. If production 
declines due to the effects of climate change, not only will the economy suffer, but smallholder farmers 
will lose access to food. Information on both crops will allow for a fuller picture of climate change’s 
potential impacts on food security in Nepal.  
Rice production was first introduced in the Tarai region likely before the 12th century (Whelpton 
2005, 16). The Tarai zone, consequently, is the area in which the majority of rice is grown, with farmers 
producing over 1,710,277 metric tons of rice in 2016 (Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agricultural 
Development 2015b). Rice can either be planted in drier fields using seeds, called dry seeded rice (DSR) 
or in flooded areas using transplanted seedlings, called aerobic rice.21 Because of its high water demands, 
rice is the crop that receives the most irrigation, with around 710,000 ha of rice production under 
irrigation schemes (Food and Agriculture Organization 2011a, 7). Smallholders are at a disadvantage 
compared to other farms in terms of irrigation: 67 percent of smallholder land is irrigated, opposed to 94 
																																								 																				
21 There are some grey areas between these general two definitions, as some producers refer to DSR even if the 
fields are flooded during the growth of the plant.  
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percent of other-sized farms (Rapsomanikis 2015, 19; S. R. Sharma, Upreti, and Pyakuryal 2012, 131). 
However, rice still makes up about 36 percent of smallholders’ production (Rapsomanikis 2015). Crop 
yields across the board have been low, but rice has experienced the most success (S. R. Sharma, Upreti, 
and Pyakuryal 2012, 132). There are over 73 varieties of rice grown in Nepal, each with different yields 
and climatic sensibilities (Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agricultural Development 2015b). Yields 
vary across the country, with farms in eastern Nepal being more productive (Joshi, Maharjan, and Piya 
2011, 108). Farmers have reported that challenges to growing rice include lack of irrigation, lack of 
access to good seeds, fertilizers and credit, and lack of technical know-how (Joshi, Maharjan, and Piya 
2011, 111).	
  
Figure 3.1. Map of rice production in Nepal (International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, 
Murray, and Central Bureau of Statistics 2003, 225). 
 Large cardamom, also called black cardamom, is one of Nepal’s top agricultural exports 
(Government of Nepal and International Trade Centre 2017; Govindarajan et al. 1982, 230). As the 
fourth-biggest exporter of cardamom in the world, Nepal earned 23 percent of its agricultural export 
income in 2018 from cardamom, almost all of which goes to India (Tridge 2018; The Kathmandu Post 
2018). Likely endemic to the Himalaya region, cardamom became commercially viable in the 1950s (KC 
and Upreti 2017, 1; Rao et al. 1993, 1). As perennial herbs, cardamom plants usually stand between 1.5 
and 3.0m tall and produce brown fruit pods with the cardamom seeds inside (Rao et al. 1993, 2). After 
harvesting, cardamom is dried in the sun or in heat-controlled driers before being sold (Govindarajan et 
al. 1982, 243). The plants themselves are long-term investments: they do not start producing their highest 
yields until they are eight to ten years old, but the plants can live for 20 to 25 years (Paudel et al. 2018, 
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856). As cardamom is harvested by hand in hilly areas, smallholder households can be competitive 
because of the high average number of hands available to do work (Ajmera et al. 2018, 177; Bhandari and 
Bhandari 2018, 83; Rapsomanikis 2015, 15; Tangjang and Sharma 2018, 2562). Around 67,000 Nepali 
families are involved in the production of cardamom (Government of Nepal and International Trade 
Centre 2017, 27; UNNATI 2016). Challenges to cardamom production include diseases and pests, poor 
extension services and poor knowledge about the drying process, as well as lack of technology and 
irrigation systems (Government of Nepal and International Trade Centre 2017, 40–43; KC and 
Upreti 2017, 2; Tridge 2018).  
 
Figure 3.2. Map of large cardamom production in Nepal (Government of Nepal and International Trade 
Centre 2017, 14). 
 After situating the key crops in their context, I now turn to the impact of climate change on them. 
Nepal has already begun experiencing the effects of climate change. Temperatures are projected to 
increase by 3.1°C, and precipitation is projected to increase by 0.4 mm/day, the largest increase of the 
four case studies (Adler and Hostetler 2013). While temperature increases are likely to be relatively 
regular between months, precipitation changes show more intermonth change. Melting glaciers means 
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that for now there may be both more water in the glacial-fed rivers and lakes that might flood, but in the 
long term it may present a different problem as water sources become more unreliable (Government of 
Nepal 2011b, 3). Nepal has two rainy seasons, one from June to September with most intensity in the 
southeast, and the other from December to February with more rain in the west; the summer rainy season 
brings 75 percent of the country’s rain (Food and Agriculture Organization 2011a). There are some signs 
that these rainfall patterns that determine crop harvests throughout the country have begun to change, and 
these rainfall changes present the greatest challenges to the production of cardamom and rice.  
 
Figure 3.3. Average monthly temperature observed and projected for Nepalganj, 400masl, part of the 
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Figure 3.4. Average monthly temperature observed and projected for Taplejung, 1441masl, part of the 




Figure 3.5. Average monthly precipitation observed and projected for Nepal (Adler and Hostetler 2013). 
 Although the elevation differences between the two crops are not as extreme as in Bolivia, I still 
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temperature to elevation conversation, I will adopt a similar approach (Akhtar, Ahmad, and Booij 2009, 
1179). To adjust the temperature, I use average data from cities in key production areas in the Tarai for 
rice and the hills for cardamom, and then add the country-wide projected change in temperature CMIP5 
model ensemble mean. This back-of-the-envelope calculation will allow me to better estimate future 
temperatures, and thus see their potential effects on cardamom and rice.  
Most rice varieties require temperatures between 10°C and 40°C to germinate, with optimal 
germination occurring at 30°C (Vergara 1992, 15). Plants grow best in warm temperatures between 25 
and 35°C (Vergara 1992, 23). As these optimal temperatures will be reached during more months of the 
year, the normal time between planting and harvesting for rice of 110 to 155 days with harvests occurring 
between September and November in the Tarai, growing seasons may shorten and harvesting may happen 
earlier, permitting farmers to plant more cycles of rice in a year and increasing production. Precipitation 
changes, however, might challenge these otherwise positive developments. Dry rice does not need to be 
flooded, but it does require moisture throughout the growing season, and rice grown in flooded patties 
requires 1,432 liters of water per kilogram of rice produced (Devkota et al. 2014; IRRI, n.d.). On average, 
all rice needs approximately 1300-1500mm of water per growing season (IRRI, n.d.). The higher spikes 
of precipitation during the summer months present both opportunities and challenges: increased rainfall 
may be stored so that irrigated crops can thrive all year-round, while floods might damage production. 
The Tarai zone is already vulnerable to floods, so without proper flood management systems and 
infrastructure, it is unlikely that rice production will benefit from the increased precipitation. Most 
farmers use improved seeds rather than local rice varieties (Government of Nepal, Ministry of 
Agricultural Development 2015b, 7). For dry seeded rice, the optimal time for sowing seeds is late May, 
and requires moist soil to germinate. Seeds that are not germinated in greenhouses can be incubated 
before planting using DSR production methods, decreasing the water necessary to grow the crop (Vergara 
1992, 16). 
Cardamom plants thrive in a wide range of temperatures, from 10°C to 30°C, although they prefer 
cooler temperatures. Increases in temperatures in the hills, where cardamom is primarily grown, may 
allow for plants to be planted at higher elevations than previously possible. Cardamom plants usually 
flower between April and June at lower altitudes, and May to July higher up (Rao et al. 1993, 3). 
Flowering time may decrease with the rising temperatures, leading to shifts in the timing of harvests. 
Because cardamom is an export crop, the timing of production is more important for the generation of 
extra income that it will give farmers. If farmers are paid upon harvesting and drying the cardamom, or 
perhaps earlier through market mechanisms, it is possible that earlier harvests might help farmers who 
plant cardamom purchase food before the subsistence rice harvest. In terms of precipitation, cardamom 
requires evenly distributed rainfall of 3000-3500mm per year (Gudade et al. 2013, 64). With increased 
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precipitation during the summer months, there is a need for water management systems to prevent 
flooding in the summer and to store water to distribute to plants later in the year. Changes in rainfall 
patterns might also challenge the production of cardamom by allowing the transmission of disease during 
wetter periods and the loss of plants during drier times.  
Investigating potential changes in temperature and precipitation and the effects of these changes 
on cardamom and rice product reveal some worrying trends for food security in Nepal. The projected 
effects of temperature on rice and cardamom show that there may be a shorter time until harvest or 
flowering, although whether or not this may have a drastic impact on food security is unclear because it 
depends upon when farmers need food the most throughout the year. In Nepal, unlike in Kenya or 
Ukraine, precipitation patterns are likely to stay the same, but with added rainfall during the summer. The 
increase in precipitation during one part of the year may cause a problem for the rice and cardamom 
plants, as they prefer evenly distributed water; rice in the Tarai is especially vulnerable to flooding. The 
main problem related to climate change problem for Nepal, then, is managing floods in order to ensure 
that food is available and accessible throughout the year. Accordingly, flood management policies should 




In this section, I explore the first question of my thesis on the right to food’s impact on food security in 
Nepal. Nepal ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 
1991 during its second democratic period. The 2015 constitution fails to indicate the status of 
international treaties vis-à-vis domestic law, leaving unresolved whether ICESCR applies directly or 
whether there must be a domestication process prior to the application of human rights treaties’ measures. 
This lack of specificity requires clarification to ensure that all international economic, social, and cultural 
rights are respected.22 Nepal has not signed nor ratified the OP-ICESCR.  
In 2006, the civil conflict officially ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiated 
between the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), beginning the process of 
adopting a new constitution (Farasat and Hayner 2009, 16). A Commission on Disappearances and a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission were established to help Nepal to a peaceful post-conflict state, 
although the actions of the commissions were weak because of little civil society participation (Farasat 
																																								 																				
22 In a 2011 court case, the judges used international human rights language to justify a decision in favor of the right 
to adequate food, perhaps pointing to a monist approach (Food and Agriculture Organization 2011b). 
Chapter 3: Nepal 
	 93	
and Hayner 2009, 25). The 2007 Interim Constitution, written by 16 lawyers, departed from previous 
governance models in three main ways: “from monarchy to republicanism, from civil conflict to peaceful 
politics, and from non-inclusive state mechanism to inclusive democracy;” it also included the right to 
food sovereignty (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015, 8; P. Sharma and 
Daugbjerg 2017, 10). Elections for the Constituent Assembly (CA) happened in 2008, and negotiations 
for the current constitution got underway (Jha 2015, 296; Phuyal 2015). During negotiations for the new 
constitution, three main areas of disagreement emerged: over state and land restructuring; over which land 
reform model to use; and over property rights (Shahi and Sapkota 2015, 2). The first CA failed to ratify a 
constitution by 2012, and a second CA was elected in 2013 (International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance 2015, 19). After the two devastating earthquakes in 2015, the different parties in the 
CA created a 16-point agreement which led to a draft, a public comment period, and finally the 
promulgation of the constitution in September 2015 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance 2015, 23–28).  
 The constitution declares Nepal to be a secular, socialism-oriented, federal democratic republican 
state, marking a shift from past constitutions, which contained the dual pillars of monarchy and 
democracy. Structured as a federalist state with three levels of government, federal, provincial, and local 
(under Articles 56-59), the constitution reimagines Nepal’s system of governance. Human rights are a 
central part of the constitution, despite the remaining issue of the application of international law, an 
outcome associated with gross violations during the People’s War. The general provision granting people 
the right to live with dignity can be interpreted as an expansive human right. Within the Directive 
Principles, the state’s political objective is to ensure that fundamental and human rights are protected, 
giving the state a human rights mandate. 
Article 36 codifies the right to food, stating: “(1) Each citizen shall have the right to food. 
(2) Every citizen shall have the right to be protected from a state of starvation, resulting from lack of food 
stuffs. (3) Every citizen shall have the right to food sovereignty as provided for in law.”23 Like Bolivia, 
Nepal eschews the language in ICESCR for stronger, choice-related rights. However, in choosing the 
word citizen to describe who has this right, the constitution effectively limits the application of this right 
to only certain members of society.24  Nepal takes a step further than Bolivia in formulating this right, 
																																								 																				
23 For a longer discussion of food sovereignty, see the Right to Food Framework section in the case study on 
Bolivia. 
24 This runs contrary to ICESCR which mandates that ESC rights be given to populations without discriminating 
based on certain characteristics such as nationality. It is likely that Nepal used the term citizen specifically to 
exclude Indian nationals living within its borders. This response to foreigners is quite different from Kenya’s, which 
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explicitly granting the right to food sovereignty. This phrasing of the right to food as the right to food 
sovereignty in the constitution was largely a political statement rather than a fully formed approach to 
food security, serving as a “coalition magnet” (P. Sharma and Daugbjerg 2017, 12). Various peasant 
movements promoted the idea of food sovereignty, although there purposefully remained “ambiguity” in 
what food sovereignty actually meant (P. Sharma and Daugbjerg 2017, 15). Specific issues that are 
unsettled in Nepal relate to the compatibility of trade and food sovereignty, the importance of self-
sufficiency of food, and at what level food sovereignty is given (P. Sharma and Daugbjerg 2017, 15–17). 
As the right to food is also included alongside the right to food sovereignty, there remains legal backing 
for the less-vague and more justiciable right. Court rulings and the government’s trade and social 
assistance policies point to a general disregard for food sovereignty and instead a focus on food security 
(P. Sharma 2018, 18–19).  
 There have been several significant court cases related to the right to food in Nepal. In the case 
Madhav Kumar Basnet v. Prime Minister, Girija Prasad Koirala and Others, writ no. 3341 of the year 
2055,25 the Supreme court ruled that the government had the responsibility to protect the life of the 
people, including protecting them from starvation, but that the state had shown that it had taken 
appropriate action (Chapagai 2014, 99). One of the tools that was used to force the government to take 
action in 2008 was another case on food security: Prakash Mani Sharma and others on behalf of Forum 
for Protection of Public Interest (Pro Public) v. Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers 
and others, writ petition No. 0149 of 2065.26 Before the ruling in favor of the plaintiff in 2011, the court 
mandated that the government supply food to suffering districts. The 2011 ruling included references to 
ICESCR, as well as to the food security pillars of access and availability (Chapagai 2014, 100–101; Food 
and Agriculture Organization 2011b; P. Sharma and Daugbjerg 2017, 20–21). Together, these rulings 
provide strong jurisprudence in support of the right to food in Nepal, making Nepal the country with the 
strongest jurisprudence on the right to food of the four case study countries.    
Consumers have the right to quality foodstuffs under Article 44, as well as the larger right to 
social justice under Article 42. To support the right to food, the constitution’s guidelines require increased 
investment in the agricultural sector for sustainable productivity and effective distribution. The landless, 
squatters, and former bonded laborers are to be provided with housing and land resources so that they can 
																																								 																				
specifically states that refugees and vulnerable groups have the same right to food as citizens within the Food and 
Nutrition Security Policy (42).  
25 Nepal uses a lunisolar calendar system, so the case is from 1998 using the Gregorian calendar.  
26 This case was filed in 2008 using the Gregorian calendar system.  
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freely make a living. Provincial and local level governments share jurisdiction over agriculture, while all 
three levels of government work together for land distribution.  
 In addition to laying the foundation for right to food legislation, the constitution also supports 
land reform measures. Although Article 25 gives people the right to property, line 4 goes on to note that 
this provision does not restrict the state from carrying out land reforms to improve productivity and 
agricultural performance. In the guiding principles section, the document highlights the introduction of 
scientific land reform to decrease absentee ownership and protect the rights of those actually working the 
land. Article 42 on social justice gives peasants the right to have access to land for agriculture as well as 
the ability to use traditional cultivation practices. Women are also guaranteed better access to land than in 
the past.  
 The constitution is quieter on the issues of infrastructure and trade, and does not stipulate food 
sovereignty as a criterion for negotiating trade agreements as Bolivia does. The National Natural 
Resources and Fiscal Commission is charged with assessing infrastructure and supporting the direction of 
funds toward districts that need it most in Article 251. Under Article 51, the constitution says the state 
will pursue policies that mobilize foreign investment for infrastructure projects. Article 236 states that 
tariffs cannot be applied to trade between provinces, a step toward facilitating the movement of foodstuffs 
from food surplus to food deficit districts.  
 Social security is offered to those who work and offered universally to the disabled, elderly, and 
other vulnerable groups (Constituent Assembly 2015; World Bank 2018c, 34). The state must offer 
additional and first access to social services to a number of groups, such as women and Dalits, and began 
a program using identity cards to target members of these groups in 2010 to help offset their exclusion 
(Holmes and Uphadya 2009, 24). As those who are self-employed or employed in the informal sector are 
excluded from the state insurance fund, subsidence farmers are likely left out at higher rates than other 
groups (International Social Security Association 2018). Nepal does spend more than the regional average 
as a percentage of its GDP on safety nets, but this still measures in at less than half of the average per 
capita spending (World Bank 2018c, 19–20). Less than five percent of the poorest receive unconditional 
cash transfers, although about ten percent receive support through food for work or public works 
programs (World Bank 2018c, 36, 40). Without all-encompassing safety nets, particularly for those living 
in remote areas that the constitution’s guidelines direct the state to support, the social justice elements of 
the constitution are likely to fall flat.   
 In addition to a national monitoring system (Nepal Food Security Monitoring System), Nepal has 
two major plans on food security: the Food and Nutrition Security Plan of Action (FNSP) and the Zero 
Hunger Challenge National Action Plan. Because the latter does not have any government funds allocated 
to it and relies entirely on international support, I will instead analyze the FNSP. The FNSP is built 
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around food security and not food sovereignty, despite language in the interim constitution granting the 
right to food sovereignty. The plan aims to implement the right to food articles of the constitution. It 
seeks to address all four areas of food security: availability, access, utilization, and stability. Stability is 
the topic least discussed in the plan, as interventions in this area are left for rapid response actions rather 
than forward planning. While the other three pillars set the stage for stability, without substantial plans for 
mitigating disaster, there remains a gaping hole in this policy. In addition, the Action Plan is not attentive 
to climate change, which makes this plan weaker than it could have been as Nepal is already experiencing 
the effects of climate change.  
Under the availability section, the FNSP plans to focus both on increasing production and 
improving trade. The steps outlined overlap much more with the Agricultural Development Strategy, 
focusing on getting improved seeds and better extension services to farmers, expanding irrigation, and 
mechanizing small farms. All four of these areas address concerns in the agricultural sector, particularly 
as farmers may need improved rice seeds and knowledge to deal with increased flooding in the Tarai. It 
also points to an expansion of support for spice production like cardamom, which may benefit the 
smallholders producing this important export crop. As Nepal imports food from other countries and also 
redistributes from food scarce to surplus domestic regions, trade is an essential part of availability. The 
FNSP focuses its attention on addressing quality and safety issues in food trade to improve access, mainly 
through legislation. Overall, the section on food availability appears that it will have positive impacts on 
this pillar of food security, and improving the components of the plan to improve availability of food will 
receive just under 70 percent of the funding under this plan.  
 In terms of access, the FNSP will focus on gender equality and social and geographical inclusion 
(GESI) to target populations that are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity. The FNSP takes a new 
approach to the topic, with plans to give funds to groups in order to streamline multi-subsector lending. 
Access will also be ameliorated by better use of forests to develop livelihood diversification through 
agroforestry. The weakest part of the plan is that concerned with access, which comes at the detriment of 
food security as it does not fill the gap left by social safety nets. Strikingly, the FNSP calls for the 
implementation of policy and legislation on the right to food from a human rights-based approach that has 
yet to fully come into existence nearly six years later. 
 The parts of the plan related to utilization center on teaching people about nutrition so that they 
can enjoy healthier, more nutritious diets. The four key actions under the theme of utilization include 
sharing information about the ways that local food can be used in nutritious diets, targeting households 
for special learning sessions about healthy diets, creating healthy snacks that are culturally appropriate 
and nutritious for communities, and lastly conducting surveys to better understand needs of specific 
communities. Nutrient deficiency is a problem even in areas with sufficient production, so the utilization 
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pillar’s programs might help these areas become healthier. While teaching people about nutrition is 
important, it is irrelevant if families cannot produce or purchase nutritious items. No fewer than 15 bodies 
and agencies will need to contribute to making the FNSP a reality; the high levels of required 
coordination likely hurt the plan’s implementation and its ability to help families become more food 
secure (Ministry of Agricultural Development 2013).  
Nepal’s development is led by the 14th Three Year Plan, which was put into place in 2017. This 
plan envisions Nepal stepping towards self-sufficiency led by high economic growth. Agricultural 
development plays a key role in the plan, as the plan’s number one strategy is to increase production by 
modernizing the agricultural sector. Infrastructure, the lack of which is one of the largest challenges to 
food security in remote regions, stands to be improved under the plan. The growth rates that the plan calls 
for, now ending its term in 2019, have not been reached: indeed, agricultural growth was only 2.4 percent 
in 2018 while the plan calls for a 4.7 percent growth rate (Shakya, n.d.; Bank 2017). A new development 
plan has yet to be realized. 
Reviewing the framework on the right to food reveals several important pieces of information 
about food security in Nepal. The use of the concept “food sovereignty” in both Bolivia and Nepal show 
how the more ambiguous term can serve political ends, while not significantly changing the policy in 
place. Nepal’s constitutional provision on the right to food violates ICESCR as it is discriminatory; 
amending the constitution to grant these rights to all inhabitants appears politically impossible. What 
Nepal has that the other four case study countries do not is clear jurisprudence supporting the right to 
food. The litigation helped get immediate support to hungry people, showing a way in which taking the 
right to food to court can have significant benefits for a whole region. Although there is no evidence that 
the FNSP emerged directly from the 2011 ruling, the ruling for the plaintiffs probably at least encouraged 
the government to create the plan. The FNSP is very much lopsided toward the availability of food to the 
detriment of the other pillars. This is a rather strange choice, as the Agricultural Development Strategy 
aims to do similar things. Further, as Nepal has limited funds, it would have made more sense to spend 
more on the other three pillars under this plan. In addition, the FNSP leaves out specific programs to 
address the effects of climate change and help inhabitants adapt, which is an omission with big 
consequences for the right to food. Social safety nets do not do enough so that Nepal can simply sideline 
access. Thus, accessibility is the pillar with the least institutional support overall, and the government 
should consider putting into place stronger social safety programs specifically targeted to food insecure 
groups to fill this gap.  
 
AGRICULTURAL	FRAMEWORK	
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In this section, I use the criteria from the previous sections in order to analyze Nepal’s agricultural policy. 
Macro-level problems this plan should take into account include land rights, infrastructure and access to 
remote areas, and trade. The populations most vulnerable to food insecurity are those in the northern 
mountainous part of the country, as well as rural agricultural wage laborers, so these groups should be 
targeted for support under the agricultural policy. Challenges specifically related to agriculture include 
low yields and production, erosion, lack of technology and inputs, and labor shifts. Rice and cardamom 
face similar challenges, with producers of both lacking extension services and access to credit, and with 
cardamom being vulnerable to disease. Under the conditions of climate change, there are risks of 
increased drought and flood episodes, with changes in precipitation affecting both rice and cardamom 
production. By using these elements to assess the current policy, I aim to make recommendations about 
how to improve food security in Nepal.  
The Agriculture Development Strategy (ADS) for the period 2015-2035 is the current agricultural 
development plan. The plan’s vision is: “A self-reliant, sustainable, competitive, and inclusive agriculture 
sector that drives economic growth, and contributes to improved livelihoods and food and nutrition 
security leading to food sovereignty.” The formulation of the objective is a clear step toward an 
agricultural policy that will contribute to the right to food, and also highlights food sovereignty as being 
related to self-sufficiency in grains. There is some room for applauding the plan, starting with its 
commitment to involving a diverse set of stakeholders in the preparation of the document. ADS envisions 
Nepal as moving away from an agriculture-based economy under its tenure, which might occur at some 
point if rates of emigration and urbanization continue but is unlikely to happen in the next 25 years. In 
order to remain food secure during this program, yields as well as incomes will have to increase so that 
people can purchase imported food. The macro-level goals of the plan are lofty, including more than 
doubling agricultural GDP per capita. Even if reaching these standards may not occur, these goals, 
however, demonstrate that the government understands the outcomes necessary for food security. The 
plan is organized around four main outcomes: improved governance; higher productivity; profitable 
commercialization; and increased competitiveness.  
The plan includes language on improving the status of land rights issues under the productivity 
pillar. This will be done by enforcing the land rules on maximum holding size, reducing land 
fragmentation, and creating a court to settle land disputes. One of the more interesting actions on land is 
the creation of a national land leasing corporation scheme and a land lease act to allow farmers to lease 
land. This might be a powerful way to help the landless poor, who often lack the funds to make a large 
down payment, gain access to land to improve their standing. In addition, there will be taxes applied to 
land that is not farmed to encourage absentee owners to sell their land to others who will make the land 
Chapter 3: Nepal 
	 99	
productive. Under the commercialization outcome, land reform will be incentivized to increase 
commercial farming.  
Infrastructure and trade are discussed in this strategy, but are less of a focus than land rights 
issues. Actions related to infrastructure appear in the commercialization outcome, and center on 
improving policy and on providing support to agricultural roads in the districts. The ADS also envisions 
the creation of a separate fund to finance road projects and management. Trade measures under the 
competitiveness component focus on international trade rather than on domestic exchange, with 
increasing institutional capacity to negotiate better agreements high on the list. Improving international 
trade is a must for short-term national-level food security, as production does not meet domestic 
consumption. Focusing on international trade forgets that the primary problem in physical access to food 
is due to difficulties in distributing food on a domestic level.  
Specific vulnerable groups will be targeted for support under the good governance heading 
through several different mechanisms. The plan initiates the design of a special targeted food and 
nutrition security plan, and calls for the implementation of the FNSP. It envisions increased coordination 
between different food and nutrition programs, which does not appear to have been done as the country 
launched an additional food and nutrition plan (the Zero Hunger Challenge) in 2016 and a multisector 
nutrition plan in 2017. Coordination between plans would help ensure that there is no overlap or 
duplicated efforts, as designing more plans does not help vulnerable populations unless they are 
implemented. While there does need to be some work to improve the FNSP because of gaps relating to 
access, these holes appear to be filled under the ADS, and so the creation of further plans is unnecessary. 
Another part of the good governance outcome will strengthen GESI monitoring and statistics, make all 
extension services sensitive to these issues and improve farmers’ access to all means of agricultural 
production regardless of gender, location, or identity. These GESI programs are good ones to increase 
cohesion and promote the inclusion of women and marginalized minority groups in agricultural programs. 
One of the problems with the targeting part of the plan is that it does not specify which groups it had 
determined as the most vulnerable, leaving open the possibility that those who need help the most- those 
in the northwest and agricultural wage laborers-will not receive it. There is one program that does target 
these groups to be implemented in the western part of Nepal: this program is a step in the right direction, 
particularly as it denotes smallholders as the beneficiaries to increase production and food availability.  
One of the reasons that farmers have low productivity is that they lack chemical inputs, so this 
strategy will help farmers gain access through better policy and a voucher system to purchase inputs 
under the productivity component. It will also help them access fertilizer through vouchers and subsidies, 
while encouraging the use of organic inputs and their effective use so as not to harm the environment. 
While in the long run, placing heavy subsidies on chemical inputs can harm production due to inefficient 
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use and pollution, combining these measures with ones to help farmers appropriately use inputs and 
making them aware of non-conventional alternatives means that this program will be more sustainable, 
and will support yield increases and food availability. 
Labor changes due to emigration and urbanization are discussed in relation to improving 
women’s access to land and credit through GESI interventions, as well as through improving the 
agricultural education system under the productivity outcome. The educational programs focus on 
improving the agricultural universities as well as creating better vocational training centers. The latter 
initiative will likely have a more positive impact on food security than the former, because the idea that 
all having all smallholder farmers attend university in the next 25 years is very unlikely, as literacy rates 
are still only just above 60 percent, and closer to 50 percent for women who are the ones more frequently 
running farms as men migrate (Central Intelligence Agency 2019). While the aggregate support to 
agriculture might incentivize people to stay in the sector, the government could implement special 
programs to encourage people to stay on their land.  
Credit is targeted under both outcome two on productivity, outcome three on commercialization, 
and outcome four on competitiveness. Under the productivity component, programs are aimed 
particularly at helping farmers gain mechanization capacity. Thus, I will discuss the technology and credit 
challenges together in this paragraph. To improve credit access, the strategy will conduct workshops to 
help farmers become more financially literate and to work in groups to create plans to receive community 
agricultural project funding. It will also provide credit through a special program at the central bank of 
Nepal to target vulnerable populations. Not only will there be improved credit access, but the strategy also 
envisions voucher systems and agricultural tool leasing systems to help farmers get access to necessary 
tools, as well as credit for manufacturers and importers of this technology so that it is more readily 
available to farmers. The commercialization outcomes related to credit treat such macro-level problems as 
improving the investment environment and incentivizing private companies to offer more financial 
services to the agricultural sector. Under outcome four on competitiveness, there is a focus on public-
private partnerships (PPP) to support credit access and investment, and to encourage innovation in 
agriculture. These programs on increasing credit and mechanization access hold promise, as they combine 
education with both direct government and private sector support.  
While not specifically targeted at rice and cardamom, the ADS establishes stronger extension 
services for farmers. Under the production outcome, there will be the creation of a pilot voucher program 
targeted at subsistence farmers to work towards improving access to these services. The services 
themselves will be improved through increasing their internet access, better training staff in marketing 
and GESI issues, and decentralizing research so it can better support specific areas’ needs. As Nepal has 
considerable geographical and climatic variation, these agricultural services will be decentralized in order 
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for them to be better tailored to fit the local conditions. There is also the targeting of extension services to 
the most vulnerable northwestern regions, a good step in improving production to avoid hunger in remote 
areas.  
Cardamom, despite being a major export crop and source of income for smallholders in the hills, 
is not targeted for improvement under the value chain development programs in the commercialization 
outcome. Through better drying and processing, Nepali farmers can produce better-quality cardamom and 
receive higher incomes from the crop; as a result, failing to help farmers in this respect is a flaw in the 
plan. In addition, there is no support for the prevention of disease in cardamom plants. A special program 
for cardamom production is listed under other programs, but there is no evidence about what exactly this 
might entail and the steps involved. In addition, cardamom is already susceptible to disease, which may 
increase in frequency with warmer temperatures. As the strategy does not address disease reduction in 
perennial crops, this omission may be detrimental to cardamom production in the future.  
In order to increase production and yields, the strategy will implement several other programs in 
addition to the ones already discussed. It will increase irrigation and water management systems, although 
it is not clear that these steps will be aimed at smallholders. Erosion is marginally targeted under the 
outcome on productivity through identifying land that requires rehabilitation; there is supposed to be a 
program to rehabilitate the land after it has been identified, but this part lacks detail.  
The ADS includes three steps to increase the resilience of farmers, and to help them cope with the 
projected effects of climate change. First, there will be better warning systems and weather programs so 
that farmers have better ideas about what climatic conditions to expect. Second, those working in 
extension services will be trained in climate-smart agricultural practices in order to help farmers get the 
information they need to make better crop and planting decisions. There will also be research into more 
resilient crop varieties could help rice improve its resilience to flooding and a voucher system to help 
farmers get access to these seeds. And third, the strategy will establish a fund to improve farmer welfare, 
and also promote insurance schemes to farmers so that they have something to fall back upon when crops 
fail. This will be done under both productivity and commercialization outcomes, with the latter creating a 
pilot program to support smallholders access to credit, and encouraging new private agricultural insurance 
programs. This three-pronged approach means that farmers will have better information, the knowledge to 
respond to it, and support when things go wrong. Combined, this approach shows promise in improving 
farmer resilience and decreasing vulnerability to climate change.  
The ADS mentions the right to food and food sovereignty several times throughout. Under the 
good governance outcome, it says it will create legislation on the right to food. I am not entirely 
convinced that Nepal needs more legislation, as its right to food framework and jurisprudence is already 
strong. The food reserve, administered by the NFC, will be strengthened under the ADS. This step is a 
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very good one to improve access to food in emergency situations, as in 2008 the corporation did not have 
the resources to adequately respond to the growing crisis (Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agricultural 
Development 2015a).  
By working in tandem with the FNSP, some of the components of this agricultural strategy, if 
properly implemented, could have a powerful, positive impact on Nepal’s food security situation. Support 
to improve mechanization, technology, credit, yields, inputs, climate resilience, and extension services 
under the strategy is well-developed, showing that the ADS will likely improve agricultural production. 
However, other areas stand to be improved, notably attention to labor changes, cardamom, and targeting 
of northern dwellers under the plan. Because of the large portion of the population that is involved in 
agricultural work, increasing production will also improve the pillars of access and stability. While the 
strategy does have a focus on expanding commercial agriculture and exporting food, the plan seems to 
balance the need for increased production for domestic consumption with the need for income from 
exports by focusing on production, especially for smallholders, in the first three components of the 
strategy. The language on transitioning from an agricultural economy can be read as aspirational, rather 
than as something that this strategy is actually going to accomplish. What may help this plan succeed 
where past plans have faltered is that implementing agencies for each program are indicated in print, so 
that every agency has a tighter blueprint of what they are supposed to accomplish. The National ADS 
Coordination Committee is to coordinate the whole policy, giving some national oversight to a 
decentralized plan and creating a higher likelihood of implementation by the ministries.  
CLIMATE	CHANGE	FRAMEWORK	
After analyzing the agricultural policy, I now turn to Nepal’s climate change framework in order to 
determine whether the policies on the books will support food security in the future, and in what areas 
they can improve. Based on my assessment of climate vulnerability using CMIP5 and information from 
the 2008 crisis, it is clear that food security will rely on drought and flood mitigation, as well as water 
management. As Nepal is ranked the fourth-most vulnerable country to climate change in the world, it is 
of upmost importance that the government take adaptation measures to help its citizens weather the 
coming storm (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). Nepal is a state party to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1994), the Kyoto Protocol (2005), and the Paris Agreement 
(2016). The constitution offers moderate environmental rights and protection, noting the need to “strike a 
balance between environment and development” in Article 30. It establishes a National Natural Resources 
and Fiscal Commission for distributing the revenue from the exploitation of natural resources. 
Conservation policy, as spelled out in the governance guidelines, should be governed by the norms of 
intergenerational use and center around the sustainable development of water resources including 
irrigation systems and renewable energy. There is also an emphasis on forest management and protection, 
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an essential element for sustainable agroforestry systems and for peasants’ continued use of forest-derived 
resources.  
There are two main documents that I will discuss in this section: the Climate Change Policy of 
2011, and the National Adaptation Programme of Action. The Climate Change Policy’s vision is “This 
policy envisions a country spared from the adverse impacts of climate change, by considering climate 
justice, through the pursuit of environmental conservation, human development, and sustainable 
development--all contributing toward a prosperous society” (Government of Nepal 2011b). To this end, 
the policy establishes a Climate Change Center and a Climate Change Management Division to oversee 
climate change mitigation and adaptation on a day-to-day basis. Several of the policy’s goals are 
important for climate change mitigation. Community-level and community-driven adaptation will ensure 
that the adaptation and mitigation measures taken address the needs of specific areas and populations. The 
indicated measures on disaster risk management as well as the creation of a special climate change fund 
for adaptation will be also useful to Nepal’s agricultural sector, as Nepal is vulnerable to natural disasters 
that harm food security. The policy also indicates that research will focus on developing flood and 
drought resistant crops and getting them to farmers. Erosion, which is only briefly mentioned in the ADS, 
is mandated to be prevented through the conservation of soil. Overall, the policy provides positive 
guidance to improving food security under climate change.  
 The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), established in the same period as the 
Climate Change Policy, articulates the steps the government will take in order to prepare for climate 
change and identifies the key vulnerabilities facing the country. The NAPA identifies food security and 
agriculture as most vulnerable to climate change. Its action steps are designed around nine cross-sectoral 
activity components, which will be implemented by sectoral ministries. As climate change will likely 
have differential impacts on individual communities and districts, the NAPA also identifies the specific 
regions that need immediate attention for adaptation measures. 
There are several activities that improve flood and drought (disaster) management. In the first 
activity component, early warning systems and disaster reduction plans will be created. The second 
activity will help farmers develop the technology to manage the more intense rainfall. Activity three 
focuses on this area, calling for community-level adaptation, the development of better infrastructure to 
reduce risks, and the creation of safety nets to help those affected by disasters. There will be better 
monitoring of glacial melt and of lakes and rivers to help communities mitigate and prepare for floods 
under activity four. Water management, in the form of irrigation facilities, is supported under activity one. 
Adding to this, activity eight will focus on sustainable use of water and the creation of support to better 
manage these resources. The disaster management activities under the NAPA are the strongest of the 
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programme, which demonstrates that agriculture may become more resilient to disasters like those in 
2008.  
Although not explicitly addressed in the NAPA, rice and cardamom will receive some support 
through the NAPA’s activities. Rice, which is susceptible to flooding, will be targeted for support through 
the second activity from improved seed varieties. Cardamom production, which is left behind in the ADS, 
will receive support from integrated pest management systems in this NAPA under activity one. If 
smallholder farmers can access support under NAPA to actually implement some of these activities, rice 
availability and food access through incomes from cardamom production may not be as impacted as they 
could be by climate change.  
Soil degradation will also be targeted for improvement and rehabilitation under activity one. It 
will also receive attention under activity seven, which specifically targets the most degraded land in the 
hills. This attention is important in relation to climate change because natural disasters can damage soils, 
so supporting soils as the basis of production will ensure that there is still land upon which to grow crops. 
Several other parts of the NAPA will help maintain food security under the conditions of climate change. 
Activity two calls for increasing the connections between food surplus and deficit regions, an important 
addition to the ADS. The creation of safety nets is encouraged under activity three. While these two 
elements are arguably the most important to food availability and food accessibility now as well as in the 
future, leaving them unclear is detrimental to Nepal’s climate change preparation.   
 Although the NAPA includes an annex on gender relations, it has become increasingly clear 
throughout the agriculture and climate change documents that the gendered aspects of agriculture and 
food security under climate change have not been fully integrated into the government’s plans. As men 
migrate for better employment opportunities, new female farmers and heads of household should receive 
support to maintain production. How to address issues of changing agricultural households with out-
migration, and how the government might approach newer farmers, is not outlined in the NAPA. It also 
does not specifically target those in northern districts or rural agricultural workers, meaning that the most 
vulnerable populations do not get special support under the NAPA.  
Overall, the Climate Change Policy and the NAPA create a solid framework to improve food 
security with climate change. They mostly focus on key issues; nevertheless, there is a need to target 
vulnerable groups and create specific adaptation programs for key food and export crops. Where both 
documents fall short, however, is in the details: how programs will be implemented: even the NAPA, with 
its program of actions, is not specific enough with its goals to be optimistic. There are many ministries 
that are supposed to collaborate on each section of the NAPA, and without enough direction or guidance, 
important components may fall through the cracks. Climate change policies in the future should focus on 
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vulnerable populations as well as improving climate change-related safety nets and climate-resilient 
infrastructure for the transportation of foodstuffs.  
 
CONCLUSION	
In this chapter, I investigated food security through Nepal’s right to food, agriculture, and climate change 
frameworks. All four pillars of food security are weak in Nepal, but it struggles especially with 
availability of food in remote areas. My exploration of Nepal’s history and political and economic context 
revealed that land rights, poor infrastructure limiting domestic trade, and international trade present 
macro-level challenges to the country. The agricultural policy as well as the constitution address land 
rights, while infrastructure and trade get less support from current policy, illustrating areas in which 
Nepal could improve. Infrastructure development is especially important, as remote areas were most hurt 
by the 2008 crisis, and rural communities are the most food insecure. During the 2008 crisis, one of the 
driving forces of high food prices in Nepal was India’s export restrictions on rice, upon which it relies too 
heavily. As a net food importing country that also has regional food insecurity, Nepal will likely continue 
having to import food in the foreseeable future. Not only should production of agricultural goods 
increase, but markets and infrastructure might also be improved so that regional disparities in food 
security are decreased. Because Nepal is landlocked, it is essential that the country increase its production 
in order to decrease dependence on India for food availability. Pursuing trade with other countries and 
supporting infrastructure development are two key activities that the government should pursue. As Nepal 
as become more politically stable, its ability to move food around and prevent famines due to political 
strife has increased, a positive sign for future food security.  
Unlike Kenya, Nepal has abundant water resources, but it also faces increasing flooding due to 
climate change. The model ensemble mean for precipitation show increased rainfall in the summer 
months, increasing the chances of floods. In addition, as the glaciers in the Himalayas melt, there may be 
higher rivers adding to the flood risk. For these reasons, flooding is the biggest concern for Nepal in terms 
of food security under climate change. The ADS’s three-pronged approach to flood mitigation, as well as 
the NAPA’s support of flood resilience programs show that Nepal is taking serious and useful steps 
towards mitigating this risk. In addition, irrigation systems that allow farmers to store water for drier 
times of the year may help mitigate droughts, and rainwater collection systems may improve farmers’ 
resilience to flooding.  
 A changing labor force due to out-migration is not addressed as fully as it should be by the 
agricultural policy. Increasingly, male family members have been leaving the country in order to pursue 
higher wages as the non-agriculture sector remains underdeveloped. Women in Nepal continue to face 
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gender-based violence and discrimination, despite prohibitions on such acts (Whelpton 2005, 163). At the 
same time, women have begun playing an even more essential role in agriculture, as male family 
members have been leaving to do outside work (S. R. Sharma, Upreti, and Pyakuryal 2012, 138). As 
women are less likely to have an education, and as mechanization is generally designed for male bodies, 
they face additional challenges in the field. While the ADS includes many references to gender-targeted 
interventions, gender fails to be fully integrated into the strategy. As more women become heads of 
agricultural household, the government might consider implementing an aggressive retraining program 
for new female farmers. Helping female farmers to stay on their land and have the skills to increase yields 
may help the smallholders themselves, as well as the country at large.  
 However, much of the ADS’s support for agriculture does address challenges to agriculture 
identified in this thesis. Farmers access to inputs, technology, extension services, and credit should 
increase under the plan. Erosion is addressed briefly in the agricultural policy and the climate change 
policies, although soil rehabilitation could stand to receive more government support.  
Specific challenges to cardamom and rice include poor extension services, lack of credit, flooding 
for rice, and disease for cardamom. Rice is targeted for expansion as a grain crop under the ADS, and will 
also be given support through research and extension services into improved varieties. Through these 
actions, the government of Nepal can support food production in the Tarai, therefore improving food 
availability at the national level. Cardamom does not receive as much support as it should, given its vital 
roles both in the economy at large and in assuring that farmers have the economic access to purchase 
food. Integrated pest management schemes as described by the NAPA will be beneficial, as might the 
increased access to chemical inputs under the ADS. What the ADS leaves out, however, is ways to help 
farmers improve the quality of their cardamom production in the drying phase; this omission is 
detrimental to incomes and food access.   
Nepal has a strong constitutional right to food sovereignty and food security, a result of the 
former’s usefulness at bringing together disparate factions in the immediate post-war period. That said, 
the ADS and the FNSP focus on elements more closely related to food security, showing that food 
sovereignty is more of a political term than it is a concrete tool for decreasing hunger. Through the two 
cases related to food security in Nepal, we learn several important facts that add to the evidence of how 
the right to food contributes to the fight against hunger. First, if there is a natural disaster and the 
government fails to adequately respond, filing litigation may not only support jurisprudence to the right, 
but may also produce immediate remedies to those harmed. That is, the right to food in the courts is 
useful in emergencies, and litigation on this issue should be tried in other case study countries. Also, if 
there are blatant policy gaps as there are in Ukraine, litigation can force the government to fill these holes. 
Third, having food sovereignty does not necessarily make the right to food non-justiciable. As Nepal’s 
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courts referenced ICESCR in their rulings, it is clear that ICESCR does have an impact on at least the 
courts, and its presence should not be completely discounted.  
Looking forward, Nepal has room for improvement to assure food security. While many of the 
challenges are covered by the policies in place, several are not. Even for issues with strong support in the 
policies, implementation may prevent them from being realized and thus jeopardize food security: as 
several authors have pointed out (Acharya 2011; Wily, Sharma, and Chapagain 2009), policy in the land 
reform area has failed to be implemented, which shows that even the projects with the most government 
attention are not fail-proof. Ensuring that Nepal has both the funding, human resources, and coordination 
capacity to fulfil the agricultural and climate change plans will be key to whether food security improves 
under climate change. To better prepare itself for the effects of climate change on food security, the 
government of Nepal should create more agricultural development programs aimed at those in the 
northeast of the country to increase their resilience through better food availability, it should invest 
heavily in flood mitigation and prevention practices and infrastructure as well as infrastructure to reach 
remote villages. Finally, Nepal should strengthen food access through special feeding programs and social 
safety nets.   
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Kenya, a regional economic powerhouse, has both high rates of undernourishment and engagement in 
agricultural livelihoods. Kenya is an interesting case study for several reasons. First, the constitutional 
provisions on the right to food neither copy the text of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, nor do they lend themselves to be read as granting the right to food sovereignty. 
Second, Kenya does not produce enough food to meet its population’s needs, particularly in the 
production of maize, which is the most-consumed staple crop. This means that Kenya is a net food 
importer, and in order to reach any sort of food self-sufficiency, it will need to greatly expand production. 
However, because of arid conditions, much of the land in Kenya is not arable, and droughts pose a 
considerable challenge for farmers as well as for pastoralists. While Kenya faces challenges to all four 
pillars of food security, food availability through adequate production has fallen behind the others. In Part 
I of this chapter, I explore Kenya’s political and geographical context, characterize the agricultural 
context, illustrate weaknesses in the food system through a study of the 2008 food crisis, and determine 
climate change’s potential effects on two key crops. In Part II, I use key factors elucidated in Part I to 
analyze the current right to food framework, agricultural framework, and climate change framework for 




To begin unpacking complexities around agriculture and food security in Kenya, this first section will 
investigate the politics, economy, and history of the country. Key issues facing government and society 
will also be discussed in order to place agricultural and climate change policies in their context. Kenya is 
situated in eastern Africa between Lake Victoria and the Indian Ocean. Kenya benefits from extensive 
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access to transportation networks via the sea, making international trade more efficient and less costly 
than for Bolivia and Nepal. Almost 90 percent of Kenya’s land is semi-arid to arid, making agriculture 
without irrigation systems difficult in much of the country (Sindiga and Burnett 1988, 232). It is 
estimated that only 16 percent of the country has conditions that are suitable for any kind of agricultural 
pursuit (Government of Kenya 2010, 9). With a rapidly growing population of roughly 48 million people, 
pressure on land and water resources are increasing. 
 Geographically, Kenya is divided into lowland Kenya with an equatorial climate and upland 
Kenya in the east by the Great Rift Valley and series of plateaus with a tropical continental climate; the 
highlands are most suitable for agriculture (Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 38, 67). The highlands themselves 
are divided by the Great Rift Valley into the western highlands and the eastern highlands. The Great Rift 
Valley is a series of smaller valleys and ridges that make up a rift system (Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 34–
35). Within the basins are smaller lakes, whose water can be used for irrigation throughout the year 
(Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 53). The smaller lakes and rivers often cease to exist during the dry season, 
exacerbating droughts and causing famines (Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 63–65). Unlike in Bolivia and 
Nepal where most irrigated land is owned by large farms, in Kenya large and smallholder farms have 
about the same amount of land under irrigation (Government of Kenya 2010, 11). The government of 
Kenya separates the country into three agricultural production zones based on rainfall: the high-rainfall 
zone where all of the country’s tea is produced, the medium-rainfall zone, and the low-rainfall area 
(Government of Kenya 2010, 9–10). 
While Kenya has few lakes and rivers, subterranean water has recently been shown to be larger 
than originally thought but are mostly untapped (Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 72; UNESCO n.d.). The great 
challenge of lack of water can be seen in the distribution of rainfall throughout the country: Madera, one 
of the northeast most points of the country, usually receives under 200mm of rain a year, and in 
Kakamega, near Lake Victoria, rainfall can reach 1845mm (Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 58–59; Government 
of Kenya 2010, 9–10). Although water access is the largest limiting factor in agricultural production, poor 
soil quality places additional boundaries on production (Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 101).  
The Rift Valley region is well-known for its paleoanthropological finds that cast light on the 
evolution of the human species. Skipping forward a couple of million years to the 17th century, the ruler 
of Oman pushed out the Portuguese. Omani rule continued, during which the rulers participated in the 
slave trade (Kaplan et al. 1984, 13–14). Europeans were present in modern-day Kenya throughout the 18th 
and 19th centuries: parts of Kenya first came under German control, and then part of the East Africa 
Protectorate of England in the 1880s and 1890s, with full control by the British occurring in 1905 (Kaplan 
et al. 1984, 14–16). Colonists and Kenyans alike sought political rights, although the latter group saw 
many of its members imprisoned following protests in the early 1950s (Kaplan et al. 1984, 29). Although 
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brutally suppressed, this rebellion made room for the Lyttleton Constitution that included African 
representatives in its legislature; after protests of low representation, the Lennox-Boyd Constitution with 
equal representatives for European and African groups, and finally the Macleod Constitution with 
majority African representatives, were put into place (Kaplan et al. 1984, 31–32). In the 1961 election, 
parties ran on platforms including the release of Jomo Kenyatta, one of the rebels imprisoned during the 
Mau Mau crackdown. When they were able to form a coalition, and the independence process began. A 
new constitution was finally agreed upon in 1963 despite tensions over access to power between ethnic 
groups (Kaplan et al. 1984, 33–34). Jomo Kenyatta quickly rose as the country’s new president after it 
was declared a republic in 1964 (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 28–30). 
When it gained its independence in 1963, the new leaders of Kenya had to contend with the 
legacy of colonialism that had placed most of the best land in the hands of colonists. Following 
independence, the Million Acre Scheme worked to settle squatters, but actually created new class 
divisions with land going to the elite, as Europeans and middle class Africans were those with the ability 
to benefit from it (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 64; Leo 1981). Europeans were allowed to maintain control of 
their land until the mid-1970s, and redistributive politics failed to distribute land to the poor (Branch 
2011, 9–10; Kaplan et al. 1984, 43).  
The economy grew rapidly in the ten years following independence, during the so-called the 
“Golden Years” (Rono 2002, 82). While there were some attempts to create social equality, Kenyatta did 
not believe in strong redistributive policies, which meant that socialistic elements were tempered by 
protection of private property (Branch 2011, 10). Kenyatta established himself as a force against Soviet 
and communist influence, causing contention with other government officials (Kaplan et al. 1984, 38). He 
did, however, take up a series of reforms called Kenyanization in order to put businesses into the hands of 
Kenyans which helped to reestablish Kenyan control of industry and services (Kaplan et al. 1984, 42). 
Through the 1980s, non-citizens were not allowed to trade in rural areas, with lists of goods that could 
and could not be traded by foreigners, in order to allow Kenyans to become owners of their 
manufacturing and industry (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 86–87). These pro-Kenyan, pro-poor policies, 
however, were unable to bring about national unity or keep the country from falling into a devastating 
economic crisis in the 1980s.  
Many of the factors contributing to the recession in the early 80s, such as high oil prices and 
interest rates, combined with domestic declines in exports of manufactured goods, a growing population, 
and food production challenges slowed growth and pushed Kenya into an economic crisis (Kaplan et al. 
1984, 137). Because of problems with its balance of payments, Kenya sought external loans with high 
interest rates which greatly increased the national debt (Kaplan et al. 1984, 178–79). The economic crisis 
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had severe effects on the country: from 1980 to 1987, the GNP per capita fell from US$420 to US$330, 
and the GDP growth fell from 6.9 percent to 3.8 percent (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 151).  
Because of this crisis, the country adopted liberalizing policies which removed the state from its 
role in setting prices and directly purchasing primary goods and instead turned to emphasizing the role of 
the private sector (Gibbon 1992, 53). Kenya received its first structural adjustment loan in 1980, which 
required domestic agricultural goods to have their prices based on the international market (Gibbon 1992, 
61). The results of the structural adjustments in Kenya have been a source of controversy both within the 
country and between the government and the World Bank (Rono 2002, 84–85). The Kenyan government 
accused the World Bank of shifting focus from the economic to the political sphere during the program so 
popular participation, decentralization, and reduced role of the government in the economy were at the 
top of the list of priorities over economic issues (Rono 2002, 85). Indeed, the 2010-2020 agricultural 
sectoral plan points to structural adjustment as a cause of continued problems in the sector (Government 
of Kenya 2010, 2). Fertilizers, which contributed to increased yields, rose in price and decreased in usage 
following the adjustments (Gibbon 1992, 69). The government of Kenya challenged the implementation 
of the structural adjustment programs, perhaps due to disagreements over its purpose (Gibbon 1992, 61–
62). Another problem with the structural adjustment program was that it cut funding for social programs, 
exacerbating inequality and suffering (Rono 2002, 87). At the same time, the country began implementing 
policies that aimed to achieve self-sufficiency in food production in 1982, with little success (Ogot and 
Ochieng 1995, 156–57).  
As the Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in 
the context of national food security outline, in order for food security to exist, states must practice good 
governance and work towards creating a just and fair society. In Kenya, racial and out-group 
discrimination, population growth and urbanization, and land rights are some of the biggest challenges to 
good governance. The following paragraphs explain in more detail the threat that these problems pose to 
food security.   
 Kenya’s diverse population has challenged the country’s leaders historically, and ethnic conflicts 
have occurred occasionally. Under colonial rule, the country was largely divided by race (Ogot and 
Ochieng 1995, 111, 114). After colonization, however, stratification became based on wealth and 
ethnicity (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 115). There are over 30 ethnic groups, with the Kikuyu, Luhya, and 
Luo making up the top three (Kaplan et al. 1984, 90). Although Swahili and English are the two national 
languages, there are also linguistic divisions; indigenous languages can be grouped into Bantu languages, 
Nilotic languages, and Cushitic languages (Kaplan et al. 1984, 89). This is not to say that differences in 
language and ethnic group caused problems per se, but rather that power differentials relegated to 
different groups under colonialism and after independence have created groups with special privileges, 
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leading to tensions between groups. While president, Jomo Kenyatta’s policies served to place the 
majority of land in the hands of his own Kikuyu group, which continues to cause problems for Kenya, 
most recently leading to violence in the 2017 elections (Obala and Mattingly 2014, 2736; Burke 2017). 
Ethnic groups have asserted conflicting claims over fertile lands, and national unity remains difficult to 
attain because individuals often view themselves as members of ethnic groups first and as Kenyans 
second (Branch 2011, 13, 15). On top of its own diverse groups, Kenya is also the home to refugees from 
surrounding countries; in 2017, 300,000 Somali refugees were in Kenya (Central Intelligence Agency 
2018). 
 Population growth and urbanization have proven a large challenge to Kenyan policymakers: in 
the 15 years after independence, Kenya’s population doubled to 15 million people, and has been growing 
rapidly ever since (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 123; Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). While 
population has been rising, the percentage of the population living in rural areas has fallen from 93 
percent of people in 1960 to 73 percent in 2017; Bolivia, Nepal and Ukraine experienced similar declines 
in rural populations (World Bank 2017). It has a youth bulge as 40 percent of its population is under 15 
years old (Central Intelligence Agency 2018). Life expectancy dropped significantly during the 1990s due 
to the AIDS crisis which impacted an estimated 1.5 million people in 2012 (Lupia and Chien 2012; 
Central Intelligence Agency 2018). Economic growth has not been able to keep pace with the population, 
leading to high rates of poverty, particularly in urban areas: 49 percent of urbanites are impoverished. 
Those in living in urban areas are more likely to be involved in the informal sector, from which they 
receive lower pay than those working in the formal sector (Government of Kenya and Agricultural Sector 
Coordination Unit 2011, 18). 
 Issues within the structure of land rights law left over from colonialism facilitate foreign 
acquisition of territories or land grabbing. Starting in 1897, the British took aggressive legal and other 
action to acquire the lands in use by Kenyans (Karari 2018, 3). Uncultivated and unsettled lands also 
became the property of colonists because they were seen as terres sans maîtres, or wastelands (Wily 
2011, 741). Land titling became compulsory after independence, which harmed those living and working 
on communal lands (Wily 2011, 743). Communal lands became a legal designation in the 1980s, but this 
designation did not prevent the lands from being taken (Wily 2011, 742). Rural and indigenous 
communities often consider not just their farmlands but other surrounding lands to be their property, and 
customary land tenure is often based on communal use. An estimated 77 percent of total land area is held 
by customary users without titles (Wily 2011, 735–36). When large-scale land acquisitions take place, 
those without titles can lose their land without consenting or receiving compensation (Wily 2011, 736). 
Chapter 4: Kenya 
	 118	
Distribution of land has been marred by corruption,27 and unequal distribution between ethnic groups has 
created ethnic tensions (Akech 2010, 17–18). The 2010 constitution helped strengthen the claim to 
communal lands. It leaves a loophole, however, that allows the government to give lands to investors as 
long as they consider the views of communities; government ministries do not need the prior informed 
consent of communities in order to sign away their lands (Wily 2011, 746).  
Ending this section, I lay out macro-level trends that are relevant to my analysis of Kenya’s 
policies. Macroeconomic indicators show positive trends. Since the 2008 food and financial crises, the 
GDP growth rate has been above 4 percent per annum. GDP per capita has been steadily rising since the 
early 2000s, with only a small dip in 2007-2009 (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). The Gini index 
has also been falling, sitting at 40.8 in 2015 as opposed to 46.5 in 2005, but still shows higher inequality 
than Nepal and Ukraine (World Bank 2015a). Trends in nutrition data, however, are worrisome. 
Undernourishment has been rising in Kenya since 2014 following decades of decline, with 2.3 million 
more people classified as severely insecure in 2017 as compared to 2014. After falling to 20.8 percent in 
2012 through 2015, there has also been an uptick in the prevalence of undernourishment, showing that 
population growth alone does not account for this increase in hunger. The prevalence of severe food 
insecurity has also increased to 35.6 percent from 31.8 percent in the three-year period from 2015 to 
2017. Measures of availability of food show much year to year variation, with a decline since 208 of the 
average value of food production and the average dietary energy supply (Food and Agriculture 
Organization n.d.). These larger trends show that while incomes may be increasing, there are still large 
swaths of the population for whom food insecurity is an existential problem. This situation highlights a 
key issue for Kenya: economic growth is not enough to assure food security; who gains wealth and what 
government income is used for has greater effects on hunger than economic growth in the aggregate. In 
addition, this highlights that in Kenya, not only are there issues of accessibility, but also availability, 
stability, and usage are challenges.  
AGRICULTURAL	CONTEXT	
In this section, I seek to explain the setting and conditions for agriculture in Kenya with the goal of using 
this analysis to understand constraints on and stakeholders in agricultural policies. The British began 
undertaking agricultural policy in Kenya and moderate land policy reforms in response to growing 
																																								 																				
27 Corruption is a significant impediment to change-making in Kenya. Scandals have plagued the country’s elected 
officials and bureaucrats, all the way up to the president (Branch 2011, 285). Although the 2010 constitution 
implements stronger human rights standards, many who committed past human rights violations remain in power 
(Akech 2010, 8). 
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discontent among the population. In the 1950s, the Swynnerton Plan created small subsistence farms as 
the basic unit, doling out land and grants that was supposed to help 600,000 families (Ogot and Ochieng 
1995, 48). It also removed restrictions on African production of important cash crops, thereby allowing 
for people to gain access to important sources of income (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 48–49). These goals 
were secondary, however, to squashing the Mau Mau rebellion and confiscating land from the fighters 
(Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 50). Under the colonial state, European-owned farms had dominated exports 
and controlled the vast majority of arable lands (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, xv). Policy (primarily in the 
form of taxes) compelled Black Kenyans to work for these large farms for low wages, increasing profit 
but destabilizing smallholder agriculture (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, xvi). Agriculture squatters and forest 
dwellers aired their grievances in the struggles after World War II and during the Mau Mau rebellion. Yet 
land tenure issues continued to be at the base of revolution and dissent, with enclosure and registration 
viewed as the solution to this problem through 1963 with the Registered Land Act (Ogot and Ochieng 
1995, 87). Government and international support to agriculture coupled with the abolishment of 
regulations on what Kenyans could produce boosted the system post-independence, allowing the gross 
farm revenue of smallholders to grow 420 percent in the period from 1958-1968 (Kitching, 1980, as cited 
in Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 90).  
Agricultural sectoral policy has evolved since the country’s independence. From 1963 to 1983, 
planning was done in the capital, Nairobi, using a highly centralized planning system (Sindiga and 
Burnett 1988, 235). This changed to a system that relied on district-level planning to increase the 
participation of local communities in the process, particularly after the 1963 constitution gave planning 
rights to county officials (Sindiga and Burnett 1988, 235–36). This decentralization of agricultural 
planning continues today. For much of Kenya’s history, national agricultural policies tended to favor cash 
crops over food crops, putting farmers that produce non-export crops both to feed their families and for 
local markets at a disadvantage (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 15). As continues today, the Kenyan economy 
is geared toward the export market, and dependent on foreign investors and multinationals (Ogot and 
Ochieng 1995, 90). The World Bank’s approach to agriculture during the 1980s was focused on large 
projects to modernize the country’s agricultural systems (Gibbon 1992, 51). During structural adjustment, 
agriculture spending was cut, harming the 80 percent of the population who live in rural areas and work in 
the sector (Rono 2002, 88). More recent sectoral plans, including the Economy Recovery Strategy in 2003 
and the Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture in 2004, established a sectoral coordination unit and helped 
to revive agricultural institutions sidelined by structural adjustment. They set lofty goals of eliminating 
large swaths of poverty and food insecurity, which remain unmet today (Government of Kenya 2010, 3–
4).  
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Approximately 80 percent of the population is engaged in agricultural activities (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2018). Kenyan smallholders produce between 63 and 75 percent of the food despite 
difficult conditions of production, and about 70 percent of agricultural goods sold on the market 
(Rapsomanikis 2015, 8; Central Intelligence Agency 2018; Government of Kenya 2010, 11). The highest 
agricultural potential exists alongside Lake Victoria (Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 101). The Rift Valley 
highlands have the potential to be used for grazing animals, while the highland forest and grasslands have 
historically the location of most of the country’s largest agricultural estates (Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 
102–3). Other crops such as groundnuts, coconuts, and coffee can grow in other pockets of the country 
depending on local soil, water, and vegetation conditions.   
 Agriculture in Kenya is characterized by rain-fed smallholder farms, which produce over 75 
percent of agricultural production (Central Intelligence Agency 2018). On the average smallholder farm, 
seven family members work together to farm an average of 0.47 hectares of land in 2015, a decrease from 
the 0.53 hectares in 2005 (Rapsomanikis 2015, 5; Food and Agriculture Organization n.d.). Because of 
frequent droughts, crops fail on average once every three seasons, and the population is forced to rely on 
food aid (Hickey et al. 2012, 333). Even in good production years, about 24 percent of the population was 
undernourished due to largely unsolved, macro-level problems caused by rapid population growth and 
urbanization, and poverty (Emongor 2014, 6–9; World Bank 2016). Population growth has exceeded 
agricultural productivity, resulting in food shortages (Emongor 2014, 14). Nutritional shortages also 
occur, and about 35 percent of children are stunted from lack of proper nutrition (Government of Kenya 
and Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit 2011, 2). 
The main challenges to expanding agricultural production in Kenya include low productivity, 
underdeveloped and inefficient markets, lack of agroindustrial processes to add value to primary goods, 
and ineffective land use (Olwande 2012). The lack of infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, constraints 
market access and exportation. Because of arid conditions, irrigation systems are important to the success 
of crops, yet many smallholders do not have access to the credit that would allow them to make 
investments in mechanization (Emongor 2014, 15). Indeed, only about 3 percent of total land in Kenya is 
irrigated, and of that, only 42 percent is held by smallholders (Rapsomanikis 2015, 18; Government of 
Kenya 2010, 11). Low soil quality restricts where planting can occur, and mismanagement of soils over 
the years has further degraded lands (Ojany and Ogendo 1973, 110). Because of these challenges, 
agricultural policies in Kenya should address low productivity and water management, while legal 
frameworks should work towards better land management, market development, and infrastructure 
building. 
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THE	2008	FOOD	CRISIS	IN	KENYA:	CAUSES,	CONSEQUENCES,	AND	POLICY	RESPONSES		
Another pillar of food security is that of stability, or whether people have enough nutritious food 
throughout the year. In this section, an analysis of the 2008 food crisis in Kenya will speak to several 
stability-related concerns with which to assess policy and offer policy recommendations. First, the 2008 
crisis showed which groups of the population in Kenya are particularly vulnerable: pastoralists and the 
rural poor. This information is useful because it will allow the recommendations to better target these 
vulnerable groups. Second, the 2008 crisis illuminated the impact of domestic issues on hunger, further 
revealing weaknesses in food systems. Last, by noting the government’s response to the crisis in 2008, we 
learn what was useful and what was not in order to improve responses in the future. All three pieces of the 
analysis provide support for policy recommendations as to what Kenya should and should not consider 
doing in order to help its population become food secure the conditions of climate change.  
During the 2008 food crisis, increases in food prices hit the urban poor and pastoralists hardest 
(Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2008, 26–27). Prior to 2008, the purchasing power of urbanites had 
increased, making it easier for them to access staple foods (Mason et al. 2011, 355). During the crisis, 
however, the value of the Kenya Shilling declined by 25 percent relative to the US dollar, further driving 
down purchasing power of foods priced at the international markets (Emongor 2014, 5). This proved 
particularly devastating when the real price of staples on the international market rose 57 percent from 
March 2007 to March 2008 (Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2008, 9). In urban areas, households 
spend between 31 and 49 percent of their income on food (Mason et al. 2011, 352). As urbanites largely 
lack their own production of foodstuffs, they must rely on the market and have no other options when 
prices increase. Urban dwellers included in the food poor category rose by 31 percent from November 
2007 to June 2008 (Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2008, 31). A full 75 percent of pastoralists were 
considered to be in the food poor group by summer 2008 (Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2008, 
32). Smallholders, though, were not spared either. Because of the increased cost of fertilizers during the 
crisis, higher prices failed to translate into elevated revenues for farmers (Emongor 2014, 18). 
Smallholders sell less than a quarter of their production, yet over half of them are net food buyers, leaving 
them vulnerable to rising prices (ReSAKSS 2009, cited in Emongor 2014, 18). Data on undernourishment 
shows that the number of people overall who were undernourished increased from 9.7 million in the 
period from 2006 to 2008 to 9.9 million in the period from 2007 to 2009 (Food and Agriculture 
Organization n.d.). 
As in Nepal, the 2008 crisis was further complicated by violence from the 2007 election and a 
drought, which highlighted weaknesses within Kenya’s food security complex and exacerbated the effects 
of the price spike in international markets (Hickey et al. 2012, 334). During the 2007 long rains period, 
rainfall was irregularly distributed, causing floods in some areas and droughts in others. Rift Valley Fever 
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spread because of these abnormal rains, sickening people and animals alike and preventing Kenyan meat 
from being exportable (Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2007). Maize production decreased by about 
300,000 tons from 2006 to 2007, and by an additional 600,000 tons between 2007 and 2008 because of 
the drought (“Kenya Maize Production” 2017). While domestic production decreased, demand for corn-
based ethanol from the United States and the European Union (for a longer discussion, see chapter 1) 
contributed to a rise in maize prices of 134 percent between 2003 and 2008, and 59 percent between 2007 
and 2008 alone (Masters 2008; Gandure 2008, 25). This decline in production and droughts and floods in 
pastoral lands drove hunger in Kenya beyond that of international markets. In addition, the 2008 elections 
served as the spark that set aflame anger over structural problems that had simmered since before 
independence (Branch 2011, 274–75). During riots over the election results, protesters set granaries and 
fields on fire, destroying important sources of food in a year where production was crippled by drought 
(Kanina 2008). Combined, the violence and rainfall issues made Kenya’s domestic conditions ripe for 
hunger.   
Kenya took urgent measures to provide reduced-cost food to its urban and pastoral populations. 
The National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), long villianized because of its status as a semi-state-
owned enterprise, was able to react quickly by coordinating the sale of subsidized corn flour in urban 
areas. At the same time, however, NCPB’s practices of buying maize at above market price likely 
exacerbated the crisis (Gandure 2008, 26). In June 2011, the Kenyan parliament passed a bill that placed 
direct price controls on food items (Emongor 2014, 19). Support to the most vulnerable parts of the 
populations—children and the elderly—came from the newly founded Cash Transfer Fund and school 
nutrition programs (Emongor 2014, 20; AllAfrica 2012).  
International groups increased their presence in Kenya, fearing famines. Although Kenya 
regularly receives food aid packages valuing in the thousands of tons, these numbers increased at points 
during the crisis, with the top shipment arriving in 2009 (550,122 tons of foodstuffs) (Food and 
Agriculture Organization 2015b). Large donations began rolling in in 2007, including over US$11 million 
in 2007 contribution from the US for small farmers (World Food Programme 2007b, 2007a). The Kenya 
Red Cross Society distributed food relief throughout the country, focusing on providing pastoralists with 
food, water, and restocking, and urban dwellers with food aid (International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies 2009, 10–13). Other NGOs operated food for work and food for training programs 
in hunger zones (Emongor 2014, 20). 
 Throughout the crisis, the government took market-oriented actions to combat price increases and 
assure the maize supply. It banned maize exports in October 2008, which prevented farmers from 
profiting from the crisis while keeping the limited maize available in the country (Shama 2011, 31). It 
eliminated import tariffs for a wide range of foodstuffs including maize from June 2010 through 2012 
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(Emongor 2014, 20). It also established subsidies for agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizers to 
increase domestic production and to prevent the crisis from persisting into the next production season 
(Emongor 2014, 20). These trade measures may have helped some residents, but did not improve the 
domestic causes of the crisis, and food prices remained high in Kenya while falling in the international 
market (Emongor 2014, 4).  
 Evidence from the 2008 crisis points to several areas that governmental policies should pay 
particular attention to in order to stem future food crises, particularly as climate change progresses. First, 
drought mitigation and adaptation should be the number one priority for sectoral policy. A drought caused 
maize production to fall during the crisis while at the same time pastoralists lost their animals for lack of 
water, so putting into place irrigation systems for farmers, water collection and storage systems for 
pastoralists would be helpful regardless of climate change. Second, overall Kenya took a number of steps 
during the crisis that likely had a positive impact on hunger, including cash transfers and school nutrition 
programs, eliminating import tariffs temporarily, and subsidizing agricultural inputs to help farmers 
increase their yields during the next crop cycle. Third, the government should put into place more specific 
programs targeting the most vulnerable groups, the urban poor and pastoralists. What the World Food 
Programme and other NGOs did that Kenya should learn from are the targeted food aid programs for both 
of these groups. Providing both longer-term support (e.g. stronger safety nets) and short-term support 
(e.g. subsidized food baskets and food for work programs where there is market failure) buffers these 
populations from both domestic and international price shocks. Kenya began a program specifically 
targeting the urban poor in Mombasa in 2012 called the Urban Food Subsidy Cash Transfer Program, 
which was an important step toward supporting the urban poor nation-wide. Fourth, political stability is a 
must to assure food security. As the violence that occurred before and during the food crisis in 2008 
amplified the effects of the crisis, the actions suggested above will likely fall flat if violence or political 
instability prevents the government from taking strong and immediate action on food price hikes and 
shortages.  
CLIMATE	CHANGE	CONTEXT	
In this section, I will provide background information on the two key crops that were chosen for study in 
this thesis, and then investigate changes to their production under climate change. Black tea is the first 
crop to be studied. It was selected because of its importance not only as an export crop, but also as a crop 
with high smallholder engagement. Tea production can be related to the food access pillar, as 26 percent 
of Kenya’s export earnings and four percent of its GDP come from tea (Intergovermental Group on Tea 
2016). This means that any change in tea production due to climate change will directly impact 
smallholders’ ability to access food through income from tea, while also having detrimental effects on the 
economy at large. The second crop surveyed is corn, Kenya’s top food crop. As the staple crop in most 
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Kenyans’ diets, maize production determines how much of this food is available for consumption. 
Together, assessing these two crops helps give us a picture of potential changes in access and availability 
of food under the conditions of climate change.  
 Kenya is a top producer and exporter of black tea. In Kenya, tea is grown in the west near Lake 
Victoria and the Rift Valley. Colonists brought tea with them to Kenya, where it was first planted in 1903 
(Gesimba et al. 2005, 335). Most of the tea grown in Kenya comes from seeds originating from India 
(Carr 2010b, 3). Both large estates and smallholder grow tea, with large estates benefiting from higher 
yields while smallholders produce higher quality leaves (Gesimba et al. 2005, 335). Smallholders produce 
approximately 50 percent of the country’s tea production (Government of Kenya 2010, 12; Kinyua 2004). 
Tea yields vary by year based on the amount of rainfall crops receive, but they have failed to increase 
significantly since the early 2000s (Food and Agriculture Organization 2017). Tea plants require 
approximately 1150 and 1400mm of rain annually, and water should be evenly spaced throughout the 
growing season (Carr 2010a, 3). The crop has been particularly successful in Kenya because of 
government support of smallholder tea growers’ integration into the market, efficient colonial state 
management, and the research into high yield varieties undertaken by the Tea Research Foundation of 
Kenya (Gesimba et al. 2005, 335). Tea is a labor-intensive crop as plants need to be modified so that they 
become wide and short for maximum production and the best quality tea is harvested by hand, giving 
smallholder families with many workers a competitive advantage (Carr 2010b, 4). One of the largest 
constraints on production is lack of water: drier districts do not have the rainfall or irrigation technology 
necessary for ample production. Moderate temperatures, however, allow tea to be harvested all year-
round, with spikes in production during the warm, wet season (Carr 2010b, 7). 
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Figure 4.1. Map of tea production in Kenya. Map created on GoogleMaps using data from Gesimba et al. 
2005.  
 There are several hypotheses about how and when maize was first introduced to Africa: by the 
Portuguese, probably in the 16th century; by Arab traders as far back as the 12th century (Miracle 1965, 
39–42). Its production spread because of demand from European slave traders during the 17th-19th 
centuries, and was well-known in Kenya by the 1880s (Miracle 1965, 43,51). Maize in Kenya makes up 
more than half of what smallholders produce, and is the main staple in the diet of over 85 percent of 
people (Rapsomanikis 2015, 8; Onono, Wawire, and Ombuki 2013, 2). What demand cannot be met by 
domestic production is substituted with imports coming mainly from Mexico and South Africa (Simoes 
and Hidalgo 2011). Smallholders are the main producers of corn, producing 70 percent of total production 
(Olwande 2012). Maize can be grown at altitudes ranging from 0 to 2200 m above sea level, and requires 
rainfall or irrigation of 600-900mm per growing season (National Farmers Information Service 2018). 
Smallholder maize yields have increased in recent years, yet it remains unable to approach the yields of 
other countries because they lack technical efficiency (Olwande 2012). Because of the wide range of 
growing conditions, different varieties of corn have been perfected to fit local conditions (TopFarmer 
2018). Corn remains, however, highly susceptible to yearly changes in rainfall, and production does not 
meet the country’s growing demand for the crop (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2009). Therefore, 
specific challenges to maize production are low yields and lack of water.  
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Figure 4.2. Map of corn production in Kenya (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2008). 
 By continuing the study of maize and tea and adding the lens of climate change, I hope to 
understand how these crops might undergo production changes under the conditions in climate change to 
speak to food security in the future. I will do this by comparing temperature and precipitation needs of the 
crops with projected values given from the CMIP5 model. The CMIP5 model ensemble mean, which 
assumes business as usual, predicts temperature in Kenya to increase by an average of 2.4°C, and rainfall 
to increase by 0.2mm/day. A disaggregation of values per month can be seen in Figures 3 and 4. These 
changes are not as significant for their numbers as they are for the seasonal changes they might bring: 
both maize and tea require rains early in the year, when CMIP5 predicts that rainfall will decrease.  
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Figure 4.3. Average monthly temperatures observed and projected for Kenya (Adler and Hostetler 2013).  
 
Figure 4.4. Average monthly precipitation observed and projected for Kenya (Adler and Hostetler 2013).  
The optimum temperature for tea plants to grow is between 24 and 26 degrees Celsius, and 
optimum leaf photosynthesis occurs between 25 and 30 degrees Celsius, with noted declines as 
temperatures increase above 30 degrees Celsius (Carr 2010b, 6, 2010a, 18). Although temperatures are 
likely to rise under the conditions of climate change, they are not predicted to rise to levels that would 
destroy crops. Some decline in production might occur during the hottest times of the year, yet it is water 
that will likely become even more of a limiting factor. Rainfall from January to March is essential for a 
productive crop, precisely the period in which climate change predictions show that precipitation might 
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subsequent months, including a projected decline from 4.3mm/day to 2.1mm/day in April. As 
replacement cycles, or the time it takes for new shoots to grow, decrease with warm, wet seasons and the 
use of fertilizers, irrigation and increased fertilizer use could make up for increased variability in water 
returns over the year (Carr 2010b, 7). 
The optimal temperature for maize to grow is 30° Celsius, as higher temperatures lower 
productivity (National Farmers Information Service 2018). Although temperatures are predicted to rise by 
2.4°C on average, no one month is expected to see temperatures above 30 °C. Maize is typically planted 
during March and April, left to grow to September, and harvested in October and November (Food and 
Agriculture Organization 2018). This time is considered the “long rains” period, and lack of rainfall 
during the period is extremely detrimental to maize production (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 
2009). Climate change predictions show that there is likely to be less rain during the long rains period, 
with more rains occurring later in the year. While aggregate rainfall might increase slightly, these changes 
in patterns will offset any benefit by increased rain. This change may pose a considerable threat to maize 
production, especially considering that smallholders grow most of the country’s maize without the help of 
irrigation systems. As maize production already fails to meet domestic consumption as is, any reduction 
of production caused by climate change will be challenging to substitute (Onono, Wawire, and Ombuki 
2013, 2).  
Based on the CMIP5 model ensemble mean for Kenya, it is clear that changes in the timing of 
precipitation are likely to become the largest barriers to production in the future for both tea and maize. 
This pattern can also be seen in Ukraine, where the rainy season is projected to switch seasons, 
challenging sunflower production. For Kenya, the effects on food security from these precipitation 
changes will likely be more detrimental than in Ukraine, however, as maize is the number one food crop 
in Kenya, and will thus impact food availability. Maize seems poised to be particularly affected by 
changes in precipitation patterns. While in 2008 drought was a main contributor to the food crisis, it 
appears that the lack of water will pose even greater threats to food security in the future. Policies that 
prepare Kenya for climate change should have as a top priority the mitigation of drought, as well as the 




In order to understand how Kenya’s specific commitments to the right to food influence agricultural and 
climate change policy, as well as the consequences of this approach to hunger alleviation, this section will 
lay out the right to food framework currently in place. Kenya ratified ICESCR in 1972, and because of 
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how international law is integrated under the constitution, ICESCR is part of the law of Kenya (“The 
Constitution of Kenya” 2010, pt. 2). Domestic legal support for human rights and the right to food has 
strengthened over time in Kenya. The 1963 constitution gave the president almost complete control over 
the country’s natural resources and ability to make changes to keep power in his own hands, flaws 
perpetuated inequalities and injustices (Akech 2010, 12). During Jomo Kenyatta’s presidency, ethnic 
tensions were amplified by the lack of land reform policy and corruption that tended to favor Kenyatta’s 
own Kikuyu group (Branch 2011, 98–99). Efforts to amend the constitution began in 2001 with the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 2001; they were succeeded by a series of ethnically charged 
revisions and violent opposition. The 2007 presidential election ignited unexpectedly violent protests that 
had been brewing since the reintroduction of the multiparty system in the 1990s (Akech 2010, 17). Many 
Kenyans saw a constitutional change as the only way to prevent violent power grabs and election violence 
in the future, so the Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 2008 was treated with urgency and resulted in 
the referendum approving the current constitution in 2010 (Akech 2010, 12–13, 17; Branch 2011, 278). 
These hopes about the new constitution’s ability to solve decade-long problems with the sweep of a pen 
were mostly unfounded, as no significant changes were observed in the country (Branch 2011, 284). The 
new constitution does provide more support for human rights and decentralizes the government to 
facilitate local participation in politics (Akech 2010, 20–24). During negotiations, progressives and 
conservatives went head to head, with progressives successfully advocating for the bill of rights which 
includes the right to food (Murunga, Okello, and Sjogren 2014, 145). Because the bill of rights was such a 
contention issue, it follows that the right to food was probably carefully crafted, although marriage 
equality, Islamic courts, and the power of the state to take discretionary action for security purposes were 
the items most hotly debated (Murunga, Okello, and Sjogren 2014, 159). However, civil society 
organizations did have a much bigger role to play in constitutional negotiations than in Ukraine, 
contributing to the presence of a strong bill of rights (Murunga, Okello, and Sjogren 2014, 108). 
 The 2010 constitution lays out the right to food within the basic rights given to all persons. In 
Article 43, it states, “every person had the right to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of 
acceptable quality,” showing that Kenya takes a strong dual perspective on right to food (“The 
Constitution of Kenya” 2010, pt. 43). The constitution appears to qualify ICESCR’s Article 11: although 
the “to be free from hunger” and “adequate food” language mirrors the Covenant, the language both on 
the right to adequate food and on hunger demonstrates the “progressive character” of the bill of rights in 
Kenya’s constitution (Murunga, Okello, and Sjogren 2014, 6). The language in the constitution expands 
from the negative right of freedom from hunger to include food security ideas about usage with 
acceptable quality. In addition, in the Kenya Law’s database of jurisprudence, 205 total cases involving 
ESC rights make reference to ICESCR, a sign that ICESCR has had an influence on domestic law 
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(National Council for Law Reporting 2019). Indeed, Kenya’s right to food law appears to be the most 
justiciable of the four cases based on constitutional language alone because it provides a modern 
definition of the right to food, while also avoiding food sovereignty, which has its own baggage.  
The right to food and other social, economic and cultural rights have been heard in court, making 
it clear that the right to food is justiciable in Kenya. This constitutional provision has been litigated in 
Petition 88 of 2011 of the Consumer Federation of Kenya v. Attorney General et al. (which also named 
the Finance and Energy ministers, Energy Regulatory Commission, and National Oil Corporation as 
respondents) for the government’s alleged failure to stop living costs, including food, from rising. This 
case was heard by the High Court, who ruled for the defendants as the judge determined that there needs 
to be a standard of reasonableness per Article 20 of the constitution in determining whether the state has 
met its economic, social and cultural obligations. The judge wrote:  
More importantly, it must be stated that in bringing matters such as this before the court, which 
have a critical bearing on the rights, lives and livelihoods of citizens, it is not enough to make 
bare statements with regard to the violation of rights without seriously addressing oneself to the 
manner in which the violations have occurred and the reasonableness or otherwise of the 
measures taken to avert or ameliorate their impact.   At this nascent stage in the implementation 
of the new Constitution, parties in the position of the petitioner, should they determine to take on 
cases which have a bearing on the public interest, must take them on with all due seriousness 
(Ngugi 2012, 88).  
However, in Petition 164 of 2011 involving resettlement to build an airport, the same judge, Mumbi 
Ngugi of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi ruled more strongly in favor of ESC rights, saying:  
“The argument that social economic rights cannot be claimed at this point, two years after the 
promulgation of the Constitution, also ignores the fact that no provision of the Constitution is 
intended to wait until the state feels it is ready to meet its constitutional obligations. Article 21 
and 43 require that there should be ‘progressive realization’ of social economic rights, implying 
that the state must begin to take steps, and I might add be seen to take steps, towards realization 
of these rights,” emphasis in the original text (Ngugi 2013).  
These two rulings, both on ESC rights by the same judge but a year apart, present a clear change in the 
court’s view on ESC rights. Several other cases, such as Petition 11 of 2013 that primarily deals with 
housing, also have as secondary claims the right to food. There have been several cases related to the right 
to adequate housing under economic, social and cultural rights in the bill of rights that have been ruled for 
the petitioners, showing that it is not impossible to gain these rights through litigation in Kenay 
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(AllAfrica.Com 2011; Lenaola 2013).28 Although there have been no attempts to seek legal recourse for 
the right to food since the 2011 case previously cited, I believe that with current jurisprudence, plaintiffs 
invoking Article 43 may have a better chance of having their case decided in their favor, provided that 
they can demonstrate that the state’s actions or policies (or lack thereof) contributed to their food 
insecurity.  
The language in the constitution of Kenya in Article 21 spells out how the country will assure the 
right to food: through legislation that will allow the progressive realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The creation of social safety nets and social security for those unable to support 
themselves is another way that these rights will be fulfilled under article 43. Kenya spends about 2.7 
percent of its GDP on social sets, higher than the global average, and has safety nets specifically for 
hungry populations that are already operational (World Bank 2015b). The role of overseeing agricultural 
production and food distribution is given to the county governments, decentralizing the forces governing 
the livelihoods of the majority of the population (“The Constitution of Kenya” 2010, sec. Fourth 
Schedule).  
 The 2010 constitution attempts to remedy some of the problems with land rights in the country. It 
lays out the definitions of the three classes of land it creates: public land, administered by the National 
Land Commission trust; community land, held by communities with shared characteristics or interests; 
and private land, registered by an individual (“The Constitution of Kenya” 2010, pts. 61–64). Not only 
does the National Land Commission administer pubic land, it is also responsible for recommending land 
policy to the government, investigating land injustices, and monitoring land use planning in the country 
(pt. 67). Article 66 allows the state to regulate the use of land in the interest of local communities and 
their economies. Article 68 allows parliament to determine maximum amounts of land that may be held 
by private individuals, ostensibly preventing land monopolies. As issues of land rights have been tied to 
issue of minority rights, resolving land rights conflicts may also help with some of the larger governance 
issues in terms of tensions between ethnic groups (Akech 2010, 26). 
 On the issues of urbanization and population growth, as well as corruption, the constitution is 
relatively quiet. Although it calls for the creation of a commission on corruption and ethics, and the 
establishment of an electoral and political party system free from corruption, it does not provide specific 
rules to prevent corruption. In regards to population growth and urbanization, the constitution does not 
call for the creation of any legislation on this front, although it does give people the right to reproductive 
health care under article 43.  
																																								 																				
28 Indeed, a quick assessment of cases in Kenya related to ESC rights deal with issues of housing and 
eviction.  
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As Kenya is a net food importing country, its trade relationships and agreements significantly 
contribute to nation-wide food security.29 In addition, under Article 11 of ICESCR, countries are tasked 
with equally distributing food in relation to need, so understanding Kenya’s trade relationships will help 
our understanding of avenues through which it could improve food security. Kenya belongs to several 
trade blocs, including the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African, with 21 member states; the 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States, with a focus on inter-state cooperation; and the East African 
Community, a customs union, in which a common tax is applied on all goods that enter the bloc. Kenya’s 
immediate neighbors, Uganda and Tanzania, dominate exchanges on the continent, while the top import 
countries of origin are China, India, and the United Arab Emirates (Tralac Trade Law Center 2018; 
Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). Unlike the other case study countries, Kenya’s trade with its neighboring 
countries is minimal compared to trade with farther away states. Kenya has ratified the African 
Continental Free Trade Area, which requires it to liberalize along 90 percent of tariff lines, but the 
agreement has yet to enter force. If ratified and implemented, this trade agreement could provide the 
framework for increased intra-continental trade, which could help Kenya reach its food security goals 
(Signé 2018).  
The National Food and Nutrition Security Policy fills in details on food security not included in 
Vision 2030, Kenya’s blueprint for development. The policy itself is “framed in the context of basic 
humans rights … including the universal ‘Right to Food’” (Government of Kenya and Agricultural Sector 
Coordination Unit 2011). The existence of this policy with a specific rights-based approach to food 
security is a substantial step in legislating for the right to food beyond the constitution, especially because 
the Policy takes food security to include nutritious diets and special attention to vulnerable groups, which 
the constitution does not specify. Kenya uses the part of the framework established by the United Nations 
in their approach to food security, addressing availability, accessibility, stability, and meeting nutritional 
requirements. Food security has been deemed an issue of national security, citing the propensity for 
violence to occur in the face of food shortages. Climate change is also mentioned throughout and 
integrated into the whole policy, something that the other case study countries could learn from. The 
policy presents three broad policy objectives: to achieve good nutrition for optimum health of all 
Kenyans; to increase the quantity and quality of food available, accessible and affordable to all Kenyans 
at all times; and to protect vulnerable populations using innovative and cost-effective safety nets linked to 
long term development. The first set of actions run in parallel with the Agriculture Development Strategy 
in order to increase production; low yields is one of the key challenges to producing enough food for 
																																								 																				
29 This was not always the case: as late as the mid-1970s, Kenya was self-sufficient in food production (Kaplan et al. 
1984, 140).  
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people, so this part of the policy will likely have a positive impact on the availability pillar of food 
security. There is also attention to urbanites in the policy, one of the key groups impacted by the 2008 
crisis. Urban zones are to be targeted for employment creation mechanisms such as educational programs, 
with the goal of increasing participation in the formal sector. Pastoralists, the other vulnerable group in 
2008, also receive special attention in order to avoid loss of livestock during droughts. Within the policy, 
Kenya clearly differentiates between populations who would benefit from food aid, and populations that 
would be better off being targeted for cash transfers or public works programs.  
 Vision 2030, focuses on the pillars of the economic, the social, and the political. Specific projects 
and plans are outlined in subsequent-medium term implementation plans, each of which focuses on a 
period of five years. Vision 2030 focuses on the big picture governance and society-level changes needed 
for food security and agricultural development, including anti-corruption measures. The plan emphasizes 
the creation of new infrastructure to eliminate this high barrier to trade, land reform, and the development 
of human capital. While the pillars indicate an interest in a society-level push, Vision 2030 remains 
economic growth focused. To this end, all projects must contribute to macroeconomic stability and be 
reviewed by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Kenya (Government of the Republic of 
Kenya 2007, 6). It calls for GDP growth of 10 percent, which the country remains far from achieving. The 
entire agricultural sector is targeted for growth and expansion. High on the list of priorities is adding 
value to primary production with priority to agroindustrial processing, innovation, and decreasing 
fertilizer costs. The Vision acknowledges the importance of the informal sector to the economy, and plans 
to support the sector while integrating it more fully into the formal economy; this formalization of the 
workforce will be helpful for the urban poor, as it is likely to increase their wages. This goal is also 
important for both women and smallholders alike, as they often engage in informal trade and 
unremunerated labor. For products commonly imported, the government will begin an import substitution 
plan to increase competitiveness, particularly in agroindustrial goods.  
 Together, the constitution, the National Food and Nutrition Security Policy, and Vision 2030 
provide the foundation for the state’s approach to food and development. The constitution and a key 
decision from the Constitutional Court make it so that the right to adequate food is enforceable by courts 
in Kenya, although there remain some challenges about how to determine when the state’s actions are a 
reasonable response or whether the state can be held liable for hunger because of this right. Because of 
the high burden placed on the petitioner, the ability to seek assistance in cases of gross violations, and the 
remedies limited to petitioners, it seems that in Kenya at least, approaching food security from a right to 
food perspective misunderstands the problem, and is thus only slightly effective at dealing with the eight 
million people who are hungry. Therefore, while the right to food is justiciable in Kenya, sectoral plans 
and policy are more useful in the everyday work of supporting a hunger-free population. What the article 
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on right to food in Kenya’s constitution shows us is a third way, beside angling for food sovereignty or 
perhaps outdated languages from ICESCR, to incorporate the right to food into a constitution. Vision 
2030 deals with the larger general issues involving economic and wage growth to make sure that food can 
be moved around the country and that people have the means to purchase it. The NFNSP seeks to solve 
many of the main challenges to food security identified by this thesis, although it does not do enough to 
provide support for drought mitigation in arid regions, nor does it create clear guidance for a universal 
safety net beyond those targeting specific populations. Kenya stands out among the case studies for its 
lack of regional trade, something that it could certainly increase in order to make food available for the 
population; several trade agreements in the works may help Kenya do this. A key take-away from the 
NFNSP is that the government of Kenya seems to have learned from its responses to the 2008 crisis 
because it plans to implement many of the targeting programs that it failed to implement properly during 
the crisis.  
AGRICULTURAL	FRAMEWORK		
In this section, I draw together the issues elucidated in the previous sections to analyze Kenya’s 
agricultural policies. Macro-level problems that these policies must account for include population 
growth, minority-majority tensions, and land organization. The populations most vulnerable to food 
insecurity are pastoralists and the rural poor, so the policy should find ways to increase access, 
availability, and stability of food supplies for these groups. Food crises are more likely to arise 
domestically because of political instability and droughts, which is another factor for the policy to 
consider. General challenges to agriculture include poorly developed markets and export infrastructure, 
lack of access of credits, low productivity from lack of mechanization and inputs, and arid conditions. 
Under the conditions of climate change, tea production may decrease because of drought, and rainfall 
pattern changes may decrease maize yields. Using these country-specific factors, I will assess the 
agricultural policy and make recommendations to support the agricultural sector and food security in 
Kenya.  
The 2010-2020 Agricultural Sector Development Strategy’s (ASDS) vision is “a food-secure and 
prosperous nation,” while its mission is “innovative, commercially oriented and modern agriculture” 
(Government of Kenya 2010, 28). The plan divides up the overall sectoral policy into various subsectors, 
including crops and livestock, and then turns its focus on production factors that contribute to the sector. 
This policy is comprehensive in terms of the topics it covers, but it is sparse on details and indicators, 
which would make the plan’s statements assessable. As there has yet to be a comprehensive review of the 
plan’s implementation, it is difficult to know how much progress has been made toward accomplishing 
the plan’s goals. Nearing the end of the strategy’s term, the growth rates, added value growth rates, and 
government expenditure rates on agriculture remain on the decline (ReSAKSS 2017).  
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Of the three overarching issue areas, most attention is focused on land. Proposed interventions for 
land use lack depth within the crops and land development subsector, only calling for increased 
sustainable agriculture and technology for the arid and semi-arid zones. As land reform and land rights 
are dealt with in the Vision 2030 and the constitution, this hole does not raise an alarm. The land 
production factor section aims to improve agricultural land use.30 The government plan includes a GIS-
based land registry to keep track of parcels and titles. Registering land and issuing land titles alone are 
unlikely to solve the larger problems around land rights, and might exacerbate tensions. What Kenya 
needs is not more titles, but rather a better way to allocate land than distribution based upon the ethnicity 
of whichevergroup is in power. Instead, attempts to reform land rights must take into account from whom 
land has been taken and to whom it has been given, in order to reconcile the past with the current 
population’s needs. This plan does say that it will end government resettlement, which is a step in the 
right direction. Population growth gets mentioned only as a factor that is causing problems for soil 
quality, water management, and wildlife, and minority-majority tensions do not appear to be addressed at 
all.  
Improving market access and export infrastructure will be done through the building of 
infrastructure for safety and health standard compliance and generating and disseminating market 
information under the crop and land development subsector. Infrastructure is lumped in with land titling 
measures, but there are no discussions about what exactly government investment in infrastructure might 
look like. Pastoralists are targeted as a group for which market access should increase, and this will hinge 
upon better sanitation and safety procedures, so the ASDS focuses on these measures. These steps do not 
seem to do much more than acknowledge that there is a problem, as there is not a clear mechanism or 
action plan for the state to ameliorate the situation.  
Tea and maize do not receive much attention under the ASDS. While Kenya has the strongest 
research out of the four case studies, improving production will depend upon bringing new techniques to 
farmers through extension services, which the Strategy details. Tea is targeted for productivity increases 
under the crops and land development subsector. This plan, however, values demand-driven research 
centered on export crops, and does not include an emphasis on maize, the main food crop. Kenya might 
consider spending more on extension services for food crops rather than export crops, as it already does 
not produce enough to feed its population under current status quo conditions.  
																																								 																				
30 There is a separate law, the Land Act of 2012, that deals with issues such as urbanization and land disputes courts. 
While analyzing this piece of legislation is outside of this thesis’s scope, determining how the government plans to 
tackle urbanization through land use outside of the agricultural sector would be a direction for further research.  
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Hoping to increase access to inputs and credit, the policy outlines a plan to work with the private 
sector while importing fertilizers in bulk to distribute to farmers at reduced costs. Credit packages will be 
centered on private lending opportunities, which have typically excluded smallholders because of high 
credit rates. If credit access for smallholders increases over the tenure of this plan, this step could make a 
real difference in the lives of farmers, but it is unlikely to do so because of the lack of incentives from the 
government to propel the private sector to lend to smallholders.  
Pastoralists, one of the two vulnerable groups in 2008, will be given more support under this plan. 
The developing northern Kenya production component is key for improving the resilience of pastoralists, 
who have some of the highest rates of poverty in the country and who were one of the two groups most 
impacted by the 2008 food crisis. In the ASAL areas specifically, lack of water will be addressed through 
better rainwater management and collection projects. The pastures themselves have degraded from 
overgrazing in recent years, so that when there is little rainfall, little grass grows for grazing. Restoring 
pastures, then, is an important drought-prevention tool to keep pastoralists from losing their livestock. 
Restoring pastures partially fills the gap in the NFNSP about non-irrigation drought prevention measures. 
Another way the ASDS supports drought prevention in arid- and semi-arid areas is through a borehole 
program, or well-drilling program, to access untapped groundwater. The Strategy places a caveat on this, 
saying that the program must be well-planned, essential in order to avoid disputes over water rights or 
overexploitation that would prevent future pastoralists from accessing water. The ASDS calls for 
increasing the area under cultivation in the ASAL area for drought resistant crops. While some 
subsistence agriculture may help pastoralists balance their food basket, a focus on cash crops in this area 
as spelled out by this plan may do further damage to the land and put increased pressure on fragile water 
resources. It is also not clear whether the Strategy envisions those already living in ASAL doing 
agricultural work, or whether people from other regions would be settled there. Pastoralists have spoken 
about their reluctance to switching their livelihoods completely because of the cultural relationship they 
have with their work, which may provide another barrier to purely agricultural pursuits. Likewise, in the 
case of the latter situation, there may be minority-majority group tensions caused by resettlement. The 
diversifying sources of income for pastoralist communities section, however, holds more promise. It calls 
for community-level wildlife conservation, which can create income from tourism. The planting of trees 
that produce fruits and spices is encouraged by the ASDS, which will not only provide additional income 
but also ground cover and water retention. By having pastoralists participate in activities like soap making 
that process animal parts, pastoralists can gain increased income and have stores of wealth besides their 
livestock. On the other hand, much of the work around breeding livestock falls on farmers because the 
government has determined that livestock breeding is not one of its priority tasks. As the private sector 
has not stepped up to invest in this area, it is unclear who will do breeding work other than the farmers 
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themselves. This is an area in which this policy admits that will not get government attention, despite the 
need for help in breeding, particularly in ensuring that animals are healthier and more resilient to extreme 
weather. In 2008, disease made much of Kenya’s livestock unable to be sold, so controlling diseases and 
pests and making sure they do not spread under this Strategy is an important step toward ensuring that 
hardships do not pile up for pastoralists. While the government may shy away from implementing its own 
breeding programs, it needs to incentivize the private sector to engage with this area in order to assure 
that farmers have quality animals.                                  
This policy gives considerable attention to water management and storage. The ASDS calls for 
the implementation of framework legislation on water management, which passed in 2016 (Water Act, 
2016, No. 43 of 2016). This law is significant: interventions to prevent drought and manage water 
resources cannot be done in a piecemeal way, and having a comprehensive piece of legislation in place 
will create streamlining and avoid conflict. It also mandates water storage, which the government’s 
support for developing systems that accomplish this. By combining legislation and government support 
for implementation on the ground, it is more likely that these beneficial plans will actually be realized 
(Government of Kenya 2010). Climate change projections show that maize production will decrease 
because of changes in precipitation patterns unless there are significant interventions to stabilize water 
availability throughout the year; because of this legislation, maize production may not decrease in 
significant ways. The water plan for agriculture reiterates the Vision 2030 goal of adding 32,000 new 
hectares of irrigated land per year, with a baseline of 144,100 ha equipped for full control irrigation in 
2010 (Food and Agriculture Organization 2015a). Rivers and lakes will also receive attention for 
depollution efforts, thus making this water safer for both human and agricultural use. While drought and 
lack of water are problems that may never be solved, the steps outlined in the ASDS put the country on a 
positive track to minimizing the effects of drought and building resilience (Government of Kenya 2010). 
Several parts of the policy appear that they will work toward meeting the county’s goals of 
decreased hunger and poverty. It is strongest when dealing with water, pastoralists, and also includes 
some elements to improve yields. It leaves behind credit, market access, and infrastructure, however. The 
policy itself acknowledges that these gains depend on economic, political, and social stability that cannot 
be counted upon. Structural governance issues may thwart even the best plans, turning something as 
positive as a social safety net into a site of corruption. The different government ministries and 
organizations would be required to collaborate fully, and monitoring and evaluation should not be left as 
an afterthought. If several of the policy’s aims meet their goals, then the policy can be deemed a success 
without its full implementation, as the latter is highly unlikely to occur.   
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CLIMATE	CHANGE	FRAMEWORK		
In this section, I transition to examine the climate change policies in Kenya in order to determine what 
actions it already takes and policy recommendations I can make to improve food security. Kenya has 
taken action at the national and local action to mitigate and adapt to climate change. In addition to its 
domestic legislation, the country is also party to the Paris Agreement (2017), the Kyoto Protocol (2005) 
and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1994). The 2010 constitution sets the stage for 
strong environmental laws by granting every person the right to a clean and healthy environment (“The 
Constitution of Kenya” 2010, pt. 42). Kenyans can bring complaints about environmental degradation 
without the need to prove injury or loss, which enables those affected by climate change to come forward 
without the traditional barriers to such lawsuits (“The Constitution of Kenya” 2010, pt. 72). Vision 2030’s 
social pillar specifically calls for a “just and cohesive society enjoying equitable social development in a 
clean and secure environment,” (Government of the Republic of Kenya 2007, 1, emphasis added).  
 Kenya’s National Food and Nutrition Security Policy lists climate change as a threat, calling 
adaptation interventions critical (Government of Kenya and Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit 2011, 
3). To respond to increased threats to food security because of extreme weather events, the policy 
mandates that the National Cereals and Produce Board retain four million bags of maize and a matching 
cash equivalent. This mandate aims to ensure that if there are food shortages or price spikes the 
government can release grain and stabilize the situation. As 30 to 40 percent of maize is lost in storage, 
and this plan does not include investments in granaries and storage systems to reduce losses, increasing 
stocks is only part of the solution (Government of Kenya and Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit 2011, 
11, 14). The policy calls for the enhancement of regional trade and local circulation of crops, realistic 
goals in face of the extreme barriers faced by international trade from the lack of infrastructure. Regional 
trade may become even more important under the conditions of climate change, as Kenya might 
experience changes in its agricultural sector that shift or decrease production, which would necessitate the 
procurement of food from external sources. Drought, the most factor most likely to impact production and 
food security, particularly in terms of maize availability, is acknowledged as one of the biggest threats 
facing the country. The NFNSP sets targets to support water collection, storage, and irrigation 
technologies and promote sustainable use of water sources. The Policy provides few details, however, on 
the specific mechanisms of preventative drought management through measures beside irrigation, calling 
for exploring the creation of special funds and agencies to address drought. It imagines a preventative 
response to climate change-induced drought, particularly in the ASAL areas through sinking boreholes 
and creating capacity building programs. It does not specifically mention maize and adaptation 
mechanisms for the country’s main food crop, a considerable oversight as the model ensemble mean 
shows that changes in precipitation patterns may have a negative effect on maize production. The creation 
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of these institutions and funds is necessary to assure food security, and failing to provide for them fully 
within the strategy leaves doubts as to Kenya’s ability to prevent drought. The NFNSP provides evidence 
of movement in areas that have shown to be weaknesses for Kenya in the past and that are likely to 
become larger problems in the future, notably food trade and drought management.  
 Kenya’s Climate Change Act of 2016 serves to both encourage resilience and spur low-emission 
development. One of its biggest independent achievements is the establishment of the National Climate 
Change Council, tasked with implementing the action plan, setting greenhouse emissions targets, and 
administering the Climate Change Fund, among other tasks. The Climate Change Fund can be applied to 
research and innovation, grants, implementation of adaptation and mitigation techniques, and technical 
assistance. As investment in agricultural research and extension services will become more important as 
conditions change due to climate change, this part of the Climate Change Act may contribute to food 
security (Government of Kenya 2016). While parts of the Act show potential, there remains much 
institutional work to be done to translate its mandates into action, showing that climate change mitigation 
and adaptation are not the government’s top priorities.  
 In light of this general legislative framework, the National Climate Change Action Plan: 2018-
2022 seeks to put into place “low carbon climate resilient development in a manner that prioritises 
adaptation” (Government of Kenya 2018, 1). Within this plan, the government has prioritized disaster risk 
management, food and nutrition security, and water and the blue economy, the three areas of concern for 
this thesis. In terms of drought management, the plan recognizes that reactive aid is costly, and thus will 
focus on increasing beneficiaries under the National Safety Net Programme while also distributing grants 
from the Climate Change Fund to target vulnerable populations. Drought infrastructure, early warning 
systems, and agency coordination will be improved under the plan to assist in emergencies. This dual 
approach of increasing the spread of the safety net while also putting into place drought management 
mechanisms is an excellent approach to ensuring food security. The food and nutrition security part of the 
plan revolves around increasing production through the use of inputs, irrigation, and sustainable crop 
systems. Furthermore, it calls for the increased use of livestock insurance and replanting in ASAL to 
support pastoralists. To prevent farmers and pastoralists from relying solely on agricultural pursuits for 
their livelihoods, the plan aims to transition over 500,000 households to more diversified sources of 
income. Finally, a focus on water and the blue economy imagines the construction of 12 new dams, water 
storage infrastructure, and farm ponds to bring water to more people. These water production measures 
are closely followed by actions to increase water efficiency and water quality (Government of Kenya 
2018). The NCCAP is a very strong plan to combat the effects of climate change and ensure food 
security. It pays attention to the key challenges facing the country in terms of changes in rainfall and 
production, and also includes support for both farmers and consumers through safety nets. With clear 
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financial obligations, monitoring tools, and an outline of who should be implementing parts of the plan, 
this NCCAP is one of the strongest policies both in content and implementation potential analyzed in this 
thesis.  
 In addition to its agricultural strategy plan, Kenya also has a Climate Smart Agricultural Strategy 
(CSAS). This strategy includes three main issue areas: vulnerabilities from temperature and precipitation 
changes, vulnerabilities from extreme weather events, and vulnerabilities from unsustainable usage of 
natural resources. The first issue area addresses many of the concerns raised by analysis on effects of 
temperature and precipitation on tea and maize through improved crop varieties and technologies as well 
as livelihood diversification. The vulnerabilities to extreme weather area is primarily concerned with early 
warning systems and insurance. Agricultural insurance is an essential way that farmers can receive 
assistance if crops fail, preventing them from going hungry. It is also something that Kenya has not 
explored in its other policies, and other countries might emulate. The natural resource use strategic area is 
concerned with taking stock of the state of natural resources and promoting better usage. While this 
strategy does have some value-added features, particularly the agricultural insurance idea, it is unclear 
what gaps this strategy really seeks to fill. As this document was created under sponsorship by a UN 
program, it is likely that it arose from outside rather than internal demand.  
 Overall, Kenya’s climate change policies and planning documents take into account the key 
issues facing agriculture and climate change, and support vulnerable populations identified in 2008. As 
we have seen with past agricultural policies, what is written does not always translate into change on the 
ground. Specific areas of concern for implementation include minority/majority group tensions and 
corruption. If implemented as spelled out, the climate change preparation that Kenya has will boost 
production, improve water management, and increase food security. If even partially implemented, this 
plan still has the potential to support Kenyans’ food security under the conditions of climate change.  
 
CONCLUSION	
In this chapter, we explored the food security, agriculture and climate change frameworks in Kenya to 
understand how Kenya, as a country with right to food provisions in its constitution, is working to provide 
its citizenry with food in the future. Because Kenya struggles with all four pillars of food security, 
especially food availability because of its limited production, agricultural policy that increases production 
is a clear way to improve food security. Looking at Kenya from a historical, economic, and political 
context reveals three general challenges that might prevent it from obtaining food security: 
majority/minority group tensions, rapid population growth, and land rights. While agriculture and climate 
change policies do not directly address these issues, many of the instruments acknowledged that good 
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governance and political and economic stability are key to their success. Granting equitable access to land 
and water resources will likely be of paramount importance to maintaining peace, and better enforcement 
of titling schemes in place will help communities and individuals profit from their land. Land reforms, 
which should proceed under Vision 2030 and the National Land Use Policy of 2017, may help prevent 
tensions arising over land rights and minority-majority group land-related disagreements. Dealing with 
corruption at all levels, including that of the president, should be high on the priority list of any reformers 
hoping to prepare the country for climate change. This is particularly important because of the links 
between violence over political issues and hunger. Political violence has preceded hunger in the country 
in the 1990s and 2008; most recently, food shortages occurred in 2018 because of droughts and political 
unrest (Andae and Kubania 2018). Likewise, cooperatives, parastatals, and private enterprises alike have 
profited from smallholder farmers’ vulnerability to make a profit (Gibbon 1992, 88–89). 
Population growth is dominantly in urban areas, and urban people were one of the two main 
groups impacted by the 2008 crisis. This group will be targeted for better employment opportunities in the 
formal sector under Vision 2030 in order to decrease poverty. The provision of more expansive social 
safety nets should seek to enroll more urbanites as well as pastoralists. Pastoralists are the second group 
identified as vulnerable to food insecurity, mainly due to droughts that kill what few crops grow in ASAL 
areas and the storage of its wealth, livestock. Both agriculture and climate change policies point to 
drought and water management as key priorities, which will help support pastoralists.  
Drought is the most serious concern for agriculture in Kenya. The CMIP5 model ensemble mean 
for precipitation shows that changes in month to month rainfall distribution might have significant 
negative effects on the production of tea and maize. The 2010-2020 agriculture sectoral plan, coupled 
with the NFNSP, provide for a two-pronged approach to dealing with this issue. One, the government has 
significant plans to increase water collection, storage, and irrigation systems throughout the country. 
These plans show great promise, as long as they are implemented in a systematic way that does not favor 
specific majority groups or exclude smallholders. The second approach deals with social safety nets and 
insurance for crops. Together, these two elements should provide both a boost in resiliency of crops and 
production, as well as mechanisms of support when the first plan of action fails. Not only will this two-
step system support the food producers themselves, it will also help the country maintain and increase its 
agricultural production as a whole by giving farmers the flexibility to make new investments in their 
fields without fear of losing everything from one bad season. Of course, there will be instances in which 
both steps may be ineffective, but on the whole, this system is a vast improvement over simply choosing 
one or the other.  
As Kenya is a net food importing country with big limitations on production due to lack of water 
resources, it appears unlikely that it will become food self-sufficient even without changes to precipitation 
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and temperature because of climate change. The reality is that Kenya will have to continue importing 
food from abroad to meet its population’s caloric needs. This situation creates incentives for Kenya to 
invest in infrastructure to improve its ability to move food around the country, particularly to the ASAL 
zones. Increasing trade with its neighboring countries can also help Kenya make food available to its 
population.  
While there is a strong rights-based approach to food security in Kenya’s legal framework, it is 
clear that this right has had little impact on its own on food security. There is a strong normative basis for 
people being hunger-free, and the government is also incentivized to take action on this issue because of 
fear of regime change or protests staged by hungry citizens. There is no evidence, however, that the right 
to food in Article 11 of ICESCR or Article 43 in the constitution have had significant effects on curbing 
hunger or ensuring people are fed. While litigation on the matter should be reattempted to create stronger 
jurisprudence on the right to food specifically and aid grossly wronged individuals and communities, this 
should not be considered the be-all-end-all solution. Because of the sheer scale of hunger in Kenya, food 
security should rather be pursued through sectoral policy that works to create the conditions under which 
everyone can be fed. In this way, ending hunger will not seem contingent on one specific ruling, but 
rather on a whole host of policies and plans that help increase production, improve economic conditions, 
and provide support when prices rise or families face crises that prevent them from purchasing food.  
Other challenges to agriculture, and specifically to tea and maize production, included low 
productivity, poor market and credit access, ineffective land use, and lack of infrastructure. Each of these 
problems is addressed to varying degrees within the agriculture policies. Improving infrastructure is a 
larger structural issue that would nevertheless impact many of the other agriculture challenges: for 
example, better infrastructure would allow food to travel more easily from the farm to different regions 
and even other countries.  
Looking forward, there remain both opportunities and challenges for Kenya to become food 
secure, especially under changing climatic conditions. Overall, Kenya’s policies cover some of the 
challenges to production and food security under changing conditions, but are strongest for their approach 
to drought and water management. Whether there will be substantial changes in the agricultural system 
based on the strategies and policies in place appears to be a challenge: corruption and lack of sufficient 
funds make implementing these plans difficult. Indeed, the value of the plans depends on their 
implementation. Kenya has struggled to make its agricultural goals a reality in the past because of issues 
ranging from internal government disagreement, lack of oversight, and lack of funding. In order to make 
food security in Kenya more robust under climate change, Kenya should consider expanding and scaling 
up its Urban Food Subsidy Cash Transfer Program, there should be significant investments made by the 
government in irrigation and water collection systems, and a domestic food security steering organization 
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should be created. Right to food advocates should consider testing the courts’ new opinion on ESC rights 
by bringing more right to food cases.   
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Ukraine, a large eastern European country, contributes to our understanding about agricultural policy, 
international law, and climate change in several ways. Ukraine is an example of a country that has rapidly 
industrialized, under Soviet rule and then continuing post-independence, something which Nepal and to a 
lesser extent Bolivia are attempting to do. After wavering on which of its powerful neighbors to join, 
Ukraine signed legislation to bring it closer to the EU, with an eye toward joining the bloc. Although 
incomes are higher in Ukraine than the other case study countries, it remains plagued by similar 
challenges: lack of mechanization in farming, corruption, violence, and land reform needs. As most 
farmers are no longer subsistence farmers and the country is a net agricultural exporter, it has greater 
control over food security and was able to quickly respond when prices increased in 2008. Ukraine is also 
important to study because some researchers have suggested that its agricultural production may benefit 
under climate change, illustrating the diverse effects that might be felt around the globe. Ukraine’s 
constitution includes a right to food clause, and the country has ratified ICESCR and signed its Optional 
Protocol (which it has not yet ratified). In Part I of this case study, I will explore the national context, the 
agricultural context, the 2008 food crisis, and the climate change context. Then, in Part II, I will analyze 
the right to food framework, as well as agricultural and climate changes policies, using elements from 




In this background section, I will investigate the history, geography, politics, and economy of Ukraine to 
place the country’s agricultural and climate change policies in their domestic context. Ukraine, second 
only in size to Russia in Europe, is a flat country with good agricultural land. Approximately 56 percent 
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of land area in Ukraine is arable, giving it high agricultural production potential (Central Intelligence 
Agency 2019). Ukraine’s name derives from its central location, coming from the word “borderland” 
(Yekelchyk 2007, 4).  The neighbor of seven eastern European countries, Ukraine also has access to the 
Black Sea and the Danube and Dnieper rivers allowing easy trading routes. Current international borders 
are relatively recent, having only been put into place in 1991. Ukraine’s population of 44 million has been 
in decline since the early 1990s, posing a different set of challenges than that of Bolivia, Kenya, and 
Nepal that all have more rapidly expanding populations (Central Intelligence Agency 2019).  
In terms of geography, Ukraine has few variations in its 579,330km2 land area. There are 
mountains in the west and in the Crimea, but the majority of Ukraine is made up of open plains and 
plateaus (Magocsi 2010, 5). Ukraine has a cool to moderate climate, and up to two-thirds of the country’s 
soil is classified as chernozems, a type of soil with high agricultural potential because of its capacity to 
store water (FAO 2017; Magocsi 2010, 6). Unlike the other case study countries, Ukraine generally has 
good access to water resources. It receives on average 565 mm of rainfall each year and has abundant 
river and ground water sources. In addition, water use has actually been decreasing in Ukraine, leaving 
room for scaling up of irrigation and other water management systems (Food and Agriculture 
Organization 2015).  
 Present-day Ukrainian land came under the control of the Habsburgs and the Russians, with the 
idea of Ukrainian independence first gained traction during the First World War (Yekelchyk 2007, 65). 
Two separate Ukrainian states announced their independence, and then tried to unite, but were quickly 
crushed by greater powers (Yekelchyk 2007, 72, 77). By the end of 1919, eastern Ukraine was under the 
control of the Bolsheviks as a part of the Russian Soviet, and western Ukraine was divided between 
Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland (Yekelchyk 2007, 82–83, 121). The peasantry under Russia was 
decimated by oppression and famine in the 1930s, as Stalin pushed a hardline industrialization program 
and pushed high grain quotas in low production years (Yekelchyk 2007, 103).31 During World War II, 
Russia invaded western Ukraine to create the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, uniting ethnic 
Ukrainians formerly controlled by different states (Yekelchyk 2007, 134).  
 This step toward nation-statehood was short-lived, as Ukraine became a World War II 
battleground (Yekelchyk 2007, 136). Germany controlled Ukraine from 1941 to 1943, conducting mass 
executions, forced labor, and extracting agricultural goods (Yekelchyk 2007, 139–40). Russian forces 
advanced, and recaptured Ukraine in 1943; they espoused a discourse of independence for their new 
																																								 																				
31 An estimated 3 to 3.5 million people died during the famine which continues to be denied by Russia and for 
which foreign aid was not accepted (Yekelchyk 2007, 112). 
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Soviet in order to get another seat in the United Nations, but Ukraine remained securely under Russian 
control (Yekelchyk 2007, 146).   
Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the 1980s and 1990s created the space for Ukrainian 
independence. While Kenya, Bolivia and Nepal were liberalizing through structural adjustment programs, 
Ukraine was opening more radically. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he started reforms 
centered around restructuring and “openness” in order to boost the USSR’s economy (Yekelchyk 2007, 
179). By 1990, reforms and student protests forced the state to allow non-Communist parties (Yekelchyk 
2007, 187). As Moscow failed to negotiate a new treaty with the Soviet states, Ukraine voted for 
independence on 1 December 1991 (Yekelchyk 2007, 191). Despite this monumental change in status, 
much remained the same in Ukraine, as the governing elites largely remained in power (Yekelchyk 2007, 
193). By 1995, Ukraine was more willing to align with the West, and entered into a cooperative 
agreement with NATO, followed by a special partnership agreement in 1997 (Yekelchyk 2007, 202). 
Questions over territory, particularly regarding ownership of the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet became 
highly politicized, with the Crimean legislature voting to become independent from Ukraine (Menon and 
Rumer 2015, 3).  
 Ukraine was rocked by election fraud and corruption following voting on referendums to 
decrease the power of the Supreme Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, in 2000, followed by the poisoning of 
Viktor Yushchenko, then-president Leonid Kuchma’s major opponent, in the 2004 election (Yekelchyk 
2007, 208–16). The 2004 election was deemed invalid and protesters mounted the famous Orange 
Revolution. A package of reform measures was agreed to by both sides, and a runoff put Yushchenko in 
power (Yekelchyk 2007, 218). During his presidency, Yushchenko closely aligned Ukraine with the 
West, but by the 2010 elections, people had lost faith in Yushchenko and elected the pro-Russian Viktor 
Yanukovych (Menon and Rumer 2015, 44–45; Yekelchyk 2007, 221–222). Corruption increased, as the 
giant state bureaucracy functioned on bribes and “special payments” (Menon and Rumer 2015, 47–48). 
 Ukraine’s economy has oscillated between capitalism and communism, with varying levels of 
commitment for each economic system. Incomes rose in the 1970s, but people (mostly women) had to 
wait in line to get food and other household goods through ration programs (Yekelchyk 2007, 171). 
Following independence, inflation rendered the new currency worthless in 1993, and the economy came 
to a standstill (Yekelchyk 2007, 198). Extreme cronyism between the government and rich businessmen 
further depressed the economy and prevented crucial reforms from being implemented. The IMF stepped 
in with conditional loans in 1994, requiring inflation control, interest rate benchmarks, and tax collection 
for Ukraine to continue to receive funds (Yekelchyk 2007, 205). It is interesting to note that the 
conditional loans received by Bolivia, Kenya and Nepal in the 1980s and the loans that Ukraine got in the 
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1990s (and still continues to receive) have similar structures, focusing on stabilization, liberalization, 
deregulation, and privatization as their key goals (Summers and Pritchett 1993, 383).32 
These reforms, however, met resistance and ambivalence from within the government that 
prevented them from being implemented properly (Menon and Rumer 2015, 30). Even the introduction of 
a new currency in 1996 did little to change Ukraine’s economic outlook (Dabrowski 2014, 2). 
Yushchenko, then the prime minister, implemented some reforms to help the middle class, but they were 
short-lived, and the system of “oligarchic capitalism” remains in place, so that the average Ukrainian has 
not benefited much from economic growth (Dabrowski 2014, 2; Magocsi 2010, 737; Yekelchyk 2007, 
207–28). The IMF’s pressure on Yushchenko to reduce the deficit coupled with pressure from his own 
administration to expand social programs led to fluctuations in real wages and GDP, but in the first eight 
years of the new millennium the economy did expand (Dabrowski 2014, 3; Menon and Rumer 2015, 38). 
Ukraine finally managed to join the World Trade Organisation, the global trade club, in 2008 (Dabrowski 
2014, 3). In 2008, Ukraine received emergency loans from the IMF to help pull it out of a financial crisis 
(Åslund 2009, 377). Ukraine continued to receive IMF loans into the 2010s, but funds were frequently 
withheld because the state did not meet the IMF’s conditions (Menon and Rumer 2015, 60).33 It has been 
suggested that some of the international interest in pushing through these reforms is related to Ukraine’s 
agricultural lands, which have already seen big investments from foreign enterprises (Word, Martin-
Prével, and Mousseau 2014, 3–4). 
The same cycle of half-hearted reforms to fulfill WTO and EU requirements, which were stymied 
by corruption, continued under Yanukovych, and Ukraine appeared on the brink of another financial crisis 
in 2013 (Dabrowski 2014, 4). The International Monetary Fund and the EU both provided significant aid 
to Ukraine following the crisis; GDP has recovered slightly since 2015, but has not yet regained pre-2013 
levels (Dabrowski 2014, 5). Conditions attached to the aid package likely did little to help with the larger 
structural issues of corruption and poor fiscal policy (Dabrowski 2014).  
Ukraine’s policies and laws since independence have been deeply impacted by both Russia and 
the EU. Because of current trends to partner with the EU after the annexation of Crimea, an exploration of 
Ukraine’s relationship with the EU will be more revelatory for understanding future policy possibilities. 
Ukraine first formally partnered with the EU in 1998 through a bilateral Partnership and Cooperation 
																																								 																				
32 Indeed, even before Ukraine received its first loan there was debate about the effectiveness of structural 
adjustment lending.  
33	Ukraine is a good example of Easterly’s findings that countries that received structural adjustment loans tended to 
receive multiple of such loans did not change how policy distorted the economy, or benefit economic growth 
(Easterly 2005).	
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Agreement which included economic and technical support (Dabrowski 2014, 4). In 2005, both parties 
signed the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, which put Ukraine on the path towards an association agreement 
(Dabrowski 2014, 4). Negotiations over a comprehensive trade agreement with the EU began in 2007, but 
then-president Viktor Yanukovych shelved the deal in 2013 because it would have required reforms that 
would have hurt his and his cronies’ wealth (Menon and Rumer 2015, 51–52). After the protests and 
change in government, however, the association agreement was signed in June 2014 (Dabrowski 2014, 4). 
In order to think more carefully about challenges to realizing food security in Ukraine, we must 
also account for society-level issues. In Ukraine, ethnic tensions and hostilities with Russia, a declining 
population, and land rights issues related to Ukraine’s time as within Soviet Russia are the most important 
areas of concern. In the next section, I pivot from general information to focus in on these specific 
problems.  
Ukraine is home to a multiethnic population, although ethnic Ukrainians make up the majority. 
Divisions between the eastern and southern regions, which are linguistically and culturally connected to 
Russia, versus the central and western part of Ukraine that is more ethnically Ukrainian and connected to 
the West, remain (Magocsi 2010, 749). These divides have allowed Moscow room to push its agenda in 
sympathetic regions, with the annexation of Crimea as the most notable example of the country’s ethno-
divisions leading to significant governance challenges. The constitution, which calls for the government 
of Ukraine to protect and support all ethnic groups, has had a “positive impact” on unity but there remains 
room for growth in this area (Magocsi 2010, 474).34  
Connected to Ukraine’s population make-up is Ukraine’s relationship with Russia. Ukraine has 
historically depended upon natural gas and oil exports from Russia (purchased at a reduced cost), which it 
also transports to the rest of Europe (Menon and Rumer 2015, 41–42). Russia repeatedly retaliated against 
Ukraine from 2006 on by increasing natural gas prices, damaging Ukraine’s ability to produce heat and to 
power industry (Menon and Rumer 2015, 42–44). The presence of extensive gas lines makes Ukraine an 
important gatekeeper for the EU, incentivizing the EU to form closer bonds with Ukraine. Russia, 
however, has made bold moves to prevent such cooperation, particularly with its military activity.  
 Russia has a long history of involvement in Crimea, first annexing it in 1783 (Yekelchyk 2007, 
34). It gave the Crimea to Soviety Ukraine in 1954, but much of the cultural remains more closely tied to 
Russia (Yekelchyk 2007, 154–55). Prior to the crisis in 2014, Yanukovych had monopolized power 
																																								 																				
34 There are also ethnic Hungarians in the West, which has caused another problem for Ukraine. After it adopted a 
law making Ukrainian the language of instruction in schools in 2017 in response to Russia’s invasion, Hungary has 
moved aggressively to block Ukraine’s integration into both NATO and the EU. Ukraine has accused Hungary of 
illegally distributing passports and supporting Russia, and the area of Transcarpathia has become another region in 
which ethnic tensions are running high (Krekó and Szicherle 2018). 
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within his own hands, and the public was fed up with politics (Menon and Rumer 2015, 58). An economic 
crisis connected to Ukraine’s growing debt to Russia for natural gas, and poor relations with Putin himself 
put Yanukovych in a difficult position as Russia intensified its efforts to keep Ukraine within its sphere of 
influence (Menon and Rumer 2015, 61, 64, 75). As Ukraine came closer to finalizing a trade deal with the 
EU, Russia banned certain products from Ukraine and stalled imports at the border which had serious 
economic repercussions on Ukraine (Menon and Rumer 2015, 77). When Yanukovych announced in 
November 2013 that negotiations with the EU were suspended, protesters took to the main square in Kiev 
and were met with increasing violence from state security forces.35 
Finally, an agreement brokered by the EU ended the violence and restored power to the prime 
minister; Yanukovych fled the country (Menon and Rumer 2015, 79–81). In the wake of instability in 
Ukraine, Russia quickly took advantage of the situation and annexed the Crimea (Menon and Rumer 
2015, 83). It took Russia36 shooting down a civilian aircraft, MH-17, for the US and the EU to begin 
large-scale sanctions on Russia for its behavior in Ukraine (Menon and Rumer 2015, 128). Instability 
took an economic toll on Ukraine, lowering its GDP and increasing the national debt (Dabrowski 2014, 
5). The situation has changed little since 2014, with continued skirmishes between the two countries. 
Indeed, while much attention has been placed on US President Donald Trump’s attempt to build a border 
wall along the southern border of the United States, Russia has proceeded to put in place a fence with 
elaborate sensors along Crimea’s border with Ukraine (Hackwill 2018). On February 18, 2019, the 
president of Ukraine signed a constitutional amendment committing the country to joining the EU and 
NATO, drawing Ukraine closer to the EU and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that governs the 
EU’s agricultural sector (Associated Press 2019). 
Low birth rates and emigration have caused Ukraine’s population to decline since independence, 
with the Russian and Jewish population declining at especially high levels (Magocsi 2010, 745). Unlike 
Nepal, Bolivia, and Kenya which are experiencing high levels of urbanization, the majority of Ukraine’s 
urbanization occurred during the late 19th and 20th century (Yekelchyk 2007, 66). As of 2017, 70 percent 
of Ukrainians live in cities and have since 1992 (Food and Agriculture Organization, n.d.). With a 
declining population, there will be fewer people paying into Ukraine’s four social insurance funds; 
furthermore, there will also be a smaller supply of qualified workers, which may be particularly 
detrimental in Ukraine because this dearth already poses a challenge to agricultural production 
(Demyanenko 2008, 11).  
																																								 																				
35 These demonstrations are commonly referred to as the Euromaidan demonstrations or the Maidan revolution.  
36 While Russia disputes this fact, independent exports have verified that it likely was Russian forces that shot down 
the plane (Walker 2018). 
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Land rights issues have been occurring since before Ukraine was a unified state, but accelerated 
under Russian control. Agriculture country-wide was collectivized in 1948 under Russian control 
(Yekelchyk 2007, 148). Land reform was slow at the beginning of Ukraine’s years as an independent 
country, but accelerated in 1999 with a decree to privatize agricultural lands immediately (Lerman et al. 
2007, 19–20). Since 2001, Ukraine has had a moratorium on land sales, despite a ruling from the 
European Court of Human Rights that it violated Ukrainians human rights. This moratorium was recently 
extended to 2020, at which time the Supreme Rada will have the opportunity to repeal the ban (Sorokin 
2018). Leasing land is permitted, however, which allows both international groups and Ukrainians to gain 
land for agricultural purposes despite the ban (Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 9). In addition, after Ukraine 
gained its independence, much land that had previously been used to crop crops went out of production 
use, so there remain big opportunities to put land into production without clearing untouched areas 
(EBRD and FAO 2008a, 2).  
In this final paragraph of the section, I discuss current macro-level trends relating to food security 
and poverty. Macroeconomic, nutritional, and political trends tell a mixed story about Ukraine’s future 
food security. The conflict with Russia over the Crimea as well as territory on the eastern border 
continues to “simmer,” with no clear way of ending it in sight (Pifer 2019). After the recovery from the 
financial and food crises, Ukraine’s GDP spiked. Since 2013 and the war with Russia, however, GDP has 
been on a downward trend, although it recovered slightly in 2017. GDP per capita (PPP) has followed 
similar trends: as of 2017, GDP per capita stood at $2,639.82 in current US dollars (World Bank 2017b). 
Ukraine is one of the world’s most economically equal countries, with a Gini index of 25.6 in 2013 
(UNDP 2013, 2013). It is difficult to assess how undernourishment has changed in the last 30 years, as 
there is no accessible data from 2003 to 2015. The average dietary energy supply adequacy, a measure of 
food availability that accounts for the population’s estimated calorie requirements compared to food 
supply, although still above 100 percent, has been in decline since 2007, suggesting that food availability 
is decreasing. From 2015 to 2017, however, prevalence of undernourishment increased by 0.4 percent to 
3.3 percent. Although the estimated 1.5 million people undernourished from 2015 to 2017 (800,000 of 
which live in conflict-impacted oblasts) is significant, this number is dwarfed by Kenya’s 8.8 million 
people (Food and Agriculture Organization, n.d.; Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster Technical 
Working Group 2017). Ukraine does have widespread hunger throughout the country, but the conflict has 
created severe localized hunger. While generally, whole lower-middle-income countries have seen 
positive change in the number of people who are undernourished, Ukraine is struggling to meet the needs 
of people in the conflict zones (FAO 2013, 42).  
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AGRICULTURAL	CONTEXT	
As the setting and conditions for agriculture, as well as the historical development of the sector, both 
greatly impact current policy prospects, I will set the scene for Ukraine’s agriculture in this section. 
Agriculture has an ancient history in Ukraine, developing in around 5,000 BCE (Yekelchyk, 2007, pp. 
156, 166). Due to good agricultural production in Ukraine because of favorable climatic and soil 
conditions, innovation in the agricultural sector has been slow (Magocsi 2010, 6). However, Ukraine has 
been, and continues to be, the world’s breadbasket: in 1914, Ukraine’s wheat production accounted for 20 
percent of global production, and since 2001 it has become an even greater wheat producing powerhouse 
(Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 55; Yekelchyk 2007, 55). Agriculture in Ukraine is characterized by large 
farms with low productivity owning most of the agricultural land that focus on commodity crops, with 
household plots producing high-value products (Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 8). The agricultural sector has 
gone through a number of important transitions, and still bears the mark of Soviet-era agricultural 
policies.  
During the post-World War II years, the agriculture sector did not receive significant government 
investments, stalling production (Yekelchyk 2007, 149). Under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev in 
the 1950s and 1960s, this pattern of state disinterest in agriculture reversed, and the state began 
purchasing crops and livestock from farmers at much higher prices, giving farmers the opportunity to 
invest in their farms. The USSR provided significant subsidies to agricultural production and also placed 
price controls on both farm gate and consumer prices (Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 4). Productivity in 
collective farms remained low, and private plots, which made up 3 percent of land under cultivation, were 
the source of a third of production (Baran, 1996, cited in Yekelchyk 2007, 170). 
After independence in 1991, most agricultural subsidies and price controls were removed, which 
sent domestic prices down while also making farmers less competitive on the global market; production 
decreased substantially and has yet to recover (Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 4–5). Since 2000, however, 
subsidies for agriculture have been increasing, a trend that is likely to continue if Ukraine’s agricultural 
sector comes under the CAP: in 2004-2005, Ukraine’s support to producers was 3 and 12 percent 
respectively of gross farm income, while in the same years, the EU provided 36 and 33 percent of income 
through support (EBRD and FAO 2008b, 5; Food and Agriculture Organization n.d., 13; Schmitz and 
Meyers 2015, 6). Changes in the mode of support have been frequent, with Ukraine most recently moving 
away from a value-added tax (VAT) scheme in which farmers could keep the VAT from goods they sold 
to a direct subsidy for inputs in 2018 (FAS/Kyiv staff 2017; Nivievskyi and Neiter 2018). Similarly, 
under the WTO, Ukraine is to decrease its import tariffs and cap trade-distorting (Amber Box) domestic 
support to agriculture at $613 million a year (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d., 10; Schmitz and 
Meyers 2015).  
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Currently, farms in Ukraine can be broken down into three categories: corporate farms, household 
plots, and smallholder farms. Ukraine reorganized its collective farms into cooperative associations, or 
corporate farms which the state usually at least partially controls, after independence, and former 
collective members often remain at the same farm, becoming paid workers (Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 8). 
Household plots refers to community gardens and small amounts of land that laborers on corporate farms 
keep privately, and mostly produce high-value fruits, vegetables, and livestock. Household plots do not 
receive support from the state, while smallholder farms do (Lerman et al. 2007, 26). Smallholder farms 
are usually “break away” farms from corporate farm divisions that focus on producing commodity crops 
(Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 8–9). The smallholder/large farm dichotomy that can be seen in Nepal, 
Bolivia, and Kenya is thus complicated by remnants from the Soviet era. Smallholder farms in Ukraine 
are more easily compared to medium-sized farming enterprises in other countries, whereas household 
plots might be more directly compared to smallholders in other areas this comparison, however, is 
imperfect because the divide between exporting and non-exporting farms is not as firmly drawn.  
Despite the large quantity of high quality agricultural land in Ukraine, only about 15 percent of 
the total workforce is engaged in agricultural activities (Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 2). Most agricultural 
land is concentrated in the hands of corporate farms (Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 8). These farms have 
been shown to be productive not because of their size, but rather due to their ability to access high-quality 
labor and infrastructure, which poses a challenge to the vision of expanding large farms to increase 
agricultural output in Ukraine (Deininger, Nizalov, and Singh 2013, 16). The average size of land plots in 
Ukraine is 4.2 hectares, two to almost six times as much land as the other case study countries (Lerman et 
al. 2007, 22). While plot sizes have been declining in Kenya and Nepal, plot size has actually been 
increasing since 1991 in Ukraine (Lerman et al. 2007, 27–28). Household farm’s share in agriculture 
production increased to 65 percent of gross agriculture production in 2004; since then, the gross 
agricultural output of agricultural enterprises has overtaken household farms, likely due to increased 
mechanization and an expansion in land under cultivation by these big farms (Lerman et al., 2007, p. 30) 
(Iryna, Zhygadlo, and Sikachyna 2015, 18). Household farms also tend to produce higher value items like 
vegetables, while corporate farms produce commodity crops (Iryna, Zhygadlo, and Sikachyna 2015, 22; 
Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 8).  
 Since there are few purely subsistence farmers in Ukraine, food security revolves around having 
the economic means to purchase foodstuffs (World Food Programme 2017, 2). As incomes have risen in 
Ukraine, consumption patterns have begun favoring dairy and meat products instead of wheat-based 
products (Sobolev 2018a, 4). However, rural populations have not had the same access to social services 
as urbanites, which the conflict with Russia has exacerbated (World Food Programme 2017, 1–2). Wages 
in agricultural work are only 69 percent of the national average, leaving 39 percent of rural households 
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impoverished (Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine 2015, 16–17). Looking forward, 
challenges to the agricultural sector in Ukraine include skilled labor imbalances, poor infrastructure, and 
lack of extension services to increase productivity (Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 13; EBRD and FAO 
2008a, 6). Because of corruption and economic instability, farmers and agribusinesses have been unable 
to get sufficient credit to meet their investment needs (Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine 
2015, 14).  
THE	2008	FOOD	CRISIS	IN	UKRAINE:	CAUSES,	CONSEQUENCES,	AND	RESPONSES		
Investigating hunger in 2008 in Ukraine reveals slightly different but nevertheless important information 
from that obtained from the other case study countries. Like the other case studies, information about 
vulnerable populations and the government’s response will be important to further policy analysis. An 
added element here, however, is that Ukraine is a net food exporter, so its responses to food price hikes 
will have a greater impact on other countries, especially if it restricts exports. As the crisis in Ukraine was 
more closely related to changes in international prices and less with domestic availability changes, the 
patterns here are more useful for understanding Ukraine’s potential weaknesses because the access pillar 
is the one where Ukraine has the largest gaps.  
In Ukraine, unlike in Bolivia, Kenya, and Nepal, the 2008 food crisis was more intimately linked 
to the financial crisis in the same period, with food access being the main issue rather than food 
availability. Prior to 2008, Ukraine’s economic standings were improving with rapid GDP growth. While 
there were warning signs that the economy was overheating with rampant inflation, the government’s 
poor policies prevented action to prevent negative consequences (Åslund 2009, 372). Because Ukraine 
was not a member of the EU, it relies heavily on exports of primary products, and foreign investors do not 
trust Ukraine’s policymakers, Åslund notes that Ukraine’s economy was particularly vulnerable to 
economic shock, which came in the form of a lending or liquidity freeze due to the bankruptcy of major 
financial institutions in the United States (Åslund, 2009, 374-375). Ukraine’s GDP fell by 14.8 percent in 
2009 and the currency devalued by almost 60 percent in fall and winter 2008 (Dabrowski 2014, 3).  
On average, households in Ukraine spend 50 percent of their earnings on food, and 56 percent in 
rural areas, the highest among its neighbors (EBRD and FAO 2008b, 3; World Food Programme 2017, 1). 
When food prices began to rise, Ukrainians were less able to adjust their household budgets and reallocate 
funds than other households in other countries. In Ukraine, producer wheat prices began increasing in 
2002, but spiked up from just above US$100 per ton in 2005 to almost US$200 per ton in 2007 (EBRD 
and FAO 2008b, 2). During the 2008 crisis, export-oriented farmers benefited from higher world prices 
and the deflation of Ukraine’s currency that made their production more competitive on the world market 
(Food and Agriculture Organization n.d., 13).  
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Grain storage patterns in Ukraine show that stocks for wheat, barley and rye are fullest in August, 
and decline for the rest of the year in a cycle that mirrors domestic production (Sobolev 2018a, 6–7). At 
the peak of the food crisis in winter 2007-2008, Ukraine would have had the fewest grain stocks to 
stabilize the market internally. The flurry of export restriction activity at this time can be understood in 
relation to low grain stocks, as well as a sharp decline in Ukraine’s 2007-2008 harvest due to drought 
(Sustainable Development Department of the Europe and Central Asia Region and von Cramon 2008, 8). 
At the same time that domestic production was declining and stocks were low, international prices 
continued to increase.  
The food crisis in Ukraine did not have the same large detrimental impact that it did in Nepal and 
Kenya, as Ukraine is a net food producer and reacted quickly with trade measures and consumer support 
when world prices began to rise. It probably is not appropriate to call the period of rising consumer prices 
in Ukraine in 2008 a food crisis, but instead the consequences of a financial crisis. During the period from 
2008 to 2011, Ukraine did not appear on FAO’s countries requiring outside intervention, pointing towards 
Ukraine’s ability to respond to hunger on its own during this period.37 The poverty headcount actually fell 
from 2006 to 2009, before increasing slightly and then decreasing again to 3.8 percent in 2016 (World 
Bank 2017a). The Global Hunger Index registered a decrease in hunger from 2005 to 2010, providing 
more evidence for the crisis’s marginal impact on hunger (Concern Worldwide and Welthungerhilfe 
2019). 
Both the rural poor and the urban poor spend heavily on food products, although not nearly as 
much as in Nepal where up to three-fourths of households’ budgets go to food. Those in rural areas likely 
suffered more than their urban counterparts for several reasons. First, pay in rural areas is lower than pay 
in other areas, meaning that price increases decreased their real purchasing power more than for other 
groups (Chreneková et al. 2016, 139). Second, accessing support like reduced-cost bread was likely more 
difficult for rural households, as poor infrastructure limits both mobility and service availability. In 
addition, many of the poorest groups live in areas that are not agricultural zones (in the eastern part of the 
country), so they did not benefit the agricultural boost prior to the crisis (Chreneková et al. 2016, 138–
39). The price of Ukraine’s imported food items, including pork, poultry, oranges, and bananas, rose as 
consumers’ money was able to buy fewer goods (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d., 5, 14). 
																																								 																				
37 As the FAO does not have data for prevalence of undernourishment between 2003 and 2014, it is difficult to 
assess whether there was any movement on this measure during the 2008 crisis. As none of its State of Food 
Insecurity in the World publications from the period point to Ukraine as experiencing increased food insecurity, it is 
likely that there was not a significant change in conditions in Ukraine.  
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A 2003 decree permitting the government to intervene in commodity markets and to purchase 
grain at the regional level set the stage for Ukraine’s response to the 2008 crisis (Lerman et al. 2007, 
16).38 Indeed, the export of certain categories of grains was restricted starting in fall 2006 before the peak 
of the crisis (EBRD and FAO 2008b, 4).39 During the 2008 crisis, Ukraine first banned wheat exports, and 
then placed restrictive export quotas on wheat, maize, and barley (Schmitz and Meyers 2015, 7). 
Restrictions were also placed on sunflower seed exports (Sustainable Development Department of the 
Europe and Central Asia Region and von Cramon 2008, 11). From August 2007 to February 2008, 
Ukraine did not export any wheat at all, and the export of other cereals also took a nosedive; 
approximately US$1.6 billion in wheat sales were lost during these bans (Sustainable Development 
Department of the Europe and Central Asia Region and von Cramon 2008, 8, 10). Ukraine’s interventions 
in the market were decried as hurting producers while providing only marginal benefits to consumers, 
although they did contribute to lowering domestic prices below international prices (EBRD and FAO 
2008b, 5; Götz, Glauben, and Brümmer 2013, 225). The necessity of implementing these bans can be 
questioned, particularly because Ukraine’s wheat production expanded by about 12 million tons between 
2007 and 2008 to more than double average domestic demand (Food and Agriculture Organization, n.d.). 
Ukraine’s grain restrictions also caused instability on both domestic and international markets, 
contributing to panic and high prices (Goetz, Glauben, and Brümmer 2010). After joining the WTO, 
Ukraine continued to place export quotas and bans on wheat, barley, and corn claiming that doing so was 
within its rights, as its actions were to in response to high world prices and lower production (Food and 
Agriculture Organization n.d., 11–12). This situation brings to light an important challenge that Ukraine 
might face if it decides to abide more closely with WTO rules in the future, or if enforcement mechanisms 
at the WTO become more effective. Using these quota and tariff-based measures has served as Ukraine’s 
main response to changes in food prices on the global market,  
Subsidies and pricing policies that had been put into place before the 2008 crisis helped stabilize 
domestic prices in 2008. The state agency Agrarian Fund had stocks ready to stabilize supply while also 
placing restrictions on consumer pricing (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d., 8). Local authorities 
put a limit on the amount of profit that could be earned from bread sales in several regions throughout the 
crisis (EBRD and FAO 2008b, 4). In 2009 to 2011, the Agrarian Fund was also involved in directly 
																																								 																				
38 It is possible to find correlation between then-president Yushchenko’s push to acknowledge the 1932-1933 famine 
and his government’s strong response to preventing another one from occurring in Ukraine.  
39 Ukraine has placed export quotas on key crops sporadically for some time, so this 2006 restriction is not out of 
character for the country’s policy. 
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purchasing grain, milling it, and redistributing it at reduced prices to special bakeries to lower the cost of 
bread (Working Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets 2011, 166).  
The 2008 food crisis in Ukraine had significantly fewer impacts on the country than it did in 
Bolivia, Nepal, or Kenya for several reasons. First, the poverty headcount in Ukraine, even at its highest 
point at 8.6 percent in 2010, is much lower than the other countries. Less poverty meant that Ukraine had 
fewer vulnerable people to begin with, so there were simply fewer people severely impacted when food 
prices rose. Second, Ukraine’s control over its food sources is greater than Bolivia, Kenya, or Nepal’s, as 
Ukraine is a large net food exporter. Ukraine is also almost completely self-sufficient in terms of 
agricultural production, so it relies less on the global market to meet internal demands (Iryna, Zhygadlo, 
and Sikachyna 2015, 23). Not only did these conditions help Ukraine maintain food security through 
having more food that it could keep in the country through export restrictions in the first place, but also 
because there was less internal demand being met by international imports. In Bolivia, domestic potato 
production was able to stem the crisis somewhat, but not to the same levels as in Ukraine. When Bolivia 
placed export restrictions on soybeans, this action did not have the same effect on food security as 
Ukraine’s wheat restrictions because soybeans are not primarily for human consumption. What set 
Ukraine apart, however, was its ability to respond with restrictions that kept grain in the country. While 
there has been considerable criticism of Ukraine’s restrictions because of the effect they likely had on 
increasing international prices and slowing investment in agriculture domestically, they did manage to 
prevent complete price transmission and therefore protected Ukrainians from price spikes.  
Fourth, Ukraine’s response was highly regionalized, permitting regional governments to directly 
support their consumers. This regional response allowed the government to respond more effectively to 
more remote and rural areas, so that specific regions of the country were not as affected as occurred in 
Nepal. The fifth and final way that Ukraine’s experience in 2008 differed from that of its peer case study 
countries can be found in the causes of the crisis. In Ukraine, the financial crisis was particularly 
devastating, decreasing people’s purchasing power. There was not significant violence that contributed to 
fueling high food prices domestically, so the only response needed was that in relation to the outside 
world. This point also brings up an important element of food security in Ukraine: because of good 
production, the food security pillar of accessibility (and to a smaller extent stability) rather than 
availability is the one that must be worked on to make sure the population is fed. 
In addition to questions about the usefulness of wheat export restrictions, the case of sunflower 
seed exports is rather mystifying. Even in 2007-2008, most of Ukraine’s production was for export, and 
there was very little domestic consumption (Polevoy, Lukashchuk, and Peskovski 2013, 5). It is likely 
then that export restrictions on sunflower seeds had a negative impact both on producers and exporters, 
hurting the income of those whose livelihoods depend on the industry. These export restrictions show that 
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perhaps the state was acting in a panic like many states did during the crisis. Whether these export 
restrictions were entirely necessary given the economic and social context in Ukraine is up for debate, as 
actions that target vulnerable rural and urban groups for social safety nets and cash transfers might have 
similar effects on hunger with fewer impacts on the market.  
CLIMATE	CHANGE	CONTEXT	
In order to understand the consequences of climate change on food security in Ukraine, and the areas to 
which policy should be attentive, I have chosen two key crops to analyze. Sunflower seed is an important 
export crop, with Ukraine landing among the top ten producers globally. Ukrainians, however, consume 
little of the sunflower products that they produce, so sunflower seed production’s contribution to AgGDP 
(36 percent) speaks to the access pillar of food security (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d., 4). If 
sunflower production falls due to climate conditions in the future, this may have a negative impact on 
both the economy as a whole and the ability for people to access food. While Ukraine is also a top 
producer of wheat, it consumes a higher proportion of total production in-country. This means that wheat 
production can give us a picture of the availability of food in Ukraine. By looking at sunflower and wheat 
production, we can better understand how climate change might impact hunger in the future.  
 Ukraine is the world’s largest producer of sunflower seed, with a 23.5 percent share of global 
production (Food and Agriculture Organization n.d., 3). Although native to North America, sunflowers 
spread to Europe by 1580 (“Sunflower Production” 2007, 1–2). Sunflower is also the crop with the 
highest net earning potential for producers in Ukraine (Sobolev 2018c, 2). Large farms have dominated 
their production: a full 86 percent of sunflower seeds were produced by agricultural enterprises in 2014 
(Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine 2015, 13). Sunflower seed yields have been increasing: 
in 2003, yields were at 1.2 tons per hectare, and in 2017, they were above 2.3 tons per hectare, reaching 
yields similar to that produced by EU countries (Krautgartner et al. 2017, 24; Lerman et al. 2007, 38; 
Sobolev 2018c, 7). Yet as demands for ethanol sources from the EU increased, Ukraine has transitioned 
land from grain production to oilseed production (EBRD and FAO 2008a, 3). Indeed, the EU is the 
destination for about 70 percent of Ukraine’s sunflower seeds (Sobolev 2018c, 6). Sunflower seed exports 
have been taxed at high rates, and currently a 10 percent tariff is applied (Polevoy, Lukashchuk, and 
Peskovski 2013, 5). This tax has incentivized sunflower seeds to be crushed domestically, leading to the 
majority of domestic production also being crushed in-country before being exported as oil (Sobolev 
2018c, 5). Under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU, Ukraine is scheduled 
to bring export tariffs on sunflower seeds down to zero by 2026 (Sobolev 2018c, 24). Domestic 
consumption trends of sunflower and other vegetable oils in Ukraine show decreasing consumption since 
2010, correlated with population decrease (Sobolev 2018c, 14). No genetically engineered sunflowers are 
allowed to be grown in Ukraine, but there are over 350 hybrids in use (Polevoy, Lukashchuk, and 
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Peskovski 2013, 4; Sobolev 2018c, 20). The main challenges to sunflower production include poor crop 
rotation practices, lack of access to hybrid seeds, fertilizers, and technology, and diseases (Polevoy, 
Lukashchuk, and Peskovski 2013; Sobolev 2018c, 2, 4).  
 
Figure 5.1. Map of sunflower production in Ukraine.40 Map from the United States Department of 
Agriculture. 
Wheat has been a staple in eastern European diets for some time. Between 2003 and 2005, 
Ukrainians ate an average of 226kg of wheat products per year (“Overview: Transitioning Wheat 
Research to Serve the Future Needs of the Developing World” 2009, 90). Grain consumption in Ukraine 
has been declining since the 2000s, yet compared to the other main cereals crops (barley and corn), 
Ukraine’s domestic wheat consumption goes overwhelmingly to food in the form of flour (Iryna, 
Zhygadlo, and Sikachyna 2015, 19; Sobolev 2018b, 5). In Ukraine, winter wheat, named for the time of 
year that it grows, makes up around 95.3 percent of all wheat production; wheat crops are planted once 
per year (Kobuta, Sikachyna, and Zhygadlo 2012, 4). Over 98 varieties of commercial wheat are grown in 
Ukraine, although several dominate in the acreage they cover (CIMMYT 2014). Wheat exports from 
Ukraine have been declining over the past 30 years, but the country still ranks among the top ten wheat 
exporters in the world (Kobuta, Sikachyna, and Zhygadlo 2012, 5). Its yields trail its neighbors, however, 
																																								 																				
40 Sunseed refers to sunflower production intended to make sunflower seed oil.  
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leaving room for increased production through yield increase without area expansion (Ministry of 
Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine 2015, 5). Exported wheat goes to Indonesia, Egypt, Bangladesh, 
and Turkey; the United Kingdom has also increased its imports of Ukrainian wheat flour in recent years 
(Sobolev 2018b, 10–11). Like sunflower seeds, wheat production is dominated by agricultural enterprises 
(Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine 2015, 13). Large transnational corporations dominated 
Ukraine’s wheat trade through 2007, at which time the balance shifted as more companies (including 
Ukrainian) began producing wheat as well as exporting it (Kobuta, Sikachyna, and Zhygadlo 2012, 4). 
Seed research and breeding are also dominated by international companies and research institutes 
(Morgounov et al. 2011, 299). Despite its large share in the world markets, infrastructure challenges mean 
that Ukrainian producers lose about 40 percent of the export price because of infrastructure and logistics 
problems, whereas the US and EU only lose about 10 to 15 percent (Ministry of Agrarian Policy and 
Food of Ukraine 2015, 49). Challenges to wheat production in Ukraine include rust disease, lack of 
infrastructure and high transportation costs, crop rotation issues, and lack of access to chemical inputs 
(Deppermann et al. 2018; Morgounov et al. 2011). 
 
Figure 5.2. Map of wheat production in Ukraine.41 Map from the United States Department of 
Agriculture. 
																																								 																				
41 Sunseed refers to sunflower production intended to make sunflower seed oil.  
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Next, I will discuss the implications of projected temperature and precipitation increases on 
agricultural production as illustrated through the two key crops, wheat and sunflowers. Although the 
agriculture sector only produced 14 percent of GHG emissions in 2015 the sector may see big changes 
because of the effects of climate change (2017, 21). The CIMP5 model ensemble mean increase in 
temperature is projected to be 3.4°C, and there is no projected annual change in precipitation (Adler and 
Hostetler 2013). Although not studied in this thesis, increased CO2 in the atmosphere might also lead to 
some wheat yield increases, provided that the temperature does not get too warm (Wheeler et al. 1996).  
 
Figure 5.3. Average monthly temperature observed and projected for Ukraine (Adler and Hostetler 2013).  
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Looking at how wheat production might change in the future allows for us to better understand 
how Ukraine might need to adjust its agricultural policies to support production of the crop to assure the 
availability of food. Ukraine’s winter wheat is planted between mid-August and mid-October, grows 
throughout the winter, and is harvested the following July and August (Food and Agriculture 
Organization 2019). Wheat plants require about 10mm of water per week during from planning until mid-
October, when they enter their dormancy phase. As rainfall is projected to decrease during the planting 
period to an average of one mm a day, which is less than usually required during this time, yields may 
slightly decrease. Since the change is not dramatic, however, losses may not be significant. When the 
weather warms up in the spring, plants can require between 10mm and 40mm of water per week though 
harvesting, depending on the temperature, but totaling approximately 560mm per growing season (Yonts 
et al. n.d., 4–5). More precipitation during the spring months, then, might offset any decreases during the 
planting season to increase yields. As precipitation is also projected to increase during the winter, the 
moister soil might protect crops from quicker soil freezes and thaws, as wheat is most resistant to cold 
temperatures during its dormancy phase between December and February, especially when soils are moist 
(Klein 2015). Indeed, the temperature increases projected for Ukraine indicate that climate change might 
aid yields by decreasing production lost to freezes. Wheat grows best in steady temperatures between 
17°C and 23°C, and a minimum temperature of 0°C (Porter and Gawith 1999, 25). While the temperature 
at the time that wheat is planting is higher than the optimal 22°C, winter wheat can usually withstand 
higher sowing temperatures up to 32.7°C, so temperature changes are not slated to have a significant 
impact on sowing results (Porter and Gawith 1999, 25, 31). The biggest challenge, then, will be 
mitigating the impact of higher temperatures before harvesting: grain filling, or the shriveling of wheat 
grains, happens above 20°C (Gooding et al. 2003, 304). This could be done by harvesting earlier, which 
would be beneficial for food security because it would decrease the time between harvests. Based on this 
assessment, it appears that the net effects of climate change on wheat production and food availability are 
likely to be minimal.   
Sunflowers follow a different growing season, as they are planted in April and harvested between 
mid-September to mid-October (Rogovska, n.d.). Planting sunflower seeds should be done when soil 
temperature reaches about 10°C, and sunflowers need air temperatures of at least 6.7°C to grow (Myers 
2002, 2; North Dakota Agricultural Weather Network n.d.). Sunflowers like warmer temperatures around 
23°C; as temperatures are projected to rise, there will be more days with the heat conditions that optimize 
sunflower growth, so production might increase with temperature. Sunflowers require about 480mm of 
water over a growing season (“Sunflower Production” 2007, 15). Sunflower water requirements increase 
with temperature, and there is also a bell-shaped curve for consumption throughout the growing period, 
meaning that more water is required between weeks five and eleven of production (“Sunflower 
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Production” 2007, 17). The changes in precipitation for Ukraine might hinder sunflower seed production 
not because of changes in net rainfall, but rather because of changes in when rainfall occurs during the 
year. Week five through week eleven of growth takes place approximately in May through July, precisely 
when projected precipitation is shown to decrease compared to observations. As lack of water in parts of 
the southern steppe currently puts limits on where sunflowers can be grown, the area suitable for 
sunflower production may decrease due to rainfall constraints (Polevoy, Lukashchuk, and Peskovski 
2013, 4, citing Andrienko et al., 2011 & Kirichenko et al., 2010). As the temperature increases, 
sunflowers will also likely need additional water to grow, which will then need to come from irrigation or 
human intervention rather than rainwater sources. The limiting factor for increasing sunflower production 
under climate change is when water is distributed to the plants throughout the growing season.  
Examining the projected temperature and precipitation changes for Ukraine reveal sunflower 
production may decline due to limitations on water resources, while changes in wheat production will 
likely be minimal. As domestic wheat consumption has been declining because of rising incomes and 
shrinking population, wheat has the potential to become a bigger export crop. This in turn could aid in 
advancing accessibility of food through employment opportunities. The story, however, is different for 
sunflowers. As a key export crop, this decrease in production will limit food accessibility and require 
changes in what crops are produced. Policies that help farmers with irrigation and water storage may help 
negate some of the future challenges for sunflower production. The potential for sunflower production to 
decline has implications for biofuel consuming countries, as the supply of such fuel may take a hit in the 
future. Considering other clean and renewable energy sources for investment may be a better idea than 
putting all of the eggs in the biofuel basket. External demand for these oils also has an impact on Ukraine: 
in 2008, Ukraine faced rising food costs mainly due to outside economic forces. These costs were 
especially high on products like bananas and oranges, which points for the need for increased fruit tree 




In this section of the case study, I will study the specific ways that Ukraine has integrated the right to food 
into its legal system with two main objectives: first, to see how the constitutional wording impacts its 
agricultural and climate change policies; and second, to determine what the implications of this 
framework are to the battle against hunger. Ukraine ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Economic Rights in 1973, and signed the Optional Protocol to ICESCR in 2009, but has yet to 
ratify it. The state has not given an official response as to the hold up in signing the agreement, despite 
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NGOs calling for action (Coalition for Personal Autonomy 2018, 5). As Ukraine moves closer to the EU, 
it will be interesting to see whether it takes the path of France, Italy, and other pro-right to food states that 
have ratified the Optional Protocol, or other states that are more hesitant about this right (Pol and 
Schuftan 2016). I remain cautiously optimistic about the prospects for Ukraine’s ratification of this 
Optional Protocol, as it might be seen as a way for Ukraine to demonstrate to the EU that it does indeed 
plan on respecting human rights. With the number of high-politics issues that the country is dealing with 
currently, however, the ratification of this protocol does not appear to be at the top of the government’s 
to-do list. International agreements are integrated into Ukrainian domestic law by article 9 of the 
constitution, which deem them part of Ukraine’s national legislation provided that they do not conflict 
with the constitution.  
It took Ukraine five years of negotiation after its independence to produce and ratify the 1996 
constitution. Rather than being carefully prepared throughout that time, however, the constitution was 
crafted rather rapidly by a group of legal experts in collaboration with the president (Wolczuk 2013, 11). 
Contentious issues included property rights, the country’s symbols, and the status of both the Russian 
language and of Crimea (Wolczuk 2013, 20). Since the implementation of this foundational document, 
there have been several key changes to the supreme law of the land. In 2004, constitutional reform 
restricted the power of the president, and making Ukraine a parliamentary republic. The Constitutional 
Court, which has jurisdiction over ensuring the primacy of the constitution, ruled the 2004 changes 
unconstitutional, returning the country to a presidential-parliamentary system. In 2014, following anti-
government demonstrations and Russian’s annexation of the Crimea, the Supreme Rada reversed the 2010 
ruling to return to the 2004 reformed version of the constitution (Mishina 2014).  
The constitution of Ukraine guarantees the right to adequate food through a general provision on 
the standard of living.42 The wording of article 48 is of particular interest, because it mirrors almost 
exactly the language in ICESCR’s Article 11, indicating that ICESCR influenced Ukraine’s perspective 
on right to food. It is important to note that the constitution uses the word nutrition instead of food, so that 
the article reads that everyone has the right to “adequate nutrition.” The choice of the world nutrition is 
may be in response to the conditions in Ukraine in which food is plentiful but access and usage (nutrition) 
are weak points. While Ukraine’s version of the right to food is closest to that of ICESCR out of the four 
case study countries, it also is the only country without a provision solely related to food. Adding to this, 
																																								 																				
42 In order to use the version as close to the original document in Ukrainian, I analyze the English translation 
submitted by the Ukrainian authorities to the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission) on 13 March 2014. 
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Article 50 says that everyone has the right to information about the quality of food, so that people have 
the proper information to make nutritional decisions.  
Starting in 2016, individuals and companies that have been able to access the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine, the legal mechanism through which they could challenge that their constitutional right 
to an adequate standard of living had been violated if lower courts rule against them (Orlyk 2016). This 
rule change opened up the possibility for Ukrainians to file cases on the right to food. Reviewing the 
decisions passed down by the court as of April 2019 shows that the Constitutional Court has yet to decide 
upon a case relating to the right to an adequate standard of living. In addition, if the court were to rule in 
favor of those alleging a violation of their constitutional right, it is unclear how it would be enforced. As 
the European Court of Human Rights has ruled against Ukraine on several occasions because of its poor 
enforcement of domestic rulings, it is unlikely that courts would be able to make a significant difference 
in terms of implementing the right to food. This lack of enforceability is pervasive throughout the articles 
on economic, social and cultural rights in constitutions in this thesis. 
Ukraine lacks, however, an independent and comprehensive food and nutrition security plan, 
instead relying upon stopgap policies that focus on nutrition for children (World Health Organization 
n.d.). This dearth of comprehensive food programs can be traced to two sources: one, that the prevalence 
of undernourishment in Ukraine is low (about three percent from 2015 to 2017); and two, as there is not 
an article solely dedicated to the right to food, efforts toward fulfilling the right to an adequate standard of 
living can focus elsewhere. The constitution does, however, provide a constitutional guarantee to social 
protection in Article 46. Specifically, it gives citizens the right to support in cases of disability, the loss of 
a household’s principle wage-earner, unemployment, and old age. To facilitate the provision of this public 
good, there is mandatory state social insurance for all. Health insurance and medical care is also 
provisioned by the state in Article 49. Together, these provisions make Ukraine the country with the 
strongest constitutionally enshrined social safety net of the countries surveyed in this thesis. Accordingly, 
Ukraine spends almost double the world average on social safety nets as a percent of its GDP, and the 
most of all of the case study countries (World Bank 2015, 22). 
The constitution of Ukraine provides some guidance as to problems with land rights and minority 
populations. Article 14 protects private lands, while Article 13 states that all land is the property of the 
people of Ukraine. Article 11 states the dual goals of both consolidating the nation and protecting 
minorities. Article 10 guarantees the “use and protection of Russian and other languages of national 
minorities,” and Article 53 guarantees that national minorities have the right to schooling in their 
language although these rights have been rolled back in the last five years (Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty 2017). On crucial issues facing the country currently, the constitution has regrettably too little 
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clarity to provide strong guidance for legislators. On issues of the declining population the constitution is 
understandably silent. 
Overall, Ukraine’s right to food framework is the weakest of the four case study countries, with 
no individually delineated right or sweeping food and nutrition security agenda. The language appears 
moderately tailored, however, to Ukraine’s national context from the ICESCR text because of the 
importance of nutrition to the population. Ukraine’s constitution is the earliest of those surveyed, which 
shows that there has been progression on how the right to adequate food becomes integrated into domestic 
constitutions. This change in how countries legislate for the right to food is an important one in two 
respects. One, it shows progress made in establishing the right to food as an international norm, as it 
shows up in even the oldest of the “modern” constitutions. Although the enforcement or even fulfillment 
of this obligation may not be met in states like Bolivia that give the people the largest breadth of rights, it 
is clear that there has been a significant shift toward states making the right to food justiciable. Second, 
the case of Ukraine also reveals how these rights can evolve to become stronger within a country. While 
originally individuals and companies could not access the Constitution Court, since 2016 there has been 
the possibility for civil society to bring to it cases in which they allege their constitutional right to an 
adequate standard of living is being harmed. As Ukraine’s major food security issue is related to food 
access, or having the economic means to buy food, Ukraine’s spending and the percent of people covered 
by social safety nets (about 54 percent), show that the state is moving toward assuring the accessibility 
pillar of food security (World Bank 2015, 47). As there have been no cases at the Constitutional Court 
involving the right to food or an adequate standard of living, it is unclear how justiciable the right is in 
practice. This situation lends credence to the conclusion that sectoral plans and policies are more effective 
ways to combat hunger than simply granting the right to food.  
 
AGRICULTURAL	FRAMEWORK	
By looking at the country background, the agricultural background, the 2008 crisis, climate change 
projects, and the right to food framework, I have identified the elements that agricultural policy should 
address in order for Ukraine to be on a stable footing vis-à-vis food security in Ukraine. I recall the key 
issues: relating to overarching societal problems, there is the declining population, minority-majority 
conflict and conflict with Russia, and land problems; in terms of general agricultural problems, Ukraine 
faces poor storage and export infrastructure, poor access to credit, labor imbalances, and poor extension 
services; specifically related to wheat there are questions about disease, and for sunflowers about both 
disease and lack of rainfall; vulnerable populations are mainly the rural poor. These country-specific 
factors will allow me to assess the agricultural policy and produce recommendations to better support 
agriculture and food security in Ukraine.  
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Prior to 2015, the government formulated policy objectives through the 2005 Law on Basic 
Principles of the State Agrarian Policy up to 2015. This law was followed by the 2007 State Targeted 
Programme for Development of the Ukrainian Countryside to 2015. Together, these laws set the stage for 
a combined push towards rural and agricultural development (Working Party on Agricultural Policies and 
Markets 2011, 165).  In 2015, the government, with the help of international experts and donors, created 
the Single and Comprehensive Strategy and Action Plan for Agriculture and Rural Development 2015-
2020 (SCS). As its name illustrates, SCS is comprehensive in that it combines traditional agriculture 
sector areas of interest with other areas that need reform in order to facilitate agricultural production. It is 
structured around ten priority areas, with subpriorities and specific measures, and expected outcomes. The 
Strategy has ten priority areas, including fighting corruption, land and institutional reform, taxation, and 
food security. What is most interesting is the way that this Strategy aims to set Ukraine up to join the EU; 
indeed, this document might be seen as setting the stage for Ukraine’s post-Crimea annexation courtship 
of the EU. It plans to harmonize its sanitary standards, institutional framework, environmental standards, 
and use the OECD’s classifications of rural development to inform its development work.43 
To increase credit options and foreign investment, the strategy sees Ukraine gutting regulatory 
acts that might limit business under priority one. It will decrease the number of permissions to do 
business, limit the power of the state to regulate, clarify the tax code, and get rid of any acts that do not 
support safety or “fair competition.” This suite of items on the list may attract more foreign business to 
the detriment of Ukrainian producers. Unless foreign businesses pay better wages or help train employees, 
these actions that gut state oversight might instead serve to harm Ukrainian food security. Under sub-
priority six on the access to financial resources, the Strategy lists several measures with positive impacts 
on credit. A sign of the poor state of credit access is that this subpriority starts by calling for the state to 
determine its priorities and the type of support to give to farmers. Other parts of the subpriority are more 
precise and useful. The creation of a system to ensure that smaller farms have opportunities to borrow is a 
good place to start because smaller farms tend either to be excluded from traditional agricultural lending 
systems or to be given interest rates that make borrowing almost impossible. Helping in the creation of 
cooperatives, and creating regulations so they can run effectively is another area in which the Strategy 
will help smaller farms get access to banking resources. Overall, the measures that are focused on 
improving access to credit have the right idea, but because they are not fully fleshed out, it is unclear how 
exactly they are to be implemented. The expected results are also vague ,so they do not shed light on 
actual state priorities and actions.  
																																								 																				
43	Ukraine	signed	a	Memorandum	of	Understanding	with	the	OECD	is	2014	(OECD	2014).		
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This policy envisions the rebooting of the state insurance program for agriculture, which is one of 
the strongest elements of the policy in terms of action to mitigate the effects of climate change. Though it 
is not projected that Ukraine will have drastic negative impacts like Kenya or Nepal, its farmers will still 
benefit from having somewhere to turn if droughts or floods occur. In turn, this will prevent farms from 
going out of business and support production for the next year so that any decline is not lasting. It also 
will re-assess and reorganize the support for agriculture to orient it to be more transparent and less trade 
distorting. Ukraine has made some progress on this front with changes in its VAT refund policy. 
Changing the support system will be necessary if Ukraine wants to join the EU and the CAP, and the 
measures outlined here will help Ukraine accomplish the former. The bigger question about how to 
increase agricultural spending remains, however, and there are also trade-offs in Ukraine between 
investing in agriculture and investing in social safety nets that is not as much of a problem in the other 
case study countries in which most people are involved in the agricultural sector.  
The SCS has language on infrastructure, one of the key impediments to exportation. It is not clear 
whether the state will fund infrastructure projects itself, as it uses the words “encourage,” “ensure,” and 
“stimulate;” as the risks talk about budget deficits, however, it seems that the state will provide in at least 
some amount of funding toward the project. Infrastructure areas targeted include storage, waterways, and 
land transport systems. Much of how SCS says Ukraine will do this is through liberalization, ensuring 
competition, and creating regulations that incentivize private investments. One part of the infrastructure 
plan that will be important for both sunflower seed and wheat production in the future is the expansion of 
irrigation systems, which are to be expanded by 2.5 times or to 1 million hectares by 2020. It is unclear 
how the writers of this document obtained this number as the FAO estimates that there is already about 
2.5 million hectares of land under irrigation (Food and Agriculture Organization 2015). Expanding 
irrigation overall will be beneficial for production in the future, so these discrepancies in hectarage are not 
very important. The performance targets illustrate how difficult it will be to improve infrastructure, as 
they do not have specific infrastructure goals (e.g. 20 miles of roads built) except for irrigation.44 Ukraine 
should plan to invest heavily in infrastructure, particularly in projects that take into account climate 
change. I am not convinced by this plan that the action on infrastructure will be what it needs to be to 
significantly increase exports, increasing GDP. Outlining priority projects would be a step in the right 
direction.  
																																								 																				
44 Irrigation, however is tricky: the Strategy calls for 2.5 times expansion of irrigated areas up to 1 million hectares 
by 2020, yet AQUASTATS, FAO’s database on all things water-related, shows that there were already about 2.6 
million hectares equipped for irrigation in 2013. It is unclear what the source of this discrepancy is, but it could be 
possible that the document’s writers underestimated the land in order to call a win at the end of the period.  
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In order to target the rural poor, the Strategy’s fourth priority calls for specific food support 
programs, several of which have made their way into law (see the section on the right to food framework). 
The Strategy also wants to see Ukraine move toward a situation in which there is no consumer price 
support. I foresee two main problems with this approach. Given that the main challenge to food security is 
accessibility, anything that changes prices may have a negative impact on food security in the country as 
prices that are artificially lowered rise. If this measure is not accompanied by wage increases, which the 
Strategy does not couple it with, then there is the possibility that purchasing power will decrease. The 
ultimate effects of this component also depend on the speed and care with which it is undertaken, as 
mitigating negative impacts is not impossible. While there is significant pressure on Ukraine from outside 
organizations to liberalize its economic policies, what is interesting is that Ukraine was able to respond in 
2008 to rising prices because of its ability to control domestic prices and exports. This is to say that if the 
government can continue to afford to subsidize food, this thesis has not shown any reason that this action 
would be detrimental in the face of a crisis in the future. Reforming taxation in the agricultural sector 
under priority five might help increase tax revenues by cutting fraud and corruption, which could improve 
the budgetary situation. In addition, consumer food subsidies illuminate a crucial tension in agricultural 
policies: producers want prices to be high, while consumers want them to be low. Subsidies and other 
forms of state support can help bridge the gap between the two. Monitoring the food security situation and 
improving emergency interventions are good additional steps, but because hunger is largely due to food 
inaccessibility, consumer support programs will be more effective in most situations.  
Another way the SCS plans to help the rural poor is through rural development under priority 
seven. Because of limitations on funds, the plan says that interventions under this priority will be 
establishing a legal and policy framework for rural development, creating the investment framework from 
priority six, helping create non-agricultural livelihood opportunities, and supporting communities to 
organize themselves for development. A “community partner scheme” wherein different parts of the rural 
community come together to support a community’s development goals is a goal under subpriority 7.2. 
Such a scheme may provide an innovative way to bring together all stakeholders so that development 
serves the community’s needs best. A problem with the rural development section of this plan, however, 
is that it does not have the state taking the lead or having a strong role in actually implementing rural 
development projects. Larger public goods programs seem to be excluded from what will happen under 
this plan. Rural people do need support for local business improvement, but they also need larger-scale 
investments. Developing support programs at local levels is a good start to assessing the needs, and could 
guide the implementation of large projects.  
Ukraine plans to facilitate exports through several methods. Under strategic priority one, the 
government of Ukraine hopes to increase investment, upgrade its sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
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system, and make the rules more transparent. Focus is placed on SPS measures because Ukraine does not 
meet all EU requirements for all of its products, hindering trade. The Strategy outlines a multipronged 
approach to meeting these regulations through creating a special oversight authority, creating necessary 
policy changes, and helping farmers access the EU market for products that do pass muster. The country 
did implement Law 2264-VIII with the goal of increasing safety and sanitation of foodstuffs, which is a 
step in the direction toward meeting the SPS targets. Priority one also wants Ukraine to create legal 
framework related to GMO and quality indicators; whether or not it has prepared the legal acts is unclear, 
but they have not been ratified.  
Strategic priority two on land reform is important to mention briefly as an example of how 
implementation can fail. The main priority of land reform under this priority is to create an agricultural 
land market; at the same time, Ukraine extended their moratorium to 2020, meaning that it will be 
impossible for the country to meet its goals. Issues of land holdings and structure, which is a crucial area 
for change in order to increase food security, fell to the wayside not at the policy phase but rather in 
implementation. While land reform is a particularly high profile issue in Ukraine, it is not unlikely that 
other parts of this Strategy met similar fates, but only not as publically so the discrepancies are more 
difficult to find.  
Rural people need support to improve their technical and specialized skills, as there is a severe 
lack of skilled workers, particularly in the agricultural sector. The plan offers education and training to 
small farmers in order to improve their agricultural skills and knowledge, which is an important step to 
increase the number of skilled agricultural workers from amongst those already participating in the sector. 
Attentive to the population shift, the SCS aims to create programs to support young farmers in order to 
keep up the agrarian workforce under priority six. It wants to improve rural people’s skills in order to spur 
non-agricultural economic activity. To this end, it hopes to see training events and participants increase 
by 30 percent. As this target does not provide a baseline, it is incredibly difficult to determine whether 
this goal has been met or even if there has been any progress towards meeting it. Under priority 9.2, the 
SCS looks at ways to improve formal education programs such as vocational training, bachelor’s and 
master’s programs. Again, we see this part of the plan revolving around legislative changes rather than 
state investment in agricultural education. There is also a trend towards internationalization of the 
education system, with English language proficiency and the development of collaborations with 
international partners as key goals. It is clear that here too Ukraine’s agricultural plan relies heavily on 
support from outside groups, which makes meeting its goals unlikely.  
Sunflower production will receive a boost from this plan, as it will support biofuel and bioenergy 
sources. Increasing the use of bioenergy domestically will help Ukraine remove itself from Russia’s 
control due to natural gas dependencies. Increasing production of biofuel crops may be helpful for 
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Ukraine because it can gain additional export income from these crops. Balancing production between 
wheat and sunflowers, however, will need to be done, as wheat production has already been declining as 
more land goes to biofuels. In order for Ukraine to continue to be a breadbasket country, it will need to 
also invest in food crops.  
Poor extension services will be improved in several ways by the policy. First, under component 3, 
regional and local-level relationships between local administrators and the Ministry of Agrarian Policy 
and Food will be established and strengthened, bringing better services and understanding of farmers’ and 
individuals’ rights and responsibilities to them. Under strategic priority nine on education and research, 
the SCS elaborates how it will use institutional changes such as regulating intellectual property and 
reforming the agricultural institutions to improve research. The performance goals all seek increases in 
international investments in research and internationally-funded research projects, showing that Ukraine 
is not planning on investing in research itself. As long as these international projects are attentive to 
Ukraine’s needs and not fully controlled by foreign agribusiness interests, international support may be 
useful. To get this information to the farmers who need it, section 9.3 creates the plan for disseminating 
this agricultural knowledge. The creation of a National Coordination Centre for Extension Services as 
well as local and oblast level programs will help spread information, while better programming and 
information gathering platforms will create the content. Here the state acknowledges that it will spend 
money to implement these services, which is a necessary expenditure in order to ensure that knowledge 
actually reaches the farmers who need access to it.  
Overall, the SCS has some elements that may improve conditions for farmers and the rural 
people, but because of its vague formulation of targets and the lack of clear allocation of funding per each 
component, is seems that the plan has had poor implementation a year from its completion. The plan is 
strongest in its approach to extension services and research, which will contribute both to yield increases 
and support for farmers to get better seeds and use more climate-resilient production methods. Access to 
credit might see a boost if the implementing ministry takes the idea in the SCS and implements them 
properly. In terms of infrastructure and rural development, this strategy places the onus on communities 
and the international community to get projects done. It should instead consider investing in key projects 
itself or in tandem with development institutions to make sure that infrastructure projects actually serve 
the needs of communities and Ukraine at large instead of the immediate needs of foreign companies. 
Exporting will become more cost-effective with better infrastructure, and paired with the plans to 
harmonize Ukraine’s regulations with EU standards, could lead to an increase in AgGDP and hopefully 
more employment opportunities and better wages (Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine 
2015). 
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This agricultural policy, like Nepal and Kenya’s, has been shaped largely by outside demands. It 
caters to the EU in terms of its obligations and requirements, which is perhaps more optimistic than it 
should be about Ukraine’s ability to implement facilitating reforms (or its ability to gain entry into the 
EU, for that matter). What is interesting is that the role of the state in agricultural development is almost 
entirely removed outside of its role in legislating. Ukraine’s business atmosphere is still poorer than it 
should be in order to attract the amount of support that would be needed to make the changes in 
agriculture that are laid out within the SCS. While the current administration attempts to implement 
change from the top, in order for Ukraine’s agriculture sector to align with EU rules and regulations, there 
must be buy-in at the grassroots level. From afar it is difficult to assess how rural people and agricultural 
sector workers feel about these changes, but I hypothesize that many local stakeholders are either unaware 
of policy changes or they do not have the means to make on-the-ground changes, which also reflects the 
lack of change in the agriculture sector under this Strategy. Another problem with the agricultural policies 
investigated in this thesis is that they create sky-high goals without the necessary transition periods and 
human and economic resources to match. A policy can be as thoughtful and well-constructed as possible, 
but without implementation, it is still as useless as a carelessly constructed policy.  
Compared to Nepal’s policies, Ukraine’s lacks attention to climate change and the key crops 
(besides sunflower’s use as a biofuel). It also puts much more of the onus for development and investment 
on the private sector, particularly international business. There is nothing inherently wrong about this 
approach, but it demonstrates a lack of understanding of the Ukrainian context in which the business 
environment is such that foreign investors are disinclined to do take the risk of putting their money into 
Ukraine. Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have also declined since their peak in 2012, showing 
that the potential for these plans to be realized through foreign backing is small (Trading Economics 
2019). While the concept of a single and comprehensive plan is a good one, in this case it has created 
overly vague targets and much room for implementing ministries to interpret the document favorably for 
their own work and incomes. Supporting agriculture in Ukraine will help not only Ukrainians have food 
available but increase their access through better economic conditions. This SCS, however, is unlikely to 
create significant change to do this.   
CLIMATE	CHANGE	FRAMEWORK	
In this section, I will analyze Ukraine’s climate change framework using the specific crop weaknesses and 
agricultural sector vulnerabilities elucidated in Part I. Ukraine has participated in international climate 
change meetings since 1997, when it became a party to the UNFCCC. It became a party to the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2004 and to the Paris Agreement in 2016. The constitution grants citizens the right to an 
environment that is safe for life and health in Article 50, and goes one step further to guarantee 
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compensation for violations of this article.45 The main document overseeing environmental and climate 
change action in Ukraine is the Underlying Principles (Strategy) of the State Environmental Policy of 
Ukraine for the period until 2020, which went into effect in 2020. The policy’s aim is not so much 
climate-focused as it is environmental preservation for human health-focused; while the latter does 
contribute to the former, the lack of a cleared delineated plan for climate adaptation  
 The Concept of State Climate Change Policy Implementation until 2030 sets the state’s climate 
change agenda for the next ten years with broad objectives. These include strengthening institutional 
capacity, increasing resilience, decreasing emissions, making sure that Ukraine’s policies are in line with 
the EU’s, creating a domestic greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme, and collaborating with neighbors 
on this issue. This Concept does not mention agriculture at all, which is concerning because the sector is 
both a contributor and vulnerable to climate change. The Action Plan, which takes this schematic 
document and turns it from rhetoric to action, centers on the governmental and policy action needed to 
support work on climate change. It begins with a number of things for ministers to do, such as review the 
emissions trading system and approve Ukraine’s NDC under the Paris Agreement. Contributing to work 
on climate change in the international arena, as well as submitting necessary documents, are also top 
action item under the Concept. Although the ministry for agrarian policy will be involved with many of 
these items, here again there is no specially targeted action for agriculture.  
While the Concept and Action Plan are more administrative-level documents, the Ukraine 2050 
Low Emission Development Strategy (LEDS) lays the foundation for Ukraine’s development plans vis-à-
vis the environment. LEDS acknowledges that Ukraine’s economy will need to grow in order to reduce 
poverty, and plans a green strategy to get there. Ukraine will need growth to help with food security so 
that people can have the economic resources to purchase food; growth alone, however, is probably not 
enough to make considerable changes, as there must also be an increase in the minimum wage and better 
social programs to go along with higher revenues. The goal of LEDS is to determine ways that the 
country can develop sustainably with an eye towards low emissions. The strategy’s three main objectives 
are to transition to a low-carbon energy system, increase carbon uptake with specific focus on the 
agricultural and forestry sectors, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions including those from agriculture. 
Unlike the Action Plan and concept, LEDS does place some emphasis on agriculture. The agricultural 
sector is targeted for the use of energy efficient technology and renewable energy usage, the use of 
agricultural products for heat and bioethanol, improving animal feeding and waste management practices, 
and enhancing targeting and efficiency of fertilizer use. In tandem with the increases of biofuel 
																																								 																				
45 Like the right to food, it appears that this right has only recently become justiciable with new access for 
individuals and firms to the Constitutional Court.   
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production under the SCS, LEDS plans to promote the use of biofuels in all transportation methods. 
Focusing on transitioning the economy to more climate friendly technologies, but there will have to be 
new education programs to help people gain access to employment in the sector. Within the SCS, part of 
priority 10 is to mitigate and adapt to climate change, with a goal of reducing agriculture’s contribution to 
emissions by 20 percent. Increasing forest coverage will help with carbon uptake, but will not do much 
for wheat and sunflower production because neither of these crops are shade crops. These measures are 
important for mitigation of the effects of climate change, but do not speak to adaptation to changes in 
rainfall patterns and increased heat that are projected by CMIP5.  
Ukraine’s climate change policy is quite weak compared with the other case study countries’. 
While it does have language on lowering emissions, there is little support for farmers besides 
transitioning from agriculture into other industries, something that cannot happen at high levels if Ukraine 
(and other parts of the world that import Ukrainian agricultural goods) wants to retain its food 
availability. Ukraine might be strongly pushing for green and renewable energy sources to fuel its 
development in order to limit Russia’s ability to assert control over the country through natural gas prices; 
as Ukraine prepares to enter the EU, Russia may retaliate through this method. As energy made up 65 
percent of GHG emissions in 2015, it is clear that targeting the sector for priority action no matter what 
the reason will be useful in overall climate mitigation (2017, 21, 56). For sunflower production, which is 
supposed to increase under the SCS and have higher domestic demand through the LEDS, without strong 
adaptation particularly around water storage and irrigation, there could be problems even maintaining 
production to meet current levels. Because it currently produces more food than it consumes, it is 
understandable why investing in adaption for the climate change sector would not be a top priority. 
Taking proactive action, however, would be a good step to ensure food security in the future.  
 
CONCLUSION	
The case study on Ukraine showed the ways in which the government is working toward food security 
through agricultural policy and the right to food. Most people who are food insecure in Ukraine are so 
because of lack of accessibility to food, and there are elements of stability at play currently in the conflict-
affected regions. Investigating how Ukraine’s history, political, and economic structure influence policies 
today revealed that a declining population, minority-majority tensions and conflict, and land issues were 
key problems, and that corruption also prevented effective regulation and robust investment. All of the 
policies address the conflict with Russia by trying to bring Ukraine closer to the EU and with less of a 
reliance on Russia for energy. Land reform was also a reoccurring theme, but effective lobbying has made 
land reform impossible despite robust policy to support its actualization. Ukraine’s population is 
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projected to decline by about 5.5 million people by 2050, posing problems for food security and 
agriculture, similar to the situation of out-migration in Nepal (UN, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division 2018).The declining population is addressed in passing through rural 
development and incentivizing young people to stay in agriculture, but larger programs to ensure that 
there are enough people left to do the agricultural work necessary are not in place.  
The 2008 crisis in Ukraine was different from that in the other case study countries in that it 
might better be referred to as a general price hike instead of a food crisis. Ukraine was much more 
affected by the global financial crisis, which also decreased purchasing power, illuminating the fact that 
accessibility is the soft spot in Ukraine’s food security. Rural people in non-agricultural zones in the west 
of the country are the most vulnerable group, who will tangentially be targeted by rural development but 
have no special programming under the agricultural policy.  
While Ukraine will likely experience the least negative impact of climate change on agriculture, 
there is still room for concern about water and sunflowers, as well as wheat and heat. Neither the 
agriculture policy nor climate change policies address adaptation for the agricultural sector, a big gap in 
Ukraine’s preparedness. If Ukraine can harness its water resources effectively, and implement the strong 
research and extension services plan within the SCS, it might be possible for the country’s agricultural 
sector to benefit from climate change. These ifs, however, are rather large, and will require both 
legislative and programmatic action from the government.  
As Ukraine faces large challenges with only one pillar of food security (economic accessibility), 
litigating the right to food for specific groups might actually be more effective than in other case study 
countries. The legislation on the right to food in the constitution in the weakest of the four case study 
countries, and the right to food only became effectively justiciable in 2016. I look forward to reviewing 
the decisions that the court passes down on ESC rights in the future, as I hope that cases are brought that 
could set a stronger jurisprudence on the issue. Ukraine’s total number of hungry people is much smaller, 
so grouping them and creating class action suits will be more feasible. As the key issue is the lack of 
social safety nets to provide people with money to buy food, over which the government has direct 
control (unlike agriculture in which individual firms determine their production), forcing the 
government’s hand through the courts might have some positive impacts. Ukraine does have robust social 
safety nets generally, but does not have specific support for food in place despite alluding to more 
comprehensive work under the SCS. Implementing this program will be extremely helpful to provide 
poorer households with added support to purchase food throughout the year. The decentralization outlined 
in the constitution and the SCS could help Ukraine bring these services to the most vulnerable rural areas.  
Likewise, infrastructure projects could improve food security by decreasing the profits lost during 
transport, increasing people’s ability to move around the country, and ensuring that proper social services 
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are located near enough for people to access them. Community input as outlined by the SCS is good in 
principle, but the language in the document puts the onus on the communities for their own development 
and decreases the state’s responsibility. The infrastructure projects are mainly supposed to be funded by 
foreign investors, but in the current political environment, it seems unlikely that the funds needed will be 
procured. Instead, the state should consider funding some of the most needed projects associated with 
grain transport and public services.  
Since 2014, Ukraine has sought to be more closely aligned with Europe in response to Russian 
aggression. Within the agricultural policy and climate change policy, entering the EU seems to be the 
main driver behind its proposed actions. While in the long run joining the EU will likely bring increased 
economic, political, and social stability, these adjustments might also cause some growing pains. For 
example, land reform must be undertaken according to the EU, but there has been much lobbying against 
such policies by large agriholdings. Ukraine needs the export revenue from agriculture exports, so it 
might consider finding a middle ground between the demands of the EU and internal demands. In this 
balancing act between local needs and the EU’s demands, so far the EU has gotten much lip service while 
domestic demands are largely met. There have been some steps toward EU integration, like elimination of 
VAT rebates, but not enough progress has been made. In terms of agriculture, Ukraine will have to 
increase its spending on green box support, but it will likely need budgetary support from the EU to do so 
(Food and Agriculture Organization n.d., 14).  
The crisis in southeastern Ukraine and Crimea are causing significant problems for Ukraine. 
Getting aid to these groups while maintaining business as usual conditions in other parts of the country 
has proven challenging. Those living in conflict areas experience higher rates of hunger because of 
quickly rising food prices compared to wages while humanitarian assistance declined (Food Security and 
Livelihoods Cluster Technical Working Group 2017, 8–9). As the conflict drags on, the World Food 
Programme and other food aid groups have struggled to attain the funds necessary to continue their 
operations in Ukraine. The most vulnerable groups in areas directly affected by the 2014 conflict that 
continues to drag on are single-headed households with children, elders, unemployed households, and 
female-headed households (Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster Technical Working Group 2017, 8). 
The government of Ukraine, especially in areas it controls, has a geopolitical and humanitarian imperative 
to help provide food to vulnerable populations.  
Looking forward, Ukraine’s climate change and agricultural policies have room to improve. The 
conflict with Russia is looming large over the policies, to the detriment of their effectiveness in the fight 
against hunger in the society at large. While there are external pressures to cut public expenditures, 
investments in infrastructure could provide big returns in the form of agricultural exports. There are some 
positive elements of the policies, such as the research and extension services and reducing agricultural 
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emissions, and implementation of these should happen without delay. In order to improve its policies and 
create a more food secure environment, Ukraine should create policies on agriculture and climate change, 
as well as a food and nutrition plan. Nutrition programs should be added to the social safety fabric, and 
investments in export infrastructure will help Ukraine gain income from its agricultural exports. Right to 
food advocates should try to bring cases on the right to food in the Constitutional Court.  
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This thesis analyzed four case studies in order to answer three main questions: In what ways does a rights-
based approach to food security help prepare Bolivia, Kenya, Nepal, and Ukraine for the fight against 
hunger under the conditions of climate change? How do current agricultural and climate change policies 
contribute to food security? What should these countries do to improve food security domestically both 
now and in the future? These questions were based on two premises: one, that the agricultural sector is the 
most important to target to improve food security in middle- and low-income countries because many of 
them are food deficit and many of the poor work in the sector; and two, that international right to food 
law not only establishes the right to food as an institutionalized international norm but also offers a 
pathway for legal action when citizen’s rights are not upheld, as in when their government’s actions or 
policies have failed them.  
In order to investigate these strategies, I started by seeking a better understanding of the country 
situation from gathering background information on the historical, political, geographical and economic 
context of each country in order to answer the second question. Investigating the agricultural context gave 
me insights into the constraints and challenges facing the agricultural sector in each country. I further 
identified vulnerabilities in their agricultural systems by investigating the causes, consequences, and 
responses to the 2008 crisis; this rupture showed the domestic soft points in the domestic food system, 
(in)adequacy of countries’ emergency responses, as well as vulnerable groups and regions. Next, I looked 
into the key food and export crops, and compared growing requirements temperature and precipitation 
projections from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 in order to gain an understanding of 
potential impacts of climate change on food security. This research laid the foundation for analyzing how 
the right to food is advanced through each countries’ agricultural and climate change policies and what 
opportunities there are for improving such practices and policies  
In this conclusion, I bring together the pieces of my thesis, return to my initial questions, and 
provide some larger takeaways that may be of interest to those working to improve food security not only 
in these case study countries, but in other areas as well. This chapter is organized into three main sections 
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based on the three questions where I present comparisons and my best answers to the questions. Finally, I 
conclude with offering some final observations and future research directions. 
QUESTION	1:	HOW	DO	CURRENT	AGRICULTURAL	AND	CLIMATE	CHANGE	POLICIES	CONTRIBUTE	TO	
FOOD	SECURITY?	
This question is answered in detail in each of the case study sections on agricultural and climate change 
policy. Here I draw out overarching concepts and trends that emerge from the analyses that suggest best 
practices to improve food security under climate change.  
In agricultural policy, context matters. To illustrate this point, I present a somewhat exaggerated 
example: say one has just finished studying Nepal’s agricultural policy, which they thought was very well 
written, and wanted to apply what they learned to Wisconsin’s agricultural policy. They would probably 
suggest that smallholder farmers should be the target group, because in Nepal smallholders make up most 
of the agricultural production. Unlike in Nepal, however, small farms in Wisconsin only make up about 
40 percent all of farms, and they are also much larger: a small farm in Wisconsin is on average 85 ha, 
while the average small farm in Nepal is only 0.55 ha (Rapsomanikis, 2015, pp. 6, 8; Schultz, 2015). This 
person’s policy recommendations would likely fall flat because they did not properly take into account 
the context of the two different places. Thus, the short answer to the second question posed by this thesis 
is simple: by addressing challenges in the agricultural sector, agricultural and climate change policies 
support food availability and stability, as well as access for those who earn their living through 
agriculture. Only by discovering the specific challenges facing a given country, however, can we hope to 
properly evaluate the agricultural policy. In this section, I will explore some of the key differences, 
strengths, and weakness of the agricultural policies in each of the four case studies, beginning with a 
discussion of the assessment criteria.  
I start this overview the same way as each of the case studies: with an overview of the macro, 
societal-level problems. In the table below, I summarize the three of the most important factors affecting 
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Table 6.1. Selected macro-level societal issues that affect policy by case study.  
Country Macro-level factors 
Bolivia Indigenous rights 
Infrastructure 
Land rights 











I found that in Bolivia the larger problems at hand are inequalities between indigenous groups 
and the population at large. Indigenous groups experience higher levels of poverty and have worse access 
to social services, making them vulnerable to food insecurity. Because the Andes divide the country and it 
is landlocked, Bolivia faces difficulties trading internationally. It also lacks important infrastructure to 
support rural areas accessing social services and food markets. In addition, issues with land access and 
land grabbing make Bolivia’s land titles unstable despite multiple attempts at reform. As a landlocked and 
mountainous country, Nepal faces similar structural issues to those of Bolivia. Remote areas are typically 
the most insecure regions because there is simply no easy way to get food to people when there is a 
natural disaster or when crops fail because of poor infrastructure. One advantage Bolivia has is that it 
does not rely almost entirely on one neighboring state for access to the sea and trade as Nepal does. 
Nepal’s relationship with India, and limited amount of geopolitical and military power it finds itself with 
compared to its giant neighbors, complicates its trade situation. Instable land rights and ownership 
discourage investment and continue the feudal pattern in Nepal, which also contributes to continuing 
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inequalities between majority and minority groups. In Kenya, rapid urban population growth has put 
additional pressure on natural resources and social services. Land rights issues with their root in the land 
tenure system under colonization threaten the tenure of communal land users and even the 2010 
constitution did not provide significant protection from land grabbing. These land structure issues have 
also exacerbated tensions between minority and majority groups, as groups seek land for their use and 
others decry the granting of land to minorities, like the Nubians. Land is also a source of tension in 
Ukraine, whose rich agricultural lands have attracted foreign investors while a slow transition from 
collectives under Soviet rule has turned many rural people into agricultural wage laborers instead of 
landholders themselves. While there has been periodic violence in Bolivia, Kenya, and Nepal since the 
adoption of their new constitutions, Ukraine is the state with the most active conflict, relating to its 
history as part of the USSR. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and fighting in the south of the 
country has pushed Ukraine toward the EU, while creating problems for Ukraine’s other minority groups 
through backlash against Russian interference. Ukraine is also the only case study country facing major 
population decline, which has reduced the labor pool and shrunk Ukraine’s rural communities.  
 From this survey of the macro issues facing Bolivia, Kenya, Nepal, and Ukraine, several trends 
appear. First, they face many similar problems. Six main issues—land rights, minority-majority group 
tensions and indigenous rights, population changes, trade, infrastructure, and conflict—are the hindrances 
to food security and development out the twelve individual issues I identified in the four case study 
countries combined. Historical roots show just how pernicious these problems are: all four case studies 
are challenged to some extent by land rights issues, so taking a deeper look into land rights will illustrate 
the vast differences between the cases even on this shared problem. Under colonial rule in Kenya, many 
groups were displaced from their land. Following independence in 1963, some progress towards 
Kenyanization of industry, redistribution of whites’ land, and the creation of a national identity occurred, 
yet powerful leaders continued to favor their own majority group while in power, leading to land 
distributions skewed toward the Kikuyu group and violence in resettlement areas. In the agricultural 
sectoral policy, there is much emphasis on the arid- and semi-arid lands to avoid further displacement and 
conflict, as well as a call to end resettlement. In Nepal, land rights were tied to the caste system, with the 
lowest castes serving as landless bonded laborers. While feudalism and caste-based discrimination are 
illegal, many former bonded laborers and their families continue to work the land that they did while 
bound. Thus, Nepal’s constitution supports the landless getting land rights, yet the agricultural policy 
does not target this group for support, although it does establish a land leasing program that may facilitate 
access. Ukrainian farmers were forcefully collectivized during the Soviet era, leaving large but rather 
unproductive farms as well as creating exiles and hunger. The current agricultural policy notes that 
collectives have little strength now, and wants to increase collectives to help small household farmers 
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compete. While I have not talked to Ukrainian farmers about this issue, it is possible that reluctance to 
collectivize under state control might stem from this history.46 Thus, other forms of government support 
to small farmers may be more appropriate and better received, such as creating marketing classes and 
better extension services. Finally, indigenous people in Bolivia have worse access to social services and 
are more impoverished than their non-indigenous counterparts. Bolivia’s agricultural policy targets 
indigenous groups to receive land and better support, making Bolivia’s the strongest in relation to land 
rights.    
 Not all aspects of agricultural policy are as politically charged as land rights, yet examining the 
importance of land rights illuminates several key points. First, considering how successful an agricultural 
policy is devoid of historical context can lead to flaws in evaluation. Take, for example, Kenya’s 
innovative land registration scheme. Upon first glance, using technology to create a solution to the issue 
of land titling appears to be an innovative approach to a current challenge. However, while Kenya’s GIS 
land registration scheme might help give titles to those currently on the land, there is a real possibility that 
if this program does not take into account the majority and minority groups that have current and 
historical claims to the land there will be political unrest. Therefore, GIS land registration becomes a 
blunt instrument for dealing with these problems, and requires further refinement to determine upon what 
basis land can be registered using this scheme. Second, appropriate land rights are the backbone of 
agricultural policy as they determine who farms where and what they produce. As states must make trade-
offs in determining what programs will get funding and how much will be allocated to what, state 
investment into programs that facilitate land rights in the country context may have the biggest production 
and stability payoff. Land rights issues often both cause and exacerbate tensions between minority and 
majority groups, so effective handling of this issue is paramount. This is not to say that governments 
should all invest in titling schemes as this is costly and may not be the most effective option in all cases 
(Atwood, 1990). What is most important in solving land issues is that they are done equitably and 
carefully, and that templates on titling mechanisms are used sparingly or are highly adapted to the country 
context. At a larger level, what we learn from the example of land rights is that in order to assess policy 
(and to create better policy), we must look at the historical and sociopolitical context at play to avoid 
costly mistakes and ineffective policy.  
Moving in from a macro-level, I focused on challenges in the agriculture sector specifically. 
Here, I chose the criteria that other studies and reports on the agricultural systems in each country deemed 
as the most significant. As with the macro-level criteria, we see some overlap.  Again, at this level it 
																																								 																				
46 Let us recall that Ukraine became independent in 1991, so it is still memory not just history for many inhabitants.  
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becomes increasingly evident that investigating the agricultural context matters when drafting agricultural 
policy. 
 
Table 6.2. Challenges to agricultural production in each of the case study countries. 
Country Agricultural challenges Quality of policy response47 
Bolivia Credit access Low 
Erosion  High 
Low yields Medium 
Poor irrigation systems Low 
Technology/mechanization access Low 
Kenya Credit access Poor 
Little water High   
Market access Medium 
Poor export infrastructure Poor  
Poor irrigation systems High  
Nepal Chemical input access High 
Erosion Low  
Labor transitions Medium  
Low yields High  
Technology/mechanization access High  
Ukraine Credit access Medium 
Labor imbalances Low 
Poor export infrastructure Medium 
Poor extension services High  
																																								 																				
47 These ratings were chosen based on results from the case study analysis, and they aim to represent not a 
definitive ranking but rather a way to think about areas to improve and relative policy strength.  
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Starting with Bolivia, I learned that the poor soil in the highlands where many smallholders live is 
susceptible to erosion over time. Farmers have little access to credit or to mechanization, particularly in 
the poorer highlands. Overall, the percent of the agricultural lands covered by irrigation systems is 
minimal, and both smallholders and larger soybean farmers struggle to produce the yields seen in 
neighboring countries. Nepal faces similar challenges due to its elevation, with soil erosion in the hills 
and poor mechanization in its terraced growing systems. Nepal’s irrigation systems are much better than 
Bolivia’s, however, but it struggles to get farmers the chemical inputs they need, and there is also 
outmigration of men who are usually the head of household, which presents a challenge to production as 
knowledge is lost. Ukraine is also experiencing problems with agricultural labor, particularly related to 
not having enough skilled laborers as the population declines. Its extension services are minimal, and 
credit access for smallholders is almost non-existent because of the poor business environment and 
corruption. While it has an agricultural export-focused economy, the infrastructure to physically carry 
goods as well as the standards to certify their safety is lacking. Kenya too is challenged by the lack of 
export infrastructure, which is a particular challenge to tea producers. Credit access for farmers is poor, as 
is market access. Kenya’s biggest challenge to agricultural production, however, is lack of water and 
irrigation systems, which mean that about one in three harvests are lost to drought.  
Here, it becomes clear that knowing that there is a problem with credit access does not tell us 
enough to fix it; instead, we must understand the issues characteristics and the cause of the problem. I 
posit that there are generally two broad types of issues: those that are a result of geography and climate 
and those that reflect policy failures. While the latter category can exacerbate the former, it is important to 
realize that many of the problems facing agriculture are ones over which policymakers have more control. 
By learning from past policies and the problems that remain, it becomes clear where there can be 
improvement. In order to understand this point, we will compare erosion in Bolivia with poor extension 
services in Ukraine. In Bolivia, many farmers farm between 2,500 and 3,500masl, where there is poorer 
soil quality to begin with because of geographical characteristics of mountains. Policies dealing with 
erosion need to both help farmers gain skills and mechanisms to prevent erosion, and also rehabilitate soil 
that is eroded. In Ukraine, poor extension services reflect a dominance of international firms in 
agricultural research who have different incentives than to improve food security, as well as the result of 
pressure to decrease government spending. In Bolivia, policymakers cannot replace all of the soil on the 
mountains, but in Ukraine, policymakers can designate money to open up extension offices and employ 
extension agents, thus enhancing extension services. This is not to say that challenges related to policy 
failures are inherently easier to solve than geographical and climate ones, but rather that policy tools are 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
	 191	
better suited to solve problems originating in policy failures. Thus, in developing and assessing policy, 
not only must we look at the macro-level factors, but we would be wise to consider the current challenges 
and their origins.  
 All crops are not created equal in the context of climate change or food security. In order to 
understand how climate change may affect food security, I focused on two crops, one relating to 
accessibility and the other to availability pillars of food security. The main export crop was the crop in 
each country that contributes the most to AgGDP, which I used as a stand-in for access, or the ability for 
people to exchange money or labor for food. The main food crop on the other hand was used as a proxy 
for availability, because its domestic production directly effects consumption. This export-access and 
food crop-availability dichotomy does not exist as clearly in Ukraine as pure subsistence farming is 
infrequent, yet wheat is the crop that is consumed the most domestically, so it is the crop I assessed.  
 
Table 6.3. Key crops and projected effects on their production based on temperature and precipitation 
data from CMIP5. 
Country Crops studied Negative effects of climate change 
Bolivia  Potatoes Too hot 
Soybeans Pests and disease 
Kenya  Maize Changing rainfall patterns 
Tea Ambiguous 
Nepal Cardamom Pests and disease 
Rice Too much water 
Ukraine Sunflower seed Changing rainfall patterns 
Wheat  Ambiguous  
 
Starting with Bolivia, it was determined that potatoes are the most-consumed crop, and soybeans 
are the main export crop. Here, availability will be challenged by temperature, while neither temperature 
nor precipitation will have direct effects on access (pests and disease might pose secondary challenges). 
In Kenya, food availability is also under threat from climate change, as changing rainfall patterns may 
affect maize productivity. The potential impact on tea is more ambiguous, and requires further study. Like 
soybeans in Bolivia, Nepal’s cardamom production might also experience secondary impacts, limiting 
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food access. Rice production may decline because of flooding, jeopardizing food availability. Finally, 
Ukraine’s soybean production may decrease because of changes in rainfall patterns while the effects on 
wheat require more research. All of the case study countries except Ukraine may see their food 
availability decrease under climate change. In order to mitigate these effects, we must be able to trace the 
cause of the decline, and then take appropriate actions in the right part of the country. Comparing Bolivia 
and Nepal, two countries with similar geographical features, reveals why the specific crop and where it is 
grown matters. In Bolivia, potatoes are grown in the highlands, while in Nepal, rice is grown in the 
lowlands. These two food crops serve similar roles in both countries’ food security and food systems, yet 
because of their temperature and precipitation needs, they are grown in different locations and thus face 
different risks from climate change. Bolivia’s climate change policy includes some language on extension 
services, but far less than needed: temperature is something that can be managed with different varieties, 
higher planting locations, and changing planting cycles. While soil conservation is important, having 
good soil will be rendered useless by temperatures that prevent plants from growing. In Nepal, however, 
there needs to be active mitigation of flooding in addition to extension services to help farmers grow 
flood-resistant crops; Nepal’s policies are more comprehensive in this respect, with support for both 
activities. To make effective policy, policymakers should take into account the key crops, where they are 
grown, and the specific climate risks faced by each of them.  
In order to assess the climate change policies, I looked not only at the specific crops discussed 
above, but also at emergency situations. As the introduction details, 2008 was a rupture in the global food 
systems, but overall the system has not changed in significant ways to prevent similar crises. These 
factors are connected to the stability of food security to determine vulnerability, and are useful 
considering that climate change may cause more extreme weather events (IPCC, 2018; Schmidhuber & 
Tubiello, 2007). Here again, context is important: it becomes clear that looking at the 2008 crisis as a 
global crisis ignores many of the domestic factors that contributed to its effects. Two factors are most 
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Table 6.4. Vulnerabilities in agricultural and food security systems as revealed by the 2008 crisis.   











• Political violence 





• Urban poor 
• Export restrictions 
• Safety net (already in 
place) 
• Import tariff removal 
• Subsidized consumer 
products 
• Subsidized farm inputs 









• Urban poor 
• Direct price controls 
• Export restrictions 
• Import tariff removal 
• International assistance 
• Safety net (already in 
place) 
• Subsidized consumer 
products in urban areas 
Nepal • Extreme weather 
events 
• India’s export 




• Political violence  





• Export restrictions 
• Food ration distribution 
• Food for food programs 
• International assistance 








Low • Rural areas in 
the northwest 
• Urban poor 
• Export restrictions  
• Regional price ceilings 
on bread 
• Direct purchasing of 
grain 
 
In all four case studies, local factors contributed to the 2008 crisis, and thus should be targets for 
government intervention under the climate change policy. In Bolivia, Kenya, and Nepal, political 
instability and extreme weather events contributed to creating a national crisis, whereas in Ukraine the 
main domestic source was limited to extreme weather events. What this tells us is that all of these 
countries are vulnerable to the extreme weather events that may increase in frequency and intensity under 
the conditions of climate change. This means that in order to assure food security, stability is a pillar that 
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should be addressed with attention to both adaptation and emergency relief efforts. All of the climate 
change policies in place address extreme weather in the agricultural sector, but similarly to the factors 
affecting production, they do so with various degrees of commitment. Kenya’s policy includes the best 
program to support drought victims, likely because it already struggles with the issue and thus 
policymakers have a better understanding of ways to deal with the problem. 
The 2008 food crisis also allowed me to understand the populations vulnerable to food insecurity 
due to accessibility (decreased purchasing power and physical access due to disasters) and due to 
availability (limited supply). In Ukraine, the crisis was largely one of rising prices, not lack of food 
availability. Thus, those who were hurt most were the already-poor rural and urban groups. In Kenya 
where the crisis was both one of high prices and failed crops, urban people and pastoralists suffered from 
both accessibility and availability. In Nepal, some areas suffered from availability, particularly the 
northwest, while other groups of rural poor suffered because of lack of economic access. In Bolivia, 
indigenous groups in the highlands saw problems with availability and access, while the urban poor 
suffered more from lack of access. This understanding of the geographical distribution of hunger is a 
useful addition to the climate change projections on specific crops, as having enough food in a country 
does not translate to their being enough food in all parts of the country, a phenomenon particularly 
notable and devastating in Nepal.  
In order to tailor responses to food crises no matter what the cause, governments need to 
understand why people are hungry in the first place before they respond. Comprehensive safety nets and 
overall high social spending as in Bolivia can support access, while direct food aid to regions lacking food 
even for purchase as in remote areas of Nepal can help with urgent problems of availability. Making 
social safety nets more robust can help vulnerable populations under both status quo and emergency 
situations, as the negligible effects of the crisis in Bolivia demonstrates. However, with more extreme 
weather events, governments should also consider maintaining more stocks in order to respond to crises 
of availability. When choosing their policy response, especially market interventions, governments should 
consider whether crops are for domestic consumption or export. In Ukraine, the government placed export 
restrictions on vegetable oils despite Ukrainian consumption being low, which therefore had a negative 
impact on income earned and no impact on food security. Domestic contexts should guide not only 
agricultural and climate change policy, but also government’s responses to food insecurity. While the case 
studies do not show that export restrictions are harmful in every situation, countries should be judicious 
about their application and make sure that the products they are targeting are actually those that are eaten 
in the country.  
Each of the case study countries’ policy responds to the particular context to moderately well, yet there is 
no policy that could be held up as a model. Agricultural and climate change policies actively contribute to 
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food security not only through availability of food, but also through the income that they generate for 
farmers and agricultural workers that allows them to purchase food. How to use agricultural and climate 
change policy to support food security, however, depends very much on context. The answer to this 
question provides a defense of the work done in this thesis; that is, in-depth country and context study are 
necessary in order to find solutions to future food security problems. In order to improve these policies, 
policymakers should improve their understanding of the context and history impacting the sectors, and 




There are two primary ways in which actors tend to force states to take action on economic, social and 
cultural rights that having the normative framework in support of the right to food facilitates. First, by 
making food into a right, it creates a normative framework in which people should have food, and when 
they do not, there is someone –a government, a company, another individual- who can be blamed for not 
having food. Second, making adequate food into a right makes it justiciable in a court of law. Having 
food be something that people have the right to provides a framework in which there can be some sort of 
legal claim by those who feel that they have not received adequate food as required by law. By integrating 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ language on the right to adequate 
food into national constitutions, those harmed can bring legal suit against their government and allege a 
human rights violation. What we see in these case studies, however, is that being a state party to ICESCR 
and having the right to food in the constitution does not mean that this right is justiciable in practice. In 
this section, I will first discuss the normative value of the right to food before turning to the issue of 
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Table 6.5. Status of the right to food in the legal systems of the four case study countries.   






Bolivia Article 16: 
“I. Every person has the right to water and 
food.  
II. The State has the obligation to guarantee 
food security, by means of healthy, 
adequate and sufficient food for the entire 
population.” 
209 None.48 
Kenya Article 43(1):  
“Every person has the right: 
(c) to be free from hunger, and to have 
adequate food of acceptable quality.” 
2010 Yes, ruled against the 
plaintiff. Several cases on 
economic, social and cultural 
rights have been successful, 
and judges have expressed a 
willingness to hear more 
cases on the right to food.  
Nepal Article 36:  
“(1) Each citizen shall have the right to 
food. 
(2) Every citizen shall have the right to be 
protected from a state of starvation, 
resulting from lack of food stuffs. 
(3) Every citizen shall have the right to 
food sovereignty as provided for in law.” 
2015 Yes, two cases have been 
decided in favor of the 
plaintiff. Outcomes were the 
provision of food aid and an 
additional push towards 
establishing a food and 
nutrition plan.  
Ukraine Article 48:  
“Everyone shall have the right to a standard 
of living sufficient for themselves and their 
families including adequate nutrition, 
clothing, and housing.” 
1996 None.49 
 
How the right to food is presented in constitutions is highly dependent on the context in which the 
constitution was negotiated. Of the four case studies, Ukraine’s constitutional provision on the right to 
food follows ICESCR’s language most closely for several reasons. Ukraine’s constitution was written by 
a group of legal experts who drew many of the rights in the bill of rights from ICESCR and ICCPR. As 
Ukraine’s constitution was written prior to the World Food Summit and the expanded definition of food 
security that it produced in 1996, there was not a strong international backing for the four pillars of food 
security. As civil society organizations did not have the kind of influence they that they did in other 
																																								 																				
48 Searches into cases in Bolivia’s Constitutional Court did not turn up any results, and there is no evidence in 
secondary sources that there have been cases in Bolivia.  
49 The Constitutional Court only opened up to civilian petition in 2016, so there has not been as much time to allow 
for petitions as in other countries, which might explain the lack of jurisprudence.		
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countries’ negotiation processes, the language in ICESCR was probably as progressive as Ukraine’s 
constitution could have included. In contrast, Kenya’s constitutional provision reflects a battle between 
conservatives and progressives in the negotiation process, with progressives ultimately prevailing in the 
bill of rights. It reflects Article 11(2) of ICESCR in saying that everyone has the right to be free from 
hunger, but qualifies this with wording on supply and quality, reflecting some of the changes in thought 
on hunger since 1996. Similarly, Bolivia’s constitution was negotiated during what could be called a 
culture war between the eastern districts who favored liberal capitalism and the western regions that were 
more committed to Morales’ socialistic policies. Both of these sides appear in the language in the 
constitution, in which the right to food security is guaranteed by the state in the bill of rights, and later on 
the state is to pursue food sovereignty — language that places a higher obligation on the state than the 
other case studies. In Nepal, the article on the right to food violates ICESCR because of its discriminatory 
language excluding non-citizens from having the right, probably to purposefully exclude Indian nationals 
from benefiting. During the constitutional negotiation process in Nepal, the right to food sovereignty was 
vague enough to bring many groups together, serving as a “coalition magnet” (Sharma & Daugbjerg, 
2017). This was particularly important because Nepal had struggled to ratify a constitution after the end 
of its civil war in 2006, so negotiators were willing to be vague in order to create the document. While the 
language was useful in the negotiation process, since then most government documents have instead 
relied upon a food security framing for food and nutrition policies. 
Based on these four examples, it is clear that the situation in which food rights were negotiated 
has consequences for how inhabitants can exercise the right, and who is responsible for fulfilling it. On its 
face, the constitutional right in Bolivia is strongest because the state has the obligation to provide food 
security, while the other three countries’ constitutions do not name the state. In addition, inhabitants have 
the right to food security which means they should have access, availability and proper usage all year-
round. These two factors put the highest burden on the Bolivian state, and explicitly describe what the 
actions the state must take to fulfil the right. Kenya’s constitutional provision is weaker, with only an 
allusion to food security and including the negative right (freedom from hunger) as well as the positive 
(right to food). Ukraine and Nepal are weakest.  The former lacks a specific mandate to the right to food 
and the latter discriminates on who has the right. Civil society had a bigger role to play in Kenya’s 
constitution, and social movements pushed for sovereign rights in Bolivia, so the robust participation of 
civil society members in the constitutional process may explain the stronger language on the right to food 
in those countries.  
In practice, however, the strength of constitutional language does not determine countries’ 
agricultural policies or legal systems. In fact, the country with the strongest agricultural policy framework 
for food security in an era of climate change is Nepal, followed by Kenya and Ukraine.  Surprisingly, 
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Bolivia is weakest. The specific food sovereignty wording had the biggest impact on Bolivia, in which 
policies not only named food sovereignty as a goal (as does Nepal), but also supports smallholder 
production and nutrition as a way to get there. However, this variation could also be attributed to 
Bolivia’s agricultural policy being the only one without international co-authors, giving Bolivia more 
room to choose its own priorities. Thus, while the language in right to food articles in the constitution 
may have effects on states’ rhetoric about food, and the language in the constitution depends on country 
context, these two elements do not appear to have significantly shaped sectoral policy in any of the four 
case study countries.  
Insofar as it creates the international norm that the right to food should be a right, and that 
countries should include it in their domestic legislation, ICESCR is useful. There is no evidence in any of 
these case studies that states took action, whether it be programmatic or legislative, to stem hunger 
specifically because of their obligations under ICESCR, although rulings in Kenya and Nepal’s domestic 
courts do mention ICESCR. Being a party to ICESCR and having to submit reviews that could be 
scrutinized by the international community might have pushed states to begin pursuing food and nutrition 
policies more aggressively, but because this study did not include any non-right to food states, it is 
impossible to make any definite conclusion. A preliminary answer to the question one, then, is that the 
right to food has little effect on government policy, and thus a right to food framework is not helping 
countries prepare for climate change.   
Next, I consider how citizens have pursued the right to food in domestic courts as well as 
international mechanisms as the second avenue in which the right to food law can improve food security. 
Between the four case study countries, there have been three high-level rulings on the right to food 
between 1998 and 2019. The first case from Nepal and the case from Kenya share very similar rulings. 
Looking at the cases on their merits gives some tentative evidence as to when the right to food is most 
successful at addressing hunger. In the first case in Nepal, the plaintiffs alleged chronic mass starvation 
due to government inaction. The courts affirmed the right to food as well as the government’s role in 
fulfilling this right, but determined that the government had been doing its best to improve the situation 
(Chapagai, 2014, p. 100). In Kenya, the case that was brought was about holding fuel companies and the 
government responsible for failing to reduce oil prices that had increased food prices and caused hunger 
(Ngugi, 2012, p. 88). Similar to the first case in Nepal, the judge ruled that while the state did have a 
constitutional obligation to fulfil ESC rights, the actors named in the suit had taken reasonable actions to 
prevent food prices from rising. In the second case in Nepal, the ruling was stronger and provided 
immediate support to those suffering. As the case made its way through the courts, the lower court 
ordered the government to provide emergency rations to prevent the problem from continuing (Chapagai, 
2014, pp. 100–101).  
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Thus, the outcomes in these cases can be traced to whether or not the judge determines the action that 
the government says it has taken is reasonable. In the second case in Nepal, it was probably easier to 
obtain a favorable ruling the situation was one of emergency hunger, not of chronic undernourishment. 
Thus, preliminary results from the cases on the right to food in Kenya and Nepal show that courts may be 
more inclined to force the government’s hand in cases that involve acute hunger rather than chronic 
hunger. It may also be easier for judges to support the right to food in cases in which there is a clear and 
limited solution to the problem, such as providing rations to specific areas in the second case in Nepal. In 
addition, plaintiffs must be able to show that the government has not taken appropriate steps (and it is 
probably easiest if they have taken no steps) to support the right in the specific case of hunger. Another 
avenue that I posit might yield similar favorable results relates to instances in which there is a clear policy 
gap. As Ukraine lacks a food and nutrition plan, right to food advocates could force government action on 
this issue through their new access to the constitutional court.  
This evidence qualifies my conclusion that the right to food is not useful in preparing for climate 
change. Rather, the usefulness of the right to food to those suffering because of climate change will likely 
be determined by the type of hunger they are experiencing. If groups are facing acute hunger because of a 
specific natural disaster like a flood, such as that that took place in Bolivia in 2008, using domestic 
legislation may help provide emergency support to those harmed. However, if production decreases in 
general because of climate change as may happen with corn in Kenya creating more chronic hunger, then 
the right to food will likely be a less useful tool to improving food security.  
We can also learn from Bolivia and Ukraine, which have not had any high court rulings on the right 
to food, about potential barriers to justice on right to food issues. In Ukraine, until recently it was unclear 
how one would seek recourse in domestic courts due to the limitations on who could bring cases on 
constitutional issues. By including the right to food in the constitution, but blocking access to the courts, 
countries can dampen the right to food. In Bolivia, it appears while there is no institutionalized barrier to 
pursuing legal action, corruption, physical inaccessibility for rural people, and long wait times 
disincentivize Bolivians from using the justice system in general. Based on these limited examples, it 
becomes clear that there can be many barriers to making the right to food justiciable. For those working to 
improve the right to food, attention to overall problems within the legal system will have to be addressed 
in tandem with advancing food security.   
This study can also shed some light on the usefulness of international mechanisms of right to food 
justice, particularly the 2013 Optional Protocol to ICESCR (OP-ICESCR) adopted by Bolivia. The OP-
ICESCR is important theoretically because it brings ICESCR up to speed with the ICPPR and creates an 
international individual complaint mechanism for individuals who allege their ESC rights have been 
violated and have exhausted domestic legal systems. As Bolivia has not been involved in any proceeding 
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(individual complaint, inquiry mechanism, or inter-state complaint) under OP-ICESCR, determining 
what, if any impact it has had is impossible. Examining legal action in other countries that have ratified 
OP-ICESCR show some interesting trends. In total, there have been 21 cases, none of which focused on 
food security.  The majority were housing claims against Spain. Of the 21 cases that the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reviewed since the Optional Protocol’s entry into force, only five 
were deemed admissible, and of these five, in four cases the committee supported the plaintiff. Because 
there are so few cases so far, it is difficult to know whether the cases deemed inadmissible were truly 
flawed cases, or whether this is a structural problem within the Optional Protocol that favors the state. 
The most useful part of the rulings are the general suggestions that the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR) makes such as x, y, and z[WC1]. Research into states’ response to these 
rulings is a further avenue of research that may help illuminate the consequences of enforcing OP-
ICESCR. Not having any cases so far on the right to food despite evidence from Bolivia that there could 
be such cases, however, may point to difficulties in bringing such cases to the Committee. As 
complainants need to show that they have exhausted all avenues of recourse in the domestic legal system, 
countries like Bolivia and Ukraine with poor access to the judiciary or poor enforcement of rulings might 
have their cases deemed inadmissible by CESCR despite violations.  
The role of right to adequate food as a constitutionally or otherwise domestically recognized right 
does not exclude developed countries, as they still have food insecure populations. Those living in food 
deserts in the United States might be better able to find solutions within the domestic legal system if the 
United States recognized the right to food as a fundamental right. Right to food advocates in both 
developed and developing countries should continue to bring cases through their domestic legal systems 
as well as to the OP-ICESCR. The only way that the OP-ICESCR will prove its usefulness to advancing 
the right to food is through cases being brought to the CESCR for adjudication. As it stands, the right to 
food on the international level is only useful in creating a normative framework for the right to food and 
providing countries with inspiration to include articles in their domestic legislation on this right. In order 
for international right to food law to fulfil its promises as a right that is justiciable, cases need to be 




After spending much time analyzing the ways that agricultural and climate change policy as well as the 
right to food can be used to improve food security now and in the future, I can offer some policy guidance 
on the topic. I will first reiterate the country-specific policy recommendations from the case studies, and 
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then I will offer some guidelines for both policymakers and right to food advocates to consider in their 
work on food security.  
POLICY	RECOMMENDATIONS	FOR	BOLIVIA		
• Right to food activists should try to bring cases on the right to food before the constitutional court 
and OP-ICESCR complaint mechanism. While setting jurisprudence in the other case study 
countries for the right to food is defensible in and of itself, in Bolivia court cases could push the 
government and Consejo Nacional de Alimentación y Nutrición to implement a food and 
nutrition security action plan, thus creating an implementation document for food security or food 
sovereignty. There is a clear policy gap, and having a concrete goal could help guide litigation. In 
addition, such a plan would help not just those bringing the case, but the entire population.  
• Bolivia should consider investing in extension services and infrastructure. One advantage that 
Bolivian farmers have is the wide range of varieties of potatoes that they grow (Theisen, 2009). 
This variety means that some are better suited to different temperatures and precipitation, and 
there is genetic diversity that can decrease disease prevalence. In order to ensure that the right 
varieties get into the hands of the farmers who need them, and that they know how to properly 
grow the varieties, strong extension services must bring the knowledge directly to the farmers 
who need it. This is particularly important for food availability as a way to maintain production 
under changing climatic conditions, and also food access, as many of the rural poor live in potato 
growing areas and rely on farming for their livelihoods. Based on the sectoral agricultural plan as 
well as projections for climate change’s impact on key crops, it becomes clear that Bolivia will 
likely have to continue to import food in the future. To make sure that it can be imported 
efficiently, transportation infrastructure should be improved.  
• Bolivia should continue to limit soybean cultivation area, and enforce these limits. Soybeans, 
while the country’s top export crop, only indirectly support food security because there is strong 
international control of the lowlands agricultural lands by foreigners. Soybean production 
contributes little to food security in Boivia. Although it is impossible to assess how much of 
profits earned by foreigners is reinvested into the local economy, there are some signs that most 
money leaves the country (Urioste 2012, 452–53). While there may be some job creation, as a 
poor and net food importing country, Bolivia needs to put more thought into expanding 
agricultural production for human consumption.  One way to do this is to more strictly designate 
land upon which oilseed crops can grow and upon which food must be grown.  
• Bolivia should formulate an updated Multisectoral Zero Hunger Program and climate change plan 
of action. Bolivia is lagging behind the other case studies in terms of its implementation of 
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specific programs to increase food security and climate change resilience. While it has legislation 
to support the right to food, it lacks many of the supporting and sectoral-level documents that 
would make the step between law and practice. Two key documents missing are an overarching 
nutrition program (which Ukraine is also missing) and a climate change plan of action. Bolivia 
also has not submitted a National Adaptation Programme of Action, which limits its ability to 
receive international funding for climate change adaptation. 
 
POLICY	RECOMMENDATIONS	FOR	KENYA	
• Kenya should put into place a domestic food security steering organization. Kenya has good 
policy and strategies. However, there are a number of different policies and agencies tasked with 
implementing them. A central planning organization should be created to make these policies 
cohesive and streamline efforts. Part of the reason why agencies are involved is because of a 
policy of devolution.  The Kenya Food Security Steering Group is useful because of the 
international experts that are involved, but a fully domestic coordination unit will increase 
ownership and help ensure implementation.  
• The government should invest heavily in irrigation and water collection systems for drought 
management. The country in general and ASAL regions in specific already suffer food insecurity 
because of droughts. As rainfall patterns shift with climate change, managing both floods and 
droughts will be of utmost importance. The insurance program for agricultural crops should be 
expanded for livestock as part of the drought management strategy in that region so that 
households do not lose everything if their livestock die. Kenya has untapped ground water, and at 
times experiences floods, so harnessing water from both sources and storing flood waters for drier 
times can help crops and livestock flourish.  
• Kenya should consider expanding and scaling up its Urban Food Subsidy Cash Transfer Program. 
Urban areas respond better to non-food aid because there usually is food available but the urban 
poor lack the funds to purchase it (Hickey, Pelletier, Brownhill, Kamau, & Maina, 2012, p. 337). 
As the urban poor were one of the two groups hit hardest by the 2008 crisis, ensuring that there is 
a specific and robust food and nutrition safety net will help this group not only during times of 
crisis but all year-round. Emergency aid is better suited for the arid- and semi-arid regions, 
because the area has little development and low ability to grow its own food. 
• Right to food advocates should file more cases concerning Article 43 and the right to food. While 
in the 2012 ruling, the judge ruled against the plaintiff because of the reasonableness standard 
embedded in the constitution, the judge himself has had an about-face on ESC rights. This gives 
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an opening for cases to be tried and won supporting the right to food. Because generally the 
policy is good and implementation is lacking, such action should not attempt to force through 
legislation like in Ukraine, but rather establish jurisprudence particularly for action in emergency 
situations. 
POLICY	RECOMMENDATIONS	FOR	NEPAL		
• Nepal should implement more agricultural development programs targeted at those in the 
northeast of the country. Most of Nepal’s hungry people live generally in the north, and more 
specifically in the northwest of the country. While these districts receive moderate attention under 
the ADS, there is much work to be done to support the region’s agricultural development. These 
services should aim to increase yields and production overall, making remote areas less 
vulnerable to food security.   
• The government should make flood control its top priority. The CMIP5 model ensemble mean 
projects that there will be more precipitation in the summer months, causing floods. In 2008, 
flooding in the Tarai decreased rice production and increased hunger. The two key ways that the 
government should do this is through research into rice varieties and support to get services to 
smallholders, and also supporting water management systems at the community level. As there is 
already significant language on the former strategy in the ADS and the NAPA, the government 
should focus on providing support to communities for the latter method, instead of leaving most 
of the funding sources up to the private sector. In addition, Nepal should increase the funds it has 
earmarked for disaster relief in order to better prepare for emergency situations than it has in the 
past.  
• Nepal should invest in infrastructure to increase access to remote rural areas. While increased 
production through the measures in the first policy recommendation is important for long-term 
food security, it is important that these areas also have access to social services and that they are 
accessible in most emergency situations. Creating road systems may have high upfront costs, but 
they will help goods reach remote areas, not only boosting the local economy through trade but 
also decreasing the amount of costly aid operations needed for these areas. In addition, providing 
transportation infrastructure will allow farmers to market their products outside of their 
immediate villages, thus helping them expand their market access and earn more income.  
• Nepal should strengthen access to food through special feeding programs and social safety nets. 
Much of the content of the Agriculture Development Strategy and the Food and Nutrition 
Security Plan focuses on increasing production, to the detriment of the access or usage pillars of 
food security. To this end, the government should fill this gap by implementing specific feeding 
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programs in schools and for other vulnerable groups. In addition, Nepal should work to increase 
its per capita spending on social safety nets to ensure that support is not limited to those in the 
formal sector or the young or old. Promoting insurance schemes, as the ADS says it will do, is not 
enough to support Nepal’s many hungry people. The government should take an active role in 
agricultural insurance schemes as well as the provision of cash transfers.  
 
POLICY	RECOMMENDATIONS	FOR	UKRAINE	
• Policymakers should put a comprehensive food and nutrition strategy, including a steering group, 
into place. Out of the four case study countries, Ukraine is the only one without a specific 
government policy or strategy on food security. Like in Kenya, there are a multitude of agencies 
and ministries with responsibility for some aspects of food security. The Single and 
Comprehensive Strategy envisions the creation of a food security committee, which could also be 
in charge of the food and nutrition policy, but the former needs to be implemented. Having a 
specific agency tasked with food security oversight and coordination would have two benefits: 
one, it would improve implementation by creating clear chains of command and oversight, and 
two, it would harmonize action across sectors to ensure that there is no duplication or 
undermining of efforts. Having a comprehensive plan in place would help Ukraine prepare for 
emergencies, while also providing day to day support to those struggling with food access.  
• Ukraine should consider creating specific legislation on climate change and agriculture. Its 
climate change policies at the moment focus on environmental protection and mitigation rather 
than on adaptation, leaving a policy gap. Rebooting the state agricultural insurance program is a 
good step toward adaptation, but research and extension services should also focus on getting 
more resilient crop varieties and climate change information to farmers.  
• Ukraine might consider adding a nutrition program to its constitutionally guaranteed social safety 
net. Such a program is proposed under the Single and Comprehensive Agricultural Strategy, yet 
its implementation is lacking as the country has been focusing on emergency food aid to conflict 
regions. In addition, safety nets will be more useful to Ukraine in crisis as it adopts more 
restrictions on the policy responses it can take toward rising food prices. In 2008, it used a 
number of export restrictions to keep food in the country, but under the WTO and as a future 
member of the EU, these measures will be less politically feasible.  
• Ukraine should invest in key infrastructure projects. The agriculture sector currently loses out on 
profit from transportation costs, so better infrastructure could help increase the incomes from 
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agricultural exports. In addition, irrigation and other water management projects are worthy 
investments in the face of climate change, as water may limit sunflowers and other crops as well.  
• Food security advocates should consider filing cases on the right to food issue. Since Ukraine’s 
constitutional court opened up in 2016, there is the opportunity for individuals and civil society at 
large to try to encourage Ukraine to put into place both the food-oriented social safety net 
outlined in the SCS and a food and nutrition plan, as well as implement higher wages for 
agricultural and other rural works through the courts. Because Ukraine is spending so much of its 
human and capital resources on the conflict with Russia, advocates may have a better shot as 
showing that the government’s actions are not reasonable and there has been a violation of the 
constitution.  
GENERAL	POLICY	RECOMMENDATIONS	
Here, I outline some general guidelines for policymakers who want to improve the right to food in their 
country through agricultural policy:  
• If land rights are a flash point, there needs to be policy put into place that reflects understanding 
of historical inequalities.  
• Policymakers should be sensitive to the issue characteristics of any given problem, and try to 
understand its origin before putting policy into place. 
• Taking into account who farms what and where will help policies be responsive to farmers’ needs 
as well as to climate change.  
• Determine who is vulnerable to food insecurity, and whether they face seasonal, chronic, or acute 
hunger. Apply policies accordingly.  
• Social safety nets and food and nutrition policies that improve access should be included 
alongside efforts to increase productivity.  
•  For climate change, early warning systems on natural disasters, agricultural research and 
extension services, as well as agricultural insurance can support both farmers and consumers. 
 In order to answer question three, I relied upon the results of question two which pointed to the 
importance of context in creating better policy. The case study country policy recommendations directly 
reflect my research into the factors necessary to improve food security; however, there general 
policymaker guidelines reflect the bigger takeaways about factors that are important to consider when 
formulating agricultural and climate change policy. Policymakers in Bolivia, Kenya, Nepal, and Ukraine 
should first learn more about the agricultural system, and then they should create policies that correct past 
policies or fill policy gaps on key challenges.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
	 206	
FUTURE	RESEARCH	DIRECTIONS	
While this thesis has already gone on for some 200 pages, it could have been at least four times the length 
given all of the questions remaining. The findings on the conditions in which the right to food is more 
likely to be upheld in court and create useful support to those suffering is still very much in its infancy. 
More research is needed to determine whether acute hunger and policy gaps are the conditions that have 
led to rulings in favor of the plaintiffs in other countries. There are many outstanding questions about OP-
ICESCR, including under what conditions countries adhere to the guidance of the rulings and whether it 
creates a useful mechanism to improving the right to food. We know that generally Nepal’s agricultural 
and climate change policies are the strongest of the four, but we do not know what about the policies’ 
creation made it so. Were there important stakeholder negotiations? Were the international experts that 
helped particularly gifted? Did Nepal’s policymakers have a better understanding of the issues than those 
in other countries? The answers to these questions has important connections to the conclusion in this 
thesis about the importance of context to good policy, as it would help us better create the conditions that 
will produce the best policy.  
CONCLUSION	
To conclude, I summarize the main findings from this thesis. First, the human right to food is more useful 
in creating the normative framework in which food insecurity becomes a state failure rather than an 
individual failing. The influence of ICESCR’s text on national constitutions depends on the circumstances 
in which the constitution was negotiated, meaning that the constitutionally guaranteed right to food 
depends more on the country context than it does on ICESCR itself. Agricultural and climate change 
policies as well as courts’ willingness to create jurisprudence on the right to food do not appear to be 
clearly connected to the specific constitutional language on this right. The right to food is more justiciable 
in cases of acute hunger and where there is a policy gap, although there needs to be more research to 
determine whether this preliminary finding holds across countries. General barriers to justice limit 
peoples’ ability to seek recourse from the courts in right to food cases; OP-ICESCR has not had any right 
to food cases, suggesting that there are high barriers here as well.   
 Thus, while right to food law may be helpful in cases of acute hunger and gross government 
neglect, agricultural and climate change policies as well as food and nutrition plans do more to fight food 
insecurity on a daily basis. In order for policymakers to make robust policy, they must know not only how 
the policy process works in their country, but also the deep historical drivers of current problems. Land 
rights is an essential area that needs attention for good policy, although what land policy should look like 
depends on the specific country. Policymakers need to know what the key problems facing agriculture 
are, as well as the ways they have been addressed in the past and the root of the problem. Understanding 
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who grows what and where will help target climate change action and agricultural policy interventions. 
Key crops effecting availability and accessibility should receive support to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change. In addition, policymakers should understand who makes up the populations vulnerable to 
disasters, as well as soft points in the system that could lead to acute hunger. As the projections on the 
effects of climate change become dire as we fail to take strong action to curb greenhouse gas emissions, 
policymakers and governments cannot afford to wait to act to improve agricultural and climate change 
policies.  
 This thesis spent much time investigating in detail the policy and context relevant to each case 
study. This approach, although initially time consuming, can help strengthen agricultural policy and, 
ultimately, prevent chronic hunger. While applying templates to improve agricultural policy is useful to 
an extent, climate change projections show that “to an extent” will likely not be good enough to prevent 
rising hunger in the future. In the right to food, in climate change and agricultural policies, and in 
emergency responses, context matters, and should serve as a guiding principle for all of those working to 
prevent hunger worldwide.  
BIBLIOGRAPHY	
Atwood, D. A. (1990). Land registration in Africa: The impact on agricultural production. World 
Development, 18(5), 659–671. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90016-Q 
Chapagai, R. P. (2014). Review of the legislative framework and jurisprudence concerning the right to 
adequate food in Nepal. Retrieved from https://hrbaportal.org/wp-
content/files/RevLegFrameworkNepal_en_v10-3.pdf 
Hickey, G. M., Pelletier, B., Brownhill, L., Kamau, G. M., & Maina, I. N. (2012). Preface: Challenges 
and opportunities for enhancing food security in Kenya. Food Security, 4(3), 333–340. 
IPCC. (2018). Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse 
gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of 
climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. (p. 32). Retrieved 
from World Meteorological Organization website: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ 
Ngugi, M. Petition 88 of 2011. , (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi May 10, 2012). 
Rapsomanikis, G. (2015). Economic lives of smallholder farmers. Rome: FAO. 
Schmidhuber, J., & Tubiello, F. N. (2007). Global food security under climate change. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 104(50), 19703–19708. 
Schultz, R. (2015, March). Number of small farms in Wisconsin continues to drop. Wisconsin State 
Journal. Retrieved from https://madison.com/wsj/business/number-of-small-farms-in-wisconsin-
continues-to-drop/article_2760181d-ae69-517f-b5e2-d1871dd823fe.html 
Sharma, P., & Daugbjerg, C. (2017). Food Sovereignty as a Coalition Magnet. Uncovering Politics in 
Public Policies for Agriculture and Food. Presented at the 3rd International Conference on Public 
Policy. 
Theisen, K. (2009). Bolivia: Centro Internaciónal de la Papa. Retrieved from 
https://research.cip.cgiar.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=13193 
 
 
